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INTRODUCTION
New law students often experience a kind of culture shock. A bit of
this shock comes from the flurry of unfamiliar words and phrases that
students confront in most every class-assumpsit, bill of attainder,
demurrer, easement, ex post facto law, seisin, trover. Another share
comes from seeing more familiar words used in new ways-bond,
consideration, covenant, release, servitude. Law professors tell
students, especially in those rocky first few weeks of first year classes,
to "look it up!" Look it up in Black's Law Dictionary, or Bouvier's Law
Dictionary... just look it up.'
Law professors thus follow the tradition of teachers generally, who
help students fully join a language community by urging them to
consult an exhaustively researched, carefully constructed repository
of the range of ordinary meanings of words in that community-in
other words, a dictionary. And in this exchange both teachers and
students reflect and reinforce the "reverence for dictionaries" that is
1. For an engaging account of Bouvier's decline and Black's ubiquity, see Mary
Whisner, Bouvier's, Black's, and Tinkerbell, 92 LAW LIBR.J. 99 (2000).
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"deeply embedded in our culture., 2 Indeed, dictionaries can be
powerful symbols of cultural accomplishment and belonging.
Consider, for example, the ad copy that accompanied the 1961
launch of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, still one of the
leading unabridged dictionaries of the English language: "Hold the
English language in your two hands," embodied by a copy of Webster's
Third, "and you possess the proven key to knowledge, enjoyment, and
success! "
If judicial behavior is any indication, dictionary formulations of
ordinary meanings not only mark common ground in a language
community, they also play a prominent role in officially stated
justifications for legal judgments. The U.S. Supreme Court, setting
the tone for the national judiciary, continues to quote extensively
from both law dictionaries and general purpose English language
dictionaries in its opinions. In the October 2003 Term, for example,
seven majority opinions (9.6%) from among the Court's seventy-. • 4
three cases with full opinions use one or more dictionaries to justify
the chosen construction of a disputed statute,' constitutional
provision, 6 or other binding legal text.7 Nor is the October 2003
2. Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 50 (1993).
Professor Solan, a law professor with a Ph.D. in linguistics and the author of The
Language of Judges (1993), is currently the Director of the Center for the Study of
Law, Language and Cognition at Brooklyn Law School. See also SIDNEY I. LANDAU,
DICTIONARIES: THE ART & CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 6 (2d ed. 2001). "Dictionary is a
powerful word. Authors and publishers have found that if they call a reference book
a dictionary it tends to sell better than it would if called by another name because the
word suggests authority, scholarship, and precision." Id.
3. HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER'S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE'S
CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARYAND ITS CRITICS 215 (1994) (facing page). The ad itself is
reproduced infra in App. A.
4. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 5, 2004, at Al ("The court decided 73 cases with full opinions during the
term.").
5. See Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 n.3 (2004) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) in support of its construction of the term "assessment" in
the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341);Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S.
Ct. 1836, 1845 & nn.15-16 (2004) (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed.
2000), BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968), and OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1989) in support of its construction of "arising under" in the federal catchall
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761 (2004) (citing WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1945) in support of its construction of the term
"standard" in the Clean Air Act's pre-emption provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a));
United States v. Galletti, 124 S. Ct. 1548, 1553 (2004) (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
(7th ed. 1999) in support of its construction of the term "assessment" in § 6502 of
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6502).
6. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (citing NOAH
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), in support of
its construction of "witnesses" in the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, U.S.
CONST. amend. VI).
7. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 1226 & n.6 (2004) (citing
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Term unusual on this score. Over the past twenty years, the Supreme
Court has increasingly relied on dictionaries to explain its
constructions of legal text.8 The federal judiciary, as a whole, has also
cited both general purpose and law dictionaries more frequently in
recent years.9
It should come as little surprise, then, that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit"), which hears all
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990), and WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1999) in support of
its construction of "accident" in the Warsaw Convention on injuries sustained during
international air travel); Virginia v. Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 598, 603 & n.2 (2003) (using
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) to define "low-water mark" in applying an
1877 arbitrators' decision to a present-day riparian rights dispute between Virginia
and Maryland).
8. The first two empirical studies of the phenomenon are Solan, supra note 2, at
51 (reporting data on Supreme Court citations to dictionaries from 1986 to 1991),
and Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries in Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437,
1438-40 (1994) (reporting data on Supreme Court citations to dictionaries from
1958 to 1992). The most comprehensive study of the Supreme Court's reliance on
dictionaries, which covers the entire body of the Court's opinions through the 1997-
98 term, is the magisterial Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon
Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L.
REV. 227 (1999) [hereinafter Lexicon Fortress]. In this study, Thumma & Kirchmeier
observed that, "at the Court's present rate, the decade of the 1990s will give rise to
nearly half of all the opinions in the Court's two-century history where a Justice has
relied on a dictionary." Id. at 260 (emphasis in original). In an update to their
study, they report that their "predictions [in 1999] were correct: the 1990s alone
accounted for nearly half of all the opinions in Supreme Court history in which the
Court relied on a dictionary." Samuel A. Thumma &Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon
Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 52 (2001) (emphasis in original).
9. For example, using the search term (dictionary /6 ("webster's" or "american
heritage" or "random house" or college or collegiate or concise or unabridged or
oxford)) in Westlaw's allfeds database, one observes the following total number of
"hits" annually over the last decade (reflecting a 37.2% increase from 1994 to 2003):
YEAR NUMBER OF "HITS" YEAR NUMBER OF "HITS"
1994 537 1999 638
1995 519 2000 610
1996 565 2001 662
1997 636 2002 718
1998 628 2003 737
In addition, using the search term ("black's law dictionary" or "bouvier's law
dictionary" or "ballentine's law dictionary") in Westlaw's allfeds database, one
observes the following total number of "hits" annually over the last decade
(reflecting a 32.2% increase from 1994 to 2003):
YEAR NUMBER OF "HITS" YEAR NUMBER OF "HITS"
1994 515 1999 603
1995 559 2000 643
1996 517 2001 694
1997 602 2002 691
1998 549 2003 681
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appeals arising under the U.S. patent laws,10 has also turned
increasingly to dictionaries when explaining its constructions of
disputed terms in patent claims. Court reliance on dictionaries to
construe disputed patent claim terms is, to be sure, nothing new.
The regional circuit courts of appeal heard patent infringement
appeals until the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982." The Court of
Customs & Patent Appeals heard appeals from Patent Office
12
proceedings on patent applications until the Federal Circuit's
creation in 1982.13 These courts, from time to time, expressly used
dictionaries and similar reference sources to construe disputed claim
terms.'4 And the Federal Circuit itself, before a key turning point in
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2002).
11. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982) (codified as amended in Title 28, U.S.C.) (establishing a United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). For a definitive study of the Federal Circuit's
early years, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
12. The agency is formally called the "United States Patent and Trademark
Office." 35 U.S.C. § 1 (a) (2002). This Article focuses on patent law questions and
thus, as is common in the literature, refers to the agency simply as the "Patent
Office." See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 & n.1 (2002) (using the term "Patent Office" instead of
other acronyms to refer to patent activities of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2216-17 (2000) (describing the rise of
Patent Office operations in the twentieth century).
13. See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 3-5 & n.9 (commentating on the creation of the
Federal Circuit to allow for specialization and to reduce incoherence and
differentiation between the circuits).
14. We found twelve such regional circuit cases spanning the oeriod from 1900
to 1982: Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 646 F.2d 1201, 1206, 1209, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 337,
341, 344, (7th Cir. 1981); Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297, 187
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1975): Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 489 F.2d 1105, 1110, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1973);
Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 413 F.2d 89, 92, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449. 451
(8th Cir. 1969); Schmidinger v. Welsh, 383 F.2d 455, 463, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289.
296 (3d Cir. 1967); Gomez v. Granat Bros., 177 F.2d 266, 268, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
197, 198 (9th Cir. 1949); Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6,
58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504. 508 (7th Cir. 1943); Cabot v. J.M. Huber Corp., 127 F.2d
805, 807, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 442, 443 (5th Cir. 1942); Dernell Potato Prods. v.
Snelling, 38 F.2d 788, 789, 4 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 193, 194 (2d Cir. 1930); I.T.S. Rubber
Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., 260 F. 934, 938, 171 C.C.A. 576 (1st Cir. 1919); Frey
v. Marvel Auto Supply Co., 236 F. 916, 920, 150 C.C.A. 178 (6th Cir. 1916); Am. Can
Co. v. Hickmott Asparagus Canning Co., 142 F. 141, 145, 73 C.C.A. 359 (9th Cir.
1905).
We found eleven such cases from the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals before
1982. See In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 1226, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 667 (C.C.P.A.
1975); In re Skoll, 523 F.2d 1392, 1395-96, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 483 (C.C.P.A.
1975); In re Altenpohl, 500 F.2d 1151, 1157 & n.7, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 38, 45
(C.C.P.A. 1974); In re McCue, 475 F.2d 1200, 1203, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393, 395
(C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Wakefield, 422 F.2d 897, 902-03, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 636, 640
(C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Markert, 396 F.2d 477, 480, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 39, 41-42
(C.C.P.A. 1968); Liebscher v. Boothroyd, 258 F.2d 948, 951 & n.2, 119 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 133, 136 & n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1958); In re Gabrielsen, 213 F.2d 545, 546, 102
20051
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1995, expressly relied on dictionaries in explaining some of its claim
construction rulings. 15 As the data presented in this study show,
however, the last nine years have seen more than a ten-fold increase
in the number of times per year that the Federal Circuit, in its
majority opinions, expressly relies on publicly available reference
16
sources such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, and learned treatises -
compressed, for the remainder of this Article, to the more handy tag
"dictionaries." The Federal Circuit, recognizing some of the
questions raised by its increasing reliance on dictionaries, granted en
banc review in a claim construction case in late July 2004.17 The court
requested briefing on, among other things, the question whether
"the public notice function of patent claims [is] better served by
refer[r]ing primarily to technical and general purpose dictionaries
and similar sources to interpret a claim term," or rather "by looking
primarily to the patentee's use of the term in the specification" of the
patent. 8
The Federal Circuit's turn to dictionaries is a key part of the court's
ongoing effort to set out a predictable method for establishing the
scope of a patent owner's right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or importing the invention established in the patent-the
right that is the heart of every patent. 19 This effort began in 1995 with
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 121 (C.C.P.A. 1954); In re Tamarin, 187 F.2d 160, 162, 88
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490, 492 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Ripper, 171 F.2d 297, 299, 80
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 96, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1948); In re Curley, 158 F.2d 300, 304, 72 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 116, 118-19 (C.C.P.A. 1946). In addition, we found two such cases in appeals
from Patent Office proceedings that were taken to what is now the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Chapman v. Beede, 296 F. 956, 959-60 (D.C. Cir.
1924); Swain v. Booth, 295 F. 236, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
To put in context the total number of such pre-Federal Circuit cases that we have
found-twenty-five, or about one every three and one quarter years-consider that
the Federal Circuit has issued twenty-three or more such opinions every year since
2000. See infta Tbl. 4.
15. See, e.g., Nike Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 647, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't. Stores
Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1561 & n.2, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1227 & n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 & n.5, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1666, 1670 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 951 &
n.8, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1938 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In reWright, 999 F.2d
1557, 1562 & n.6, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510, 1513 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Miles
Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 876, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1035, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate,
Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1571, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1137, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
16. See infra Tbl. 4.
17. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (en banc order).
18. id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766. The court posed a total of seven
questions, many of them compound, for additional briefing. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1766.
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2002) (providing that one who "without authority
[Vol. 54:829
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the court's decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, 1 where the
court, en banc, held that it is for judges-not juries-to construe
disputed terms in patents and thereby define patent rights. 2' Because
claim construction disputes frame nearly every issue in a patent
infringement dispute, from the question whether the accused
infringer has practiced the claimed invention to whether the patent
was validly issued to begin with,22 most post-Markman Federal Circuit
opinions in patent cases contribute to the court's claim construction
jurisprudence. Systematic empirical study of the substance of this
jurisprudence-of the public explanations that the Federal Circuit
provides for the claim construction decisions it makes-is necessary
to understand fully the scope, and thus the value, that patents
generally possess. There is, however, almost no such systematic
empirical study of the Federal Circuit's substantive claim construction
case law.
This Article helps to close that gap, presenting the first systematic
empirical study of the Federal Circuit's use of dictionaries to help
construe the scope of disputed patent rights. Specifically, we present
both (a) top-level counts of yearly total dictionary citations in Federal
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefore, infringes the patent"); 35 U.S.C. § 281 ("A patentee shall have remedy by
civil action for infringement of his patent."). As Chief Justice Taney long ago
observed, "The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to
exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without the
permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent." Bloomer v.
McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
20. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
21. Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. A year later, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Federal Circuit's allocation of claim construction authority to judges.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) ("We hold that the
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within
the province of the court.").
22. See Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1027, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The first step in any invalidity or infringement
analysis is claim construction."). As Professor Wagner and Mr. Petherbridge note in
their recent empirical study of Federal Circuit claim construction methodology,
"Though the precise magnitude of its role is a matter of considerable debate, it is
clear that claim construction plays a major-and perhaps the major-role in patent
infringement litigation." R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1119
(2004) (footnote omitted); see a/soJANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT
LAW 8 (2003) ("The interpretation and scope of the claims will be the focal point of
any litigation involving the patent. The language of the claims is scrutinized
intensely in analyzing both the validity of the patent and whether it has been
infringed.").
23. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 22, at 1110-11 & n.16, 1127 & n.83
(discussing the outcome-based methodology used in nearly all empirical studies of
the Federal Circuit). Indeed, the Wagner & Petherbridge study is the first systematic
empirical study of the substance of the Federal Circuit's claim construction
methodology. See id. at 1110-11.
2005]
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Circuit and district court patent cases for the last decade, and
(b) detailed data from a review of all Federal Circuit opinions,
precedential and nonprecedential, from April 5, 1995 (the date of
the court's Markman decision) to June 30, 2004, in which the majority
opinion for the court expressly relied on one or more dictionaries to
help construe a word in a disputed patent claim. The dataset from
this detailed review, a copy of which we provide as Appendix C to this
Article, identifies all the cases reporting such dictionary use, the
specific sources the court used, the words it defined, and the judges
who authored each of the opinions in the study.
This Article also takes the next step that the data suggest,
presenting the normative case for integrating the choice of preferred
reference sources into the patent application and examination
process at the Patent Office. Starting from the Federal Circuit's
stated reasons for relying on dictionaries, which focus on the need
for neutral reference materials that can ground predictable claim
scope analysis, we show that the court's desiderata cannot likely be
achieved so long as courts remain effectively free, as they are now, to
choose whatever dictionaries they favor after litigation has already
2 4
begun. We further show that the Patent Office can and should use
its power to regulate patent examination proceedings to mandate
that all patent applicants identify the general purpose and technical
dictionaries to which parties should refer when construing the words
in their patent claims, and that the dictionaries so identified be listed
on the face of any resulting issued patent. Indeed, only the Patent
Office, a key player in the multi-institutional framework that is our
24. Our normative goal is not to show that the Federal Circuit's reliance on
dictionaries to establish ordinary meaning is sound, but is rather to show how, given
the commitment to rely on dictionaries for this purpose, one can make the use of
dictionaries more neutral and predictable for all parties. The existing literature on
the deeper normative question-is it sound to use dictionaries to help establish a
word's ordinary meaning?-is substantial. The interested reader should consult, in
addition to the works cited already, supra note 8, the following sources: Ellen P.
Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
275 (1998); Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J.
1561 (1994); Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the
Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (2002-
2003); Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning: Law Dictionaries and the Liberal
Tradition of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 257 (2000); Aaron J. Rynd, Dictionaries
and the Interpretation of Words: A Summary ofDifficulties, 29 ALBERTA L. REV. 712 (1991);
and Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory
Cases, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 235.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2002) (giving the Patent Office the power to
'establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which.., shall govern the conduct
of proceedings in the Office").
[Vol. 54:829
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patent system,26 is well-placed to bring about the predictable and
neutral deployment of dictionaries that the Federal Circuit envisions.
Part I begins with the top-level data about the rate at which the
Federal Circuit and the district courts cite dictionaries when
construing patent claim terms. Then, as a bridge to the data
resulting from detailed case review, Part I examines the Federal
Circuit's evolving rationale for using dictionaries in the claim
construction process-a rationale reflected in a small number of
milestone decisions in the post-Markman era. In these cases, the
Federal Circuit moves from a largely expertise-based rationale for
dictionaries (according to which one might predict more frequent
reliance on technical or specialized sources than on general purpose
English language dictionaries) to a neutrality-based rationale
(according to which one might predict no greater reliance on
specialized than on general purpose sources). Finally, Part I provides
a detailed assessment of every occasion, from its April 1995 decision
in Markman to the end of June 2004, that the Federal Circuit has
reported relying on a dictionary or similar source to construe the
meaning of a word in a patent claim. The data show, among other
things, that the neutrality-based rationale more accurately reflects the
court's actual dictionary citation behavior.
Part II explores existing constraints on a court's choice of
dictionary for use in claim construction. At present, the constraints
are minimal. Indeed, in the milestone Telegenix case, the Federal
Circuit emphasizes the absence of such constraints as an apparent
boon for the courts.27  Our discussion reveals, however, that the
courts' unfettered discretion to choose whatever dictionaries they
may favor during the litigation process threatens to undermine the
Federal Circuit's professed goals of greater neutrality and
predictability in claim construction. Part II closes with a
demonstration that this unfettered discretion presents a real
jurisprudential and institutional problem. It analyzes three recent
cases where dictionary selection had a palpable effect on the claim
construction outcome.
26. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach
to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1036-40 (2003) (discussing the need
for patent reforms that consider all patent system actors, including the Federal
Circuit, the Patent Office, the federal trial courts, and the Supreme Court).
27. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-04, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1818-20 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("As resources and references to
inform and aid courts and judges in the understanding of technology and
terminology, it is entirely appropriate for both trial and appellate judges to consult these
materials at any stage of a litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in
evidence or not.") (emphasis added).
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Part III proposes a new approach to choosing dictionaries for claim
construction-an approach that preserves the neutrality of these
sources by eliminating the apparent arbitrariness that now attends
their selection by the courts. The key to this approach is to place
dictionary selection squarely in the patent applicant's hands and
push it back in time to the patent's examination phase at the Patent
Office, i.e., before a concrete infringement dispute skews one's
preferred construction. Indeed, it is precisely when a would-be
patentee files for patent protection that the applicant can most
readily match the background reference sources for claim word
meaning-whether ordinary or specialized-to the intended scope of
the claim. Thereafter, third parties and the courts would know which
reference sources to consult when construing words in the resulting
patent, whether for licensing, design-around, or litigation purposes.
The enhanced predictability and reduced cost of assessing the scope
of the resulting patent, which would benefit every member of the
interested public for the entire multi-year term of the patent, should
more than offset the increased cost to the applicant of determining
which dictionaries he prefers.
I. THE RISE AND RISE OF DICTIONARIES AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Before discussing our empirical results, it is useful to review briefly
the basic way that patent claims define patent rights, as well as some
of the fixed stars that guide patent claim construction.
Every utility patent-the most common kind of patent, 8 and the
subject of this study-ends with one or more separately numbered
paragraphs, known as "claims. 2 9 The Patent Act expressly requires
28. U.S. law provides for three separate types of patents: utility patents, design
patents, and plant patents. See MUELLER, supra note 22, at 169 & n.1, 194-96. Utility
patents cover useful, new, and nonobvious products and processes. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-
103. This is the sort of patent most people think of as, simply, a patent. Design
patents cover new, original, and ornamental designs for "article[s] of manufacture."
35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173. Plant patents cover distinct and new varieties of plants that are
asexually reproduced. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164. The Patent Office grants many more
utility patents than design or plant patents. For example, during the eight years
from 1994 to 2001 inclusive, the Patent Office granted 1,049,260 utility patents (or
about 131,158 per year); 109,414 design patents (or about 13,677 per year); and
3,755 plant patents (or about 470 per year). See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2001 (2004) (reporting annual grant
totals), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.pdf.
29. As Professor Mueller puts it, "A patent claim is a precision-drafted, single-
sentence definition of the patent owner's right to exclude others." MUELLER, supra
note 22, at 37. For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,263,732 (issued July 24, 2001),
entitled "Measuring Cup," has a single claim. One of us used this patent as the basis
for a semester-long writing project in his basic Patent Law class. The sole claim of
the patent provides as follows:
1. A measuring device, comprising:
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the patentee to provide these numbered claim paragraphs, the
prescribed function of which is to "particularly point[] out and
distinctly claim [] the subject matter which the applicant regards as
his invention."30  Each of the claims gives the patentee a separate
right to exclude others,3' the scope of which is determined by the
words in that claim. As the Federal Circuit put it in a recent case,
"the claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim
construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the
actual words of the claims.
3 2
Patents are, of course, legal instruments. The rights they create,
however, involve varied, and sometimes quite complex, technologies.
Of necessity, then, patent claims often use a range of specialized
technical terms. 3 When a generalist federal judge34 confronts a claim
a bottom wall and a generally vertical and encircling side wall having a
lower edge and an upper edge, said sidewall defining an upwardly
opening cup with an upper end;
a spout attached integrally to said side wall; and
a pair of continuously sloping ramps formed integrally with and radially
inward in relief from said sidewall, said ramps extending from about said
bottom wall generally opposite said spout toward said open upper end
generally adjacent said spout, wherein said ramp is coextensive with said
spout, said ramp having an upwardly directed surface and indicia located
on said upwardly directed surface being at least one of standard and
metric units of measurement providing a readily observable indication of
the volume of the contents contained within said cup.
Id. at col. 4, 1. 59-col. 6,1. 3. As Figures 4 through 6 in the '732 patent suggest, and
the matching patent number molded into its plastic bottom confirms, the OXO-
brand "Angled Measuring Cup" (a picture of which you can call up in the Kitchen &
Housewares section of http://www.amazon.com) embodies the invention in this
claim.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The Patent Act has contained this claiming requirement
since 1870. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870); see also
William R. Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MIcH. L. REV.
755, 757-60 (1948) (tracing the history of the modern patent claim in U.S. patent
law).
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (providing that "[e]ach claim of a patent... shall be
presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims"); Leeds & Catlin Co. v.
Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319 (1909) (discussing the legal separateness
and viability of individual patent claims); MUELLER, supra note 22, at 37-39.
32. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Par Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.,
122 F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("the
language of the claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim
interpretation," and "throughout the interpretation process, the focus remains on
the meaning of claim language"). In this respect, the Federal Circuit is simply
following a path cleared more than a century ago by the Supreme Court. See alsoYale
Lock Mfg. v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 559 (1886) ("The scope of letters patent must
be limited to the invention covered by the claim, and while the claim may be
illustrated it cannot be enlarged by language used in other parts of the
specification."); Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877)
("When the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct (as they always should
be), the patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it.").
33. For example, contrast the largely familiar terminology from the '732 patent,
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construction dispute, she must both preserve the specialized meaning
of claim terms and ensure that her chosen construction preserves the
patent's internal coherence as a legal instrument. The Supreme
Court, in fact, emphasized the need to ensure a patent's integrity as a
legal instrument when it affirmed the Federal Circuit's allocation of
claim construction authority to the judiciary. 5
How, then, do courts structure the claim construction inquiry to
best ensure both technological fidelity and documentary coherence?
Two overarching principles frame the claim construction process.
First, a court must construe claim terms as would a person of ordinary
skill in the field of art to which the patent pertains. As the Federal
Circuit recently summarized it,
It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention
through whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person is
deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with an
understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field.3
supra note 29, with the more specialized terminology from claim 1 of U.S. Patent No.
4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988), entitled "Transgenic Non-Human Mammals":
1. A transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic
cells contain a recombinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into
said mammal, or an ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage.
Id. at col. 9, 1. 35-col. 10, 1. 2. This patent is better known as the (in)famous
Harvard oncomouse patent. SeeJanice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 & nn.58-59 (2001) (discussing the importance of the oncomouse
patent in the context of patent-protected biomedical research tools); Dashka Slater,
huMouseT ', LEGAL AFFS., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 20, 25 (discussing the oncomouse patent
in the context of debates over the patentability of living, genetically modified
organisms); The Harvard Mouse: A Short History, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2003, at 30
(recounting Harvard's efforts to patent the oncomouse).
34. SeeJohn Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent
Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2003) (
There are no science prerequisites in Article III. Nothing in the process of
selecting federal judges screens for technologists. We therefore may fairly
picture the average district judge as a smart, accomplished, and legally
sophisticated person who is technologically ignorant: an able and successful
lawyer before appointment, but a person who might have been a history or
English major and who may never have taken a course in calculus or in any
basic science at all.
35. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996) ("In
the main ... any credibility determinations [regarding expert witnesses] will be
subsumed within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole [patent]
document, required by the standard construction rule that a term can be defined
only in a way that comports with the instrument as a whole.... The decisionmaker
[now] vested with the task of construing the patent [i.e., the judge(s)] is in the better
position to ascertain whether an expert's proposed definition fully comports with the
specification and claims and so will preserve the patent's internal coherence.")
(citations omitted).
36. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45
840 [Vol. 54:829
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Taking on this perspective requires a judge to dip into the substance
of the pertinent art; litigation parties must thus find ways to deliver
this substance effectively.
3 7
Second, a court must start with a baseline, a default meaning for
the words in a patent claim; the party who contends the default
meaning is inappropriate must carry the burden of proving that
contention. The default rule is, according to the Federal Circuit, a
word's "ordinary meaning": "As a starting point, we give claim terms
their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art.,3 8  This "ordinary meaning" default for
patent claim terms is a longstanding one: it originates in regional
circuit law, 39 and the Federal Circuit has long observed it.
40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191
F.3d 1356, 1362, 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (" [C]laim
construction is firmly anchored in reality by the understanding of those of ordinary
skill in the art."); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The district court correctly recognized that
words in a patent claim are construed as they would be understood by a reader
skilled in the relevant art unless it appears that the inventor used the words
differently.").
There are, as experienced patent practitioners know, some words that have
become terms of patent law art. The court construes these not as a technically
trained person would but rather as a trained patent lawyer would. Thus, for
example, the court construes the transition word "comprising" to mean "including,
but not limited to" and construes the transition phrase "consisting of' to mean
"including only." See, e.g., Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus., 156
F.3d 1351, 1354-55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
37. See Wiley, Jr., supra note 34, at 1420 ("If judges do not begin with specialized
knowledge but must make difficult scientific and technical decisions, what is to be
done? Plainly they must gain a scientific and technical education if they are to
perform their work with competence.").
38. Bell Ad. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
1258, 1267, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also ResQNet.com,
Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir.
2003). "A fundamental principle for discerning the usage of claim language is the
ordinary and accustomed meaning of the words amongst artisans of ordinary skill in
the relevant art at the time of invention." ResQNet.com, 346 F.3d at 1378, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
39. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1943) ("[W]ords will be given their ordinary and
accustomed meaning unless it appears that the inventor used them differently.").
40. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249-50, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 1121-22 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc.,
127 F.3d 1420, 1427, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Bell
Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816, 1819-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475,
1480, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Nike Inc. v. Wolverine
World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 646, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., 15 F.3d 1573. 1577, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d
1384, 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Envirotech Corp. v. Al
George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
40. Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
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In recent years, however, the Federal Circuit has strengthened this
principle by underscoring the way that it structures the process of
proving the meaning of a disputed claim term. Specifically,
beginning in 1999 with Johnson Worldwide Associates v. Zebco Corp.,4' the
court has linked the "ordinary meaning" default to that familiarS 42
proof-structuring device, the presumption:
The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be
given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. General descriptive
terms will ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will not
be added to broad terms standing alone. In short, a court must
presume that the terms in the claim mean what they say, and,
unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and
accustomed meaning of claim terms.
In order to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of the
ordinary meaning of claim language, it is clear that "a party wishing
to use statements in the written description to confine or otherwise
affect a patent's scope must, at the very least, point to a term or
terms in the claim with which to draw in those statements."42
The Johnson Worldwide shift to a "heavy presumption" has stuck.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has invoked this "heavy presumption" in
at least twenty-two of its precedential claim construction decisions in
the past two and one-half years. 4
(BNA) 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
41. Id. at 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
42. See Ronald J. Allen, The Explanatory Value of Analyzing Codifications by Reference
to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1080, 1090 (1984-1985) ("Once the label is pierced, it becomes obvious that the word
'presumption' is the label applied to the various methods of structuring the process-
of-proof at trial, in particular (but not limited to) allocations of burdens of
production and persuasion and judicial summary and comment on the evidence.").
It may seem strange, in the context of a discussion about how one establishes a
proposition of law (i.e., the meaning of a disputed claim term), to invoke constructs
familiar from the process of proving facts. Standards of proof and presumptions,
however, are just as useful-indeed, necessary-in adjudicating law disputes as they
are in adjudicating fact disputes. See generally Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U.
L. REv. 859 (1992) (discussing the need for an appropriate standard of proof in legal
interpretive theory). See alsoJames R. Barney, In Search of "Ordinary Meaning", 85J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V 101, 109 (2003) ("By imposing a 'heavy
presumption' ... courts essentially impose a burden of proof on whichever party
opposes th[e] ordinary and accustomed meaning.").
43. Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (citations
omitted) (quoting Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1248, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121).
44. See Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1164, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1255, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings,
370 F.3d 1354, 1360, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2004); W.E. Hall
Co. v. Atlanta Corrugating, LLC, 370 F.3d 1343, 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135,
1140 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348,
1352, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Norian Corp. v. Stryker
Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1334, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Golight, Inc. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 355 F.3d 1327, 1332, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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The heavy presumption of ordinary meaning for patent claim
terms puts a premium on identifying that ordinary meaning. How is
a court to do so? One key way appears to be by looking up the
disputed claim word in a dictionary: "Standard dictionary definitions
indicate ordinary meaning. In fact, it is hardly surprising that, in
the midst of a decade of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases
equating ordinary meaning with the content of general purpose
46English language and law dictionaries, the Federal Circuit would
1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 2004); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1378,
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic
Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1098, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir.
2003); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298,
1302, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Omega Eng'g, Inc. v.
Raytech Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computers, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Northrup Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325
F.3d 1346, 1355, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Riverwood Int'l
Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1357, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331, 1339
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318
F.3d 1143, 1148, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1818, 1821 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1327, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1817-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics
Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1551
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,
288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Leggett &
Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg., 285 F.3d 1353, 1357, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266,
1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
45. MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 n.*, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1856, 1859 & n.* (Fed. Cir. 2001) (relying on Webster's II New Riverside
University Dictionary for ordinary meaning of "feed"); see also Apex, 325 F.3d at 1371,
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1449 ("[D]ictionary definitions may be consulted in
establishing a claim term's ordinary meaning."); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662 ("Sensibly enough, our precedents show that dictionary
definitions may establish a claim term's ordinary meaning.").
46. The Supreme Court used one or more dictionaries to provide an "ordinary
meaning" for a disputed statutory term at least thirteen times between 1991 and June
2004. See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761
(2004); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 & n.5 (2002);
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431-32 (2000); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S.
751, 757-58 (1997); Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 519
U.S. 248, 255-56 (1997); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207-08
(1997); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995); Asgrow Seed v.
Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995); United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350,
357-58 (1994); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994); Smith v. United States,
508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993); Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship,
507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991).
The Federal Circuit, for its part. has used the same ordinary meaning/dictionary
methodology in many of its statutory interpretation decisions since 1985. See Bayer
AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1371, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d 1284, 1289 (Fed.
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turn to dictionaries to establish the ordinary meanings of disputed
claim terms. So comfortable is it with equating ordinary meaning to
dictionary content that the Federal Circuit, in its milestone Telegenix
case endorsing dictionaries as claim construction tools, slips in the
space of two pages from a "heavy presumption" of "ordinary
meaning '47 to "the presumption in favor of a dictionary definition."' '
Telegenix also expressly supports the use of dictionaries to provide the
ordinary meanings of claim terms by analogizing such use to reliance
on dictionaries for ordinary meanings in statutory construction
cases.49  Importantly, as Telegenix itself takes pains to emphasize,
consulting a dictionary is simply the first step in a properly conducted
50claim construction analysis, and it can never be the last step.
Cir. 2003); Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1320(Fed. Cir. 2003); Liesegang v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 312 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Mudge v. United States, 308 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Am.
Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376, 1381 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2001); AK Steel
Corp. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.
v. United States, 201 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Aimcor v. United States, 141
F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1998); NSK Ltd. v. United States, 115 F.3d 965, 975 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Cook v. Brown, 68 F.3d 447, 451 (Fed. Cir. 1995);Jones v. Brown, 41 F.3d
634, 638 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1571 &
n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sharp v. United States, 14 F.3d 583, 587-88 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Best Power Tech. Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re
Canadian Pac. Ltd., 754 F.2d 992, 994, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 971, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
47. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
48. Id. at 1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
49. See id. at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (providing examples of courts
using dictionaries to "aid in the interpretation of statutes and regulations" in cases
involving tariff terms and Internal Revenue Service regulations).
50. See id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1819 (stressing that "[b]ecause words often have
multiple dictionary definitions, some having no relation to the claimed invention,
the intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify which of the different
possible dictionary meanings of the claim terms in issue is most consistent with the
use of the words by the inventor"); id. at 1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1819 (insisting that
"the intrinsic record also must be examined in every case to determine whether the
presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is rebutted"). In one post-Telegenix
case, the Federal Circuit further emphasized this fundamental point:
While dictionaries and treatises -are useful resources in determining the
ordinary and customary meaning or meanings of disputed claim terms, the
correct meaning of a word or phrase is informed only by considering the surrounding
text. This is why consulting dictionary definitions is simply a first step in the claim
construction analysis and is another reason why resort must always be made to
the surrounding text of the claims in question, the other claims, the written
description, and the prosecution history. Our precedent referencing the use
of dictionaries should not be read to suggest that abstract dictionary
definitions are alone determinative. In construing claim terms, the general
meanings gleaned from reference sources, such as dictionaries, must always be
compared against the use of the terms in context, and the intrinsic record must
always be consulted to identify which of the different possible dictionary
meanings is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor.
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 326 F.3d 1215, 1221-22, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
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With this backdrop in mind, we are well-placed to appreciate the
stunning rise in the Federal Circuit's reliance on dictionaries and
similar sources as claim construction tools. We begin with data that
give a bird's eye view.
A. The Top-Level View of Dictionary Citation Rates in Patent Cases
It is not difficult, when surveying the post-Markman claim
construction case law, to sense the growing centrality of dictionaries
as a claim construction resource. At the same time, one might
wonder whether the apparent increase in courts' reliance on
dictionaries is simply an artifact of an increase in the overall number
of patent decisions or the overall number of claim construction
decisions. It is possible, by casting a broad net with text-based
searches in electronic case law databases, to approximate some
rough-but nevertheless informative-answers to these questions.
We used both broad and a narrow Boolean search strings in
Westlaw's district court (dct) and Federal Circuit court (ctaj)
databases to flag both precedential and non-precedential opinions
wherein the court likely used a dictionary or similar source to
construe a claim term, whether for an infringement or a validity
analysis. The search strings are as follows:
Narrow Search-patent! /s claim! /s (constru! or interpret!) /s
(dictionar! or encyclopedia! or treatise! or handbook!) and date([re-
strictor])
Broad Search-patent! /p claim! /p (constru! or interpret!) /p
(dictionar! or encyclopedia! or treatise! or handbook!) and date([re-
strictor])
The Narrow Search string looks for key words that occur within a
sentence and the Broad Search string looks for the same key words that
occur within a paragraph. We also used an even broader Baseline
Search string in the same two databases to flag both precedential and
non-precedential opinions where the court likely decided a claim
construction question. That search string is thus:
Baseline Search-patent! /p claim! /p (constru! or interpret!) and
date ( [restrictor])
In each of these searches, we adjusted the date restrictor term to
reflect the time period of interest, whether a given year or a larger
interval.
1. Comparing the pre- and post-Markmnan eras
Before the Federal Circuit's Markman decision, parties could opt to
give claim construction questions to the jury. Both district courts and
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the Federal Circuit could review the resulting jury verdicts without
elaborate analysis. After Markman, detailed opinions on claim
construction questions cannot be avoided, except in the case of
summary affirmances on appeal.'
Our counts of the baseline number of apparent claim construction
opinions issuing from the U.S. district courts (considered as a group)
and the Federal Circuit show a sharp increase in claim construction
opinions in' the nine years since the April 5, 1995 Markman decision,
when compared to the number of such opinions issued from 1983
(the first full year of the Federal Circuit's operation) to the day
before Markman came down. This increase is all the more notable
when one considers that the pre-Markman interval is twenty-five
percent larger, measured in months, than the post-Markman interval.
Table 1 presents the claim construction opinion counts.
TABLE 1
Number of opinions flagged by the Baseline Search
1983 TO Markman Markman TO 2003
DISTRICT COURTS 1,284 2,478
FEDERAL CIRCUIT 541 1,032
Our counts also show an increase in the share of all claim
construction opinions that likely involved use of a dictionary or
similar source to construe a claim term. Table 2 presents the counts
of district court opinions using both the Narrow Search and Broad
Search, expressed both in absolute numbers and as proportions of the
Baseline Search results for the same time interval. The proportional
data effectively allow comparisons that control for the increase in the
overall number of claim construction opinions. Additionally, they
show a greater rate of dictionary citation in the post-Markman period.
Specifically, the (Narrow Search/Baseline Search) proportion increased
more than 27-fold from the pre- to the post-Markman period. The
(Broad Search/Baseline Search) proportion increased more than six-
fold.
51. See Fed. R. App. P. 36 (mandating that the court must provide a copy of its
opinion to all parties to the litigation or a copy of the judgment where no such
opinion was written).
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TABLE 2
Number of district court opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad searches in
total and as a percentage of Baseline Search cases
1983 TO Markman (%) MarkmanTo 2003 (%)
NARROW 4 (0.3%) 206 (8.3%)
SEARCH
BROAD 43 (3.3%) 492 (19.9%)
SEARCH
Table 3 presents analogous counts of Federal Circuit opinions,
again expressed in absolute numbers and as proportions of the
Baseline Search results. As was true for the district court opinions, the
Federal Circuit opinions show a greater rate of dictionary citations in
the post-Markman period. Specifically, the (Narrow Search/Baseline
Search) proportion increased more than five-fold from the pre- to the
post-Markman period. The (Broad Search/Baseline Search) proportion
increased more than three-fold.
TABLE 3
Number of Federal Circuit opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad searches
in total and as a percentage of Baseline Search cases
1983 TO Markman (%) MarkmanTO 2003 (%)
NARROW 4 (0.7%) 39 (3.8%)
SEARCH
BROAD 18 (3.3%) 130 (12.6%)
SEARCH
In sum, to the extent that our chosen search strings do a good job
of capturing actual claim construction output and actual dictionary
use within claim construction opinions, the first nine years after
Markman (Apr. 1995-Dec. 2003) have witnessed a marked increase in
the rate at which the U.S. district courts and the Federal Circuit use
dictionaries as claim construction tools.
2. Annual dictionary citation rates from 1993 to 2003
We augmented the aggregated pre- and post-Markman data with
annual counts for the U.S. district courts (again considered as a
20051
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group) and the Federal Circuit using the same three search strings-
Baseline Search, Narrow Search, and Broad Search-for each year from
1993 to 2003, inclusive.
Figure 1 presents the results of the Baseline Search for both the
district courts and the Federal Circuit. From 1993 to 2003, annual
Federal Circuit claim construction opinion output tripled from 49 to
151 cases, while district court opinion output more than tripled from
125 to 406 cases. Not surprisingly, the raw number of opinions from
the district courts was greater than the raw number of opinions from
the Federal Circuit throughout this period.
FIGURE 1
Annual number of opinions flagged by the
Baseline Search from 1993 to 2003
Baseline Count of Claim Construction Opinions
450 -
400
350
300
1 250
0
u 200
150
100
50
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
-- Fed Cir -a- Dist Ct
Figure 2 focuses on the results of the Narrow and Broad searches in
the district court opinion database. The datapoints in this figure
reflect the proportions (Narrow Search/Baseline Search) and (Broad
Search/Baseline Search) for each year in the decade. As with the
aggregated data discussed above, the use of proportions effectively
allows us to control for the rise in dictionary use that is attributable
simply to the general rise in claim construction opinion output.
Figure 2 shows that the rate of dictionary citation in claim
construction opinions in the district courts increased markedly from
1995 to 1999, in both the Narrow Search (from 0.8% to 11.3%) and
Broad Search (from 4.8% to 25.3%) categories. After dips in 2000 and
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2001, the 2002 and 2003 levels for both the Narrow Search (10.4%,
9.1%) and Broad Search (22.6%, 23.2%) categories are close to the
1999 level.
FIGURE 2
Annual number of district court opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad
searches, expressed as percentages of Baseline Search cases
District Courts - % Claim Construction Cases Citing
Dictionaries
30.0
25.0
a
.2 20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
-- Broad Search -4- Narrow Search
Figure 3, like Figure 2, focuses on annual proportions, but this
time in the Federal Circuit. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the
dictionary citation rates reflected by the Narrow Search and Broad
Search. The Narrow Search proportions show a nearly steady rise, from
zero percent in 1993 to 9.3% in 2003. In addition, the rise in citation
rates from 2.6% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2003 represents an increase of
over 350%. The Broad Search proportions show two periods of
marked increase, the first from 3.3% in 1995 to 11.3% in 1998 and
the second from 8.7% in 2000 to 26.5% in 2003. The second burst in
citation rates is especially sharp, with a one-year jump from 14.6% in
2002 to 26.5% in 2003. It is interesting to note, in connection with
this tripling in annual dictionary citation rates from 2000 to 2003 in
the Broad Search and the more-than-tripling in the Narrow Search, that
two of the six most active claim construction dictionary citers on the
2005]
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Federal Circuit revealed by our data, Judges Dyk and Linn, began
their active service on the court in the first half of 2000.
FIGURE 3
Annual number of Federal Circuit opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad
searches, expressed as a percentage of Baseline Search cases
Federal Circuit - % Claim Construction Cases Citing
Dictionaries
30.0
25.0
._ 20.0
.2
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
L-U Broad Search -*- Narrow Search!,
In sum, to the extent that our chosen search strings provide good
measures of claim construction and dictionary reliance activity (an
important qualification on the data presented in this section of the
paper), the period from 1993 to 2003 witnessed marked increases in
the annual rates at which the U.S. district courts and the Federal
Circuit used dictionaries as claim construction tools. Indeed, at the
Federal Circuit, the 2000 to 2003 time period saw a dramatic increase
in dictionary citation rates, tripling from 8.7% to 26.5% in the (Broad
Search/Baseline Search) proportions and more than tripling from 2.6%
to 9.3% in the (Narrow Search/Baseline Search) proportions. The
impression of more frequent reliance on dictionaries in claim
52. Infra Tbl. 7, App. B. Judge Linn began active service on January 1, 2000 and
Judge Dyk began active service on June 9, 2000. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last
modified Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review).
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construction opinions should not be dismissed as an artifact of the
general increase in claim construction opinions.
To achieve a deeper understanding of dictionary citation rate
growth, one must examine in detail the Federal Circuit cases wherein
the court used one or more dictionaries to help determine the
meaning of a word in a contested patent claim. After touching briefly
on three milestones in the Federal Circuit's claim construction
jurisprudence-Markman, Vitronics, and Telegenix-we present data
from just such a detailed examination.
B. "Unbiased Reflections of Common Understanding"
We know that one factor driving the Federal Circuit to use
dictionaries in claim construction more often is the heavy
presumption in favor of giving a claim term its ordinary meaning to
those of skill in the pertinent art, combined with the identification of
ordinary meaning with dictionary content.53  As an additional
backdrop against which to assess the data from our detailed review of
all dictionary-citing Federal Circuit cases from April 1995 to June
2004, it is helpful to explore the Federal Circuit's avowed rationale
for relying on dictionaries. The rationale has evolved, shifting from a
stance rooted in the need generalist judges have to learn background
information about the disputed technology, to one rooted in the
greater neutrality of publicly available reference sources that predate
a given dispute. The shifts in rationale are readily apparent upon
close review of a small number of milestone claim construction cases,
beginning with the Markman case.
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments
The Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.'4 is best known for its holding that "the court"-that
is, the judge, not thejury-"has the power and obligation to construe
as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent
claim." 55 However, just as important as this bare holding is the
Federal Circuit's assessment in that case of the sources on which
judges should rely when construing disputed patent claim terms.
In keeping with many of its prior cases, the court began with a
focus on sources internal to the patent document itself, including the
claims in the patent, the specification that supports those claims (also
53. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
54. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517
U.S. 370 (1996).
55. Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
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called the written description of the patent), and the patent's
prosecution history before the Patent Office.6  The court then
discussed sources aimed specially at helping a generalist judge learn
enough about the pertinent technological field to construe the
disputed claim language properly, grouping the materials under the
rubric "extrinsic evidence."'7 According to the court,
[e]xtrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent
and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
dictionaries, and learned treatises. This evidence may be helpful to
explain scientic principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of
art that appear in the patent and prosecution history. Extrinsic
evidence may demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of
the invention. It is useful to show what was then old, to distinguish
what was new, and to aid the court in the construction of the
patent.5 8
The court thus approved extrinsic evidence, including dictionaries
and treatises, as claim construction resources while at the same time
tethering use of such materials to the need for specialized
technological information.
Time has weakened this link between reliance on dictionaries and
the need for specialized information. The next case was the first step
in the attenuation process.
2. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.
A little over a year after its own Markman decision, and shortly after
the Supreme Court's affirmance of Markman, the Federal Circuit
handed down an opinion that drew special attention to the utility of
dictionaries in claim construction. The case is Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc.,59 and it "place [s] technical treatises and dictionaries
near the top of the extrinsic evidence hierarchy.,
60
In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit reversed a trial court's erroneous
construction of the phrase "solder reflow temperature" in a patent
claim directed to a method for mounting chips on circuit boards.1
The undermining vice in the trial court's approach to claim
56. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
57. Id. at 979-81,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-31.
58. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (emphasis added)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
59. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60. Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on
Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 181, 183
(2003); see also Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 29 (1999) (opining that "Vitronics established a hierarchy for types of
extrinsic evidence").
61. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1578-79, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573-74.
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construction was undue reliance on the testimony of the accused
infringers' expert witness.62 In explaining the trial court's error, the
Federal Circuit rehearsed the list of permissible extrinsic sources-
"expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, and technical
treatises and articles., 63 It then passed beyond mere rehearsal in a
footnote-footnote 6-that has changed the face of claim
construction:
64
Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of
extrinsic evidence, as they do not form a part of an integrated
patent document, they are worthy of special note. Judges are free to
consult such resources at any time in order to better understand the
underlying technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when
construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not
contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of
the patent documents.
65
Two important things happened here. First, the court directly
encouraged judges to consult dictionaries and similar sources to
learn about the technology at issue in a dispute, stating they are
available "at any time. 66  Second, and quite apart from the
'technology backgrounder' point, the court approved "rel[iance] on
dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, 6 1 foreshadowing
62. See id. at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575 (describing testimony from
defense expert, Dr. Rothe); id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578
("Unfortunately, here the trial judge did use the extrinsic evidence to vary or
contradict the manifest meaning of the claims.").
63. Id. at 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
64. The Federal Circuit, in the time between the Vitronics case and the Telegenix
case (the next milestone case in this line of development), has at least nine times
squarely relied on footnote 6 in Vitronics to support its use of dictionaries as claim
construction tools, including in Telegenix itself. See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167,
1177 & n.4, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc.
v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Bell Ad. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
1258, 1267, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Dow Chem. Co. v.
Sumitomo Chem. Co., Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334-35, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138
F.3d 1448, 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); Circle
R, Inc. v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 894, 898 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rival
Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., Nos. 98-1198, 98-1199, 1999 WL 96416, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb.
23,1999).
65. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 n.6 (emphasis
added).
66. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1578.
67. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1578.
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the identification of dictionary definition with ordinary meaning that
has since become so pronounced in the court's cases.68
Why this special solicitude for dictionaries in Vitronics? The court
highlighted the utility of such sources by contrasting them with the
partisan slant that expert witnesses provide-and remember, the root
of the trial court's error in this case was over-reliance on inapposite
expert testimony.69  Specifically, after distinguishing "expert
testimony... on the proper construction of a disputed claim term" from
background "testimony on the technology,, 70 the court urged that
prior art documents and dictionaries, although to a lesser extent, are
more objective and reliable guides [than expert testimony]. Unlike
expert testimony, these sources are accessible to the public in advance
of litigation. They are to be preferred over opinion testimony, whether
by an attorney or artisan in the field of technology to which the
patent is directed. Indeed, opinion testimony on claim construction
should be treated with the utmost caution, for it is no better than
opinion testimony on the meaning of statutory terms.
Opinion testimony on the meaning of a disputed claim term is thus
inherently disfavored, relative to publicly available "objective"
documents, such as prior art references and dictionaries that predate
the litigation. It warrants a judge's "utmost caution.' '  The court's
68. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
69. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
70. Id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. The court continues to approve
the use of expert testimony to teach trial judges background information about the
ertinent technology. See, e.g., Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709,
16, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that "trial courts
generally can hear expert testimony for background and education on the
technology implicated by the presented claim construction issues, and trial courts
have broad discretion in this regard"). The court also approved a district court's
decision, in a case involving highly complex microprocessor technology, to appoint a
"technical advisor" to help the court better cope with the scientific and technical
information in the case. TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1377-79,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1460-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
71. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (emphasis added).
72. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. The court has recently commented on this
need for objectivity in claim construction:
The inquiry into the meaning that claim terms would have to a person of skill in
the art at the time of the invention is an objective one. This being the case, a
court looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill
in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean. Those
sources include the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the
specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning
relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state
of the art.
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Bell &
Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1033, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Once a dispute over claim construction arises,
'experts' should also not be heard to inject a new meaning into terms that is
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central message here, in combination with footnote 6, is
unmistakable: dictionaries are better than expert testimony.
Vitronics, like Markman, links the use of dictionaries to the need for
specialized technological information. Unlike Markman, however,
Vitronics also approves the use of dictionaries to define claim terms,
praising these sources as superior to expert witnesses because they
are "more objective and reliable guides." This theme-that
dictionaries are preferred because they are not avowedly partisan in
content-took center stage in the next milestone case.
3. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.
A little over six years after Vitronics, the Federal Circuit handed
down its decision in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.," which
reframed its rationale for using dictionaries in claim construction.
The court had, of course, continued to use dictionaries after Vitronics
to help construe claims.7 4 In Telegenix, however, the court discussed
the benefits of recourse to dictionaries more elaborately than in any
other case. One commentator has called it "a momentary high water
mark" in the line of dictionary cases."
Before plunging into detailed analyses of the eleven separate claim
construction disputes requiring resolution,"6 of which only three used
inconsistent with what the inventor set forth in his or her patent and communicated,
first to the patent examiner and ultimately to the public. Patents should be
interpreted on the basis of their intrinsic record, not on the testimony of such after-
the-fact 'experts' that played no part in the creation and prosecution of the
patent.").
73. 308 F.3d 1193,64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
74. In two cases that Hattenbach highlights, see supra note 60, at 186, the Federal
Circuit emphasized the vital role dictionaries can play in providing evidence of a
word's ordinary meaning. See Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp., 308
F.3d 1167, 1177 n.4, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Although technically a form of extrinsic evidence, dictionaries hold a special place
in claim construction, and judges 'may... rely on dictionary definitions when
construing claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any
definition found in or ascertained by the reading of the patent document.'.")
(quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir.
1996)); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[T]echnical terms often have an 'ordinary
meaning' as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, although these same
terms may not be readily familiar to a judge, or may be familiar only in a different
context. Thus, in determining the ordinary meaning of a technical term, courts are
free to consult scientific dictionaries and technical treatises at any time.").
75. Hattenbach, supra note 60, at 181.
76. See Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1205-16, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820-29 (setting
out the eleven disputed claim terms, including "repeatedly substantially
simultaneously activating," "selectively controlling the durations of the time intervals
of activation," "color control means," "display areas" and "background areas,"
"display areas arranged in a pattern," "means for selectively activating said display
light sources," "converter means," and "control means for selectively coupling said
light sources").
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a dictionary to help construe the term," the Telegenix court provided
a spirited encomium to dictionary use."8 Specifically, and with greater
emphasis than Vitronics, the court identified the benefit of
dictionaries with their freedom from the taint of litigation advocacy
masquerading as expertise. According to the court,
[d]ictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises, publicly available at the
time the patent is issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable
sources of information on the established meanings that would
have been attributed to the terms of the claims by those of skill in
the art. Such references are unbiased reflections of common understanding
not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the
intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives of the
parties, and not inspired by litigation. Indeed, these materials may be
the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better
understanding both the technology and the terminology used by
those skilled in the art to describe the technology.7 9
77. See id. at 1206, 1209, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821, 1823 (construing claim
limitation "repeatedly substantially simultaneously activating" with the aid of MODERN
DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS (6th ed. 1984) and "display area" and "background area"
with the aid of ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARYOF ELECTRONICS (3d ed. 1985)).
78. Id. at 1202-05, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818-20.
79. Id. at 1202-03, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (emphasis added). If one were
to take "unbiased" in this passage to refer to the complete absence of prejudice or
personal interest, the Federal Circuit has stumbled badly here. Dictionary-writing is
a decidedly human enterprise; the people who write dictionaries, like the rest of us,
bring their individual judgments and points of view to their work. As Sidney Landau,
an eminent lexicographer with over forty years' experience, has stated, "[e]very
established dictionary reflects, however it may strive to be impartial, the prevailing
biases of its times, because the biases often inhere in the very manner of expression
used in its definitions." LANDAU, supra note 2, at 421. Landau argues that
"[d]ictionaries act as a conservative force on the language because they tend to
overrepresent the volume of conservative speech and writing, which is that of the
educated classes, and underrepresent the volume of speech and writing by and for
people who are relatively uneducated." Id. at 207. For example, Landau discusses
the range of approaches, across books and over time, to the inclusion of sexual and
scatological taboo words in dictionaries. Id. at 228-31; see also HENRI BEJOINT,
MODERN LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 124-36 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the
range of ways in which dictionaries reflect the ideology of the dominant culture);
Anne Curzan, The Compass of the Vocabulary, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED: PIONEERS
IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 96, 96 (Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000) (commenting that
"[t]he apparent objectivity of dictionaries rests on a series of subjective judgments"
because "dictionaries and dictionary makers define what constitutes 'the language' as
much as they do any individual word in the lexicon"). In a similar vein, David Foster
Wallace, a successful novelist and astute observer of literary culture, recently
observed that "claims to objectivity in language study are now the stuff of jokes and
shudders." David Foster Wallace, Tense Present: Democracy, English, and the Wars Over
Usage, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1, 2001, at 39, 46. He continues that " [t]o presume that
dictionary-making can somehow avoid or transcend ideology is simply to subscribe to
a particular ideology, one that might aptly be called Unbelievably Naive Positivism."
Id.
If, however, one takes "unbiased" in the narrower sense of "disinterested" that the
passage as a whole suggests-namely, not reflecting any stake in the outcome of the
case at hand-then the Federal Circuit is on solid ground. An expert witness,
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And gone is the careful parsing of extrinsic from intrinsic evidence.
The court rejected categorizing dictionaries as "extrinsic evidence" or
even a "special form of extrinsic evidence."8  After Telegenix,
dictionaries are, quite literally, in a category by themselves.
The court also quite openly equates a word's ordinary meaning
with its dictionary definition, moving from mention of "a 'heavy
presumption' that" claim words "have the ordinary meaning that
would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant
art,"'. at the outset of the discussion, to "the presumption in favor of a
dictionary definition ''82 toward the close of the discussion. It is thus
not surprising that, at the conclusion of its general discussion of
dictionary use, the court suggests a standard claim construction
procedure in which using relevant dictionaries to obtain possible
meanings that would have been attributed to the words of the claims
by those skilled in the art is effectively a universal first step.
8 3
Markman's more narrowly drawn link between resort to dictionaries
and the occasional need for specialized technological information
has far receded.
The road from Markman to Telegenix, then, is one from the
occasional reference to a specialized dictionary of technological
arcana to routine reliance upon numerous definitions from neutral
reference sources. Dictionaries admittedly have not assumed this
central role without some controversy.84 The court's decision in
retained by a party in a particular dispute, surely has a stake in the success with which
she persuades the decisionmaker in the case and crafts her testimony accordingly;
hence the common knock on expert witnesses is that too often they are biased
mouthpieces for the parties who hire them. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Judicial
Control Over Expert Testimony: Of Deference and Education, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1156, 1162-
65 (1993). By contrast, a team of professional dictionary writers, who toiled at their
work before the patent in dispute (much less the lawsuit about it) ever existed,
almost certainly cannot have had any stake in the scope of a later-issued patent or the
outcome of a later-filed infringement case as they wrote the definitions that a
dictionary contains. Dictionaries are, for the most part, published in the hopes of
turning a profit, and they cannot do so unless they attract as wide a range of
consumers as possible; writing skewed definitions to curry favor with a single
individual or firm would, in these circumstances, be self-defeating.
80. Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
81. Id. at 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
82. Id. at 1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
83. Id. at 1205, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820. However valuable a first step in
claim construction, consulting a dictionary can never be the final step. See supra note
50 and accompanying text.
84. For example, the court occasionally expresses some skepticism about reliance
on dictionaries. See Kinik Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J.) (indicating that a
court should not rely on a dictionary to provide the meaning of a common word
where the working definition of that word within a patent document is peculiar to
the context of that document); AFG Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239,
1248, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Michel, J.) (emphasizing
20051
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Telegenix, however, hails dictionaries as the primary tools for
identifying ordinary meanings of disputed claim terms as they would
be understood by those skilled in the art-a step that must be taken
to resolve any claim construction dispute, given the heavy
presumption in favor of ordinary meaning for the words in a claim.
The change in rhetoric from dictionary as occasional reference
(Markman) to basic tool (Telegenix) accompanies a correlative change
in the court's avowed rationale for using dictionaries, from one
rooted in the need to educate the court about technology to one
rooted in the need to establish a word's ordinary meaning with a
neutral resource. Which rationale, one might query, better comports
with the Federal Circuit's actual use of dictionaries? Does the court,
as the Markman rationale might lead one to predict, use specialized
dictionaries more often than general purpose English language
sources? Or rather does the court, as the Telegenix rationale might
lead one to predict, use general purpose English language sources
just as often-or perhaps even more often than-specialized sources,
for the simple reason that the quality that makes reference sources
attractive is their neutrality rather than any specialized content? Only
detailed data on the Federal Circuit's actual use of dictionaries can
answer these questions.
C. The Federal Circuit's Use of Dictionaries for Claim Construction
Our top-level data show that, while the number of written Federal
Circuit claim construction decisions roughly tripled from 1993 to
that courts should turn to dictionaries only when patent documents fail to define
terms of art, particularly since standard dictionaries can fail to distinguish two words
treated as distinct within the patent documents); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1067-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Newman, J.) (suggesting that the general nature of dictionary definitions renders
dictionaries unable to settle disputes over the specific scientific meanings of words in
patent documents); Anderson v. Int'l Eng'g & Mfg., Inc., 160 F.3d 1345, 1348-49, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1631, 1633-34 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.) (noting that where
dictionaries provide more than one meaning for the same word, the technical
meaning of the word must be taken from the context of the patent documents at
issue); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.) (cautioning courts
against using dictionaries to provide "legal, not linguistic, significance" to patent
document terms); see also Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d
1348, 1356-60, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing both the heavy presumption in favor of ordinary meaning and
the use of dictionaries as claim construction tools). Judge Newman authored all but
one of the court's opinions expressing skepticism about dictionary use, and, as our
detailed data show, Judge Newman used dictionaries as claim construction tools only
twice from April 1995 to June 2004. See infra Tbl. 7, App. B. Among the judges still
in active service on the court, only Chief Judge Mayer used dictionaries on fewer
occasions. Id.
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2003, the rate at which the Federal Circuit appeared to cite
dictionaries in aid of its claim construction analysis increased about
nine-fold in the same period.85 And a close reading of the Federal
Circuit's post-Markman caselaw shows that the court's rationale for
using reference sources such as dictionaries shifted from a focus on
gaining helpful background information about disputed technology
(in Markman and, to a lesser extent, in Vitronics), to a focus on the
greater neutrality offered by such reference works (in Telegenix).86
Which rationale, then, better comports with the Federal Circuit's use
of dictionaries? Our data show that the Telegenix rationale explains
the court's actual use of dictionaries far better than does the
Markman rationale.
1. Methodology
We created a dataset describing all occasions from April 5, 1995 to
June 30, 2004, where the Federal Circuit used one or more
dictionaries or similar sources to help define a word or phrase in a
contested patent claim.87 The unit of analysis in this dataset is not an
individual case; rather, it is the use of a reference source to define a
word or phrase in a claim. Thus, for example, the case captioned
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS Technology, Inc.,88 involving a dispute over the
claim limitation "a stored waveshape table," yielded three entries for
our dataset-one for each word that the court defined with the aid of
a dictionary (i.e., "stored," "waveshape," and "table")." Similarly, the
case captioned Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.,90 involving a dispute over the
claim limitation "coherence length of the beam," yielded one entry
for our dataset-an entry reflecting the phrase that the court defined
by consulting a reference source (i.e., "coherence length"). 9' It is also
important to note that we counted only majority opinions for the
court; individual judges' citations to dictionaries in concurring or
dissenting opinions are not counted here.
To create this dataset, we first used broad searches to flag all
arguable candidates in Westlaw's database of Federal Circuit opinions
85. See supra Figure 1 (showing a three-fold increase in claim construction
decisions), Figure 3 and accompanying text (showing that Broad Search proportion
increased from 3.3% in 1993 to 26.5% in 2003).
86. See supra Part I.B.
87. See infra App. C (providing the dataset).
88. No. 95-1362, 1996 WL 146499 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996).
89. See infra App. C, at rows 12-14.
90. 79 F.3d 1563, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 1565 & n.1, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 & n.1; see infra App. C, at row
17.
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(cta) .9  With the help of research assistants, we read the cases to
winnow the group to those that argibly involved use of at least one
dictionary or similar source to help define a word in a disputed
patent claim. At that stage, we read the smaller group of cases in
close detail, collecting the relevant information about each occasion
where the Federal Circuit did, in fact, use a dictionary to help define
a contested claim term. The dataset in Appendix C describes each of
these occasions. We identified only four cases (two precedential and
two nonprecedential) in which the Federal Circuit first identified
dictionary definitions for claim words with specificity and then
expressly rejected any reliance on the dictionaries. 93 We excluded
these cases from our dataset. We also identified, and excluded from
the dataset, ten cases in which the Federal Circuit used a dictionary to
define a word from the written description portion of the patent,
rather than from a claim.94
2. Results
From April 5, 1995 to June 30, 2004, the Federal Circuit used one
or more dictionaries to help construe a disputed claim term 209
times.95 Table 4 presents annual totals, separating precedential from
92. We used search terms such as (patent! and (infringe! or valid!) and
(dictionar! or treatise! or encyclopedia! or handbook!)) and (patent! and claim! and
dictionar!). Because we are analyzing the reasons the court provides in its written
decisions, our data do not include-and we know nothing about the role of
dictionaries in-cases in which the Federal Circuit summarily affirmed the trial
court's claim construction without writing its own opinion.
93. See Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1367-68, 1372 & nn.3-5, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1222-23, 1226 & nn.3-5 (Fed. Cir. 2003); AFG Indus., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1247-49, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776, 1782-84 (Fed.
Cir. 2001), vacated by 375 F.3d 1367, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Ultratech Stepper, Inc. v. ASM Lithography, Inc., 97 Fed. Appx. 914, 919-20 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 35 Fed. Appx. 918, 924
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
94. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 1335-36, 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1656-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery
Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1099, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1600 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1345, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1408-09 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1350, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co.,
264 F.3d 1377, 1382, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124, 1126-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re
Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297, 1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Lizardtech, 35 Fed. Appx. at 924; G&S Metal Prods. Co. v. Ekco Housewares,
Inc., 152 F.3d 944, Nos. 97-1188, 97-1210, 1998 WL 121472, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17,
1998); Storz Instrument Co. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 135 F.3d 777, No. 97-1149, 1998 WL
50947, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1998). The Novartis case, decided in July 2004, is also
outside the temporal scope of this study.
95. See infra App. C.
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nonprecedential decisions. Annual dictionary use increased by a
factor of fourteen from 1995 to 2003.
TABLE 4
Number of times the Federal Circuit relied on at least one dictionary definition
of a patent claim word to help construe an element of that claim
YEAR Published Unpublished TOTAL
Decision Decision
1995* 2 1 3
1996 9 5 14
1997 8 6 14
1998 4 5 9
1999 4 6 10
2000 13 10 23
2001 19 9 28
2002 22 10 32
2003 34 8 42
2004* 25 9 34
TOTAL 139 69 209
* Partial year
In using dictionaries to help construe claim words 209 times, the
Federal Circuit used 268 individually identified sources, i.e., 1.28
sources per term.96 Specifically, the Federal Circuit relied on one,
and only one, source 167 times (79.9%), on two sources thirty-three
times (15.8%), on three sources four times (1.9%), on four sources
three times (1.4%), and on five sources and six sources one time each
(0.5%).
General purpose English language sources dominate the dataset.
97
Specifically, out of the 268 sources used, the court used 189 (70.5%)
general purpose English language sources and seventy-nine (29.5%)
specialized sources. Tables 5 and 6, contained in Appendix B, list all
the general purpose English language sources cited and all the
specialized sources cited, respectively, including the number of times
the court cited each source. Of the six most-often cited sources,9 the
top five are general purpose sources.
96. See infra App. C.
97. See infra This. 5-6, App. B.
98. These are Webster's Third New International Dictionary (cited sixty-eight times);
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Several facts stand out immediately upon review of Tables 5 and 6.
First, citations to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Webster's
Third) dominate the dataset. The court cited various printings of
Webster's Third sixty-eight times; Webster's Third was originally
published in 1961 and is still Merriam-Webster's flagship dictionary.
This represents 25.4% of all citations to any source (general or
specialized), and 36.0% of all citations to a general purpose English
language source. The Federal Circuit is, in this respect, like the
Supreme Court, where Webster's Third New International Dictionary and
its predecessor, Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition,
are the two most frequently cited dictionaries.
Second, the Merriam-Webster family of dictionaries-comprising
Webster's Third, its two immediate predecessors, and four different
editions of its New Collegiate series (all of which share a common
editorial core with the New International series) 1°'-accounts for 38.4%
of the citations to any source, and 54.5% of the citations to any
general purpose source. Considering families of editorially related
dictionaries, Houghton Mifflin's American Heritage Dictionary family
takes second place with twenty four citations (9.0% of all citations). 10
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (cited eighteen times); Webster's New World
Dictionary (cited fifteen times); American Heritage Dictionary (cited twelve times);
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (cited ten times); McGraw-Hill Dictionary
of Scientific and Technical Terms (cited nine times). See infra Tbls. 5-6, App. B.
99. See infta App. C.
100. Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, at 262-63 (reporting statistics); id. at 533-55
(listing cases); Lexicon Remains, supra note 8, at 52 (summarizing results); id. at 66-68
(listing cases).
101. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (1985) (describing itself
as "the latest in the Collegiate line of Merriam-Webster dictionaries which began in
1898"); WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 4a (1972) ("For many years
Merriam-Webster dictionaries have formed a series in which the unabridged
dictionary is the parent work and the Collegiate Dictionary the largest abridgment.
From each successive revision of the unabridged work new abridged books have
sprung.... The definitions [herein] are for the most part based on the most recent
available information contained in the parent work, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, with such modifications or adaptations as are required by the smaller
scope of the Collegiate."); WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY iv (6th ed., 1949)
(providing the language quoted in the 1972 publication of Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary, citing the "parent work," however, as "Webster's New International
Dictionary, Second Edition"); see also WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, FIFTH EDITION
(1936) ("The publication in 1934 of Webster's New International Dictionary, Second
Edition, another complete revision of the unabridged dictionary, inaugurated a new
Merriam-Webster series to which this present work belongs.").
102. See infra Tbl. 5, App. B. The American Heritage family remains in second
place, with thirty-five (13.1%) of the citations to any source, even if one extends it to
include two other Houghton Mifflin dictionaries-Webster's II New Riverside University
Dictionary and its successor title Webster's II New College Dictionary.
The American Heritage college dictionaries, like the Merriam-Webster college
dictionaries, share a common editorial core with the much larger American Heritage
Dictionary. See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY vii (3d ed. 1997) (calling
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed.) "[t] he immediate predecessor of the College
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Oxford University Press's family of dictionaries, which includes both
the Oxford English Dictionary and the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,
comes in third with eighteen citations (6.7% of all citations).
Random House's family of dictionaries, the last identifiable family
among the general purpose sources, takes fourth place with eleven
citations (4.1% of all citations).
Third, citations to specialized sources are considerably more
spread out among different titles than citations to general purpose
sources. For example, thirty-three of the forty-four specialized titles
(74.4%) are cited once and only once during the period of the study,
and only three of them (6.7%) are cited more than five times. By
contrast, sixteen of the twenty-six general purpose titles (61.5%) are
cited more than once, and eight of them (30.8%) are cited more
than five times.
We also observed an interesting phenomenon not easily captured
in any of the data tables. Specifically, in six different cases during the
period of the study, all of them precedential, the Federal Circuit both
used a dictionary to define a word from a disputed claim and then
used a dictionary to define a word from the dictionary definition it
had just quoted."" Four of these six cases were issued in just the last
two and one-half years. Interestingly, the second-order dictionary is
not always the same as, or even the same type as, the first-order
dictionary. Perhaps the most vivid instance of the phenomenon is
the Novartis case, where the court forged a five-step chain of
dictionary definitions of words appearing in other dictionary
definitions: "hydrosol" (the claim term), to "sol," to "solution," to
"medicinal," to "medicine," to "preparation.""4 The first four words
were defined using two different general purpose dictionaries, and
Dictionary," and asserting that the College Dictionary "displays the[] same virtues and
assets [as its parent] in a more compact form"); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY,
SECOND COLLEGE EDITION 6 (1985) (describing itself as "the first complete revision of
the American Heritage Dictionary").
103. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308-10, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 144041 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (tracing a long series of dictionary
definitions of words in other dictionary definitions); Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS
Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1372-74, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 1215-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(defining "annular," then "ring," then "band"; and defining "adjoining," then
"adjacent"); Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d
1167, 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (defining
"characterizable," then "characterize"); Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d
718, 723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1033-34 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (defining "groove,"
then "channel"); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1114,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (defining "along," then "by");
Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569, 1574, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1997, 2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (defining "flexural," then "flexure").
104. Novartis, 363 F.3d at 1308-09, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 144041.
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the last word was defined using three different specialized medical
dictionaries.l0 5
Who on the Federal Circuit has cited dictionaries when authoring
claim construction opinions for the court? Table 7, contained in
Appendix B, provides comprehensive data on this question. The
Federal Circuit has twelve judges in regular active service and a
number of senior judges. During the period studied here, from April
1995 to June 2004, sixteen judges were in regular active service on the
Federal Circuit for at least some months; Table 7 notes the different
periods of service for each of these sixteen judges. Every one of the
judges authored at least one majority opinion for the court in which
the court used at least one dictionary to help construe a disputed
claim term. 10 6 Six of the sixteen judges (37.5%) each account for
10% or more of the 209 occasions on which the Federal Circuit has
used one or more dictionaries to help construe a claim term. They
are, in descending order of frequency of contribution, as follows:
* Judge Linn, with 27 of 209 (12.9%)
* Judge Rader, with 26 of 209 (12.4%)
* Judge Clevenger, with 24 of 209 (11.5%)
* Judge Lourie, with 23 of 209 (11.0%)
* Judge Dyk, with 22 of 209 (10.5%)
* Judge Gajarsa, with 21 of 209 (10.0%)
Together, they account for 68.4% of the entries in the dataset.
And of the six, three-Judges Dyk, Gajarsa, and Linn-joined the
court after both Markman and Vitronics had already been decided.
It also appears from our data that, during the period of the study,
the Federal Circuit judges who had patent law or technical
backgrounds before joining the court cited a greater proportion of
105. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440-41. The dissenting judge in Novartis, with
some justification, calls the majority's reasoning a "chase through the dictionary." Id.
at 1315 n.7, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 n.1 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). Indeed,
one could well call it a chase through five dictionaries.
106. Another indication of the pervasiveness of dictionary use is that, from August
1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, all twelve judges in active service on the courtjoined at least
one panel opinion in which the court used one or more dictionaries to help construe
a disputed claim term. See Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1165-66, 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1260-61 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Schall, Gajarsa, & Prost, JJ.);
Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (Mayer & Clevenger, JJ.); Globetrotter Software,
Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Linn, Dyk, & Archer, JJ.); Int'l Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1209 (Newman, Linn, & Prost,JJ.); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life
Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, Bryson,
& Prost, JJ.); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Lourie & Bryson, JJ.); Abbott Labs. v. Syntron
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Mayer,
Michel, & Dyk,JJ.).
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specialized reference sources than did the judges who did not have
such backgrounds. The data are in Table 8. Using information from
the judges' biographies, °7 we separated all the judges who were in
active service on the court from April 1995 to June 2004 into two
groups: the judges who had a patent law or technical background,1 0 8
and the judges who did not.'°9 Using the opinion authorship data in
Appendix C, we also counted the number of occasions a given judge
cited one or more general purpose sources to help define a claim
term, and the number of occasions a given judge cited one or more
specialized sources to do so. When a given judge cited one or more
general sources and one or more specialized sources to help define
the same term, we counted the event in both columns of our table. " °
As Table 8 shows, the judges with a patent law or technical
background cited specialized sources 36.1% of the time, whereas the
judges without a patent law or technical background did so 21.7% of
the time. The difference in citation rate to specialized sources is
statistically significant using the conventional test for whether two
variables are independent."'
TABLE 8
Number of citations to one or more general or specialized references, grouped by
Federal Circuit judge background
GENERAL SPECIALIZED
SOURCES SOURCES
JUDGES WITH PATENT LAW OR 63.9% 36.1%
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND (53/83) (30/83)
JUDGES WITHOUT PATENT 78.3% 21.7%
LAW OR TECHNICAL (101/129) (28/129)
BACKGROUND (101/129) (28/129)
107. See U.S. COURT FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHIES (reporting biographical information for active and senior judges), at
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last revised Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
108. Sixjudges have a patent law or technical background: Judges Gajarsa, Linn,
Lourie, Newman, Nies, and Rich.
109. Ten judges do not have a patent law or technical background: Judges
Archer, Bryson, Clevenger, Dyk, Mayer, Michel, Plager, Prost, Rader, and Schall.
110. There were ten such instances in the full dataset.
111. Specifically, the likelihood that this different rate is due to chance alone, as
measured by the X2 statistic, is 0.02.
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In sum, the data from our detailed review of individual cases show
that (a) the Federal Circiit uses dictionaries to construe words in
claims more often with each passing year; (b) it most often identifies
only one reference source per word; (c) it uses general purpose
English language dictionaries more than twice as often as specialized
sources, consistent with the "neutral sources"-based Telegenix
rationale (and not the "specialized knowledge"-based Markman
rationale) for dictionary use; (d) it uses Webster's Third most of all;
(e) just over a third of the judges who have served on the Federal
Circuit since the Markman decision account for more than two thirds
of the occasions where the court has used dictionaries to construe
disputed claim terms; and (f) judges with a patent law or technical
background cite specialized reference sources at a greater rate than
those without such a background. Both general purpose and
specialized dictionaries and similar reference sources have become
central to the Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence.
II. BIAS THROUGH THE BACK DOOR? DICTIONARY
SELECTION AT COURT
The Federal Circuit's cases firmly establish both that one should
begin the claim construction process by presuming that a term has its
ordinary meaning to a person of skill in the art, and that one can use
a dictionary or similar objective reference source to help establish
this ordinary meaning. The Federal Circuit's actual dictionary
citation behavior over the last nine years just as firmly shows that,
when the court uses a dictionary to establish the ordinary meaning of
a disputed claim term, it most often does so by reference to a single
general purpose English language dictionary. And although a full
theoretical critique of judicial use of dictionaries to help establish
ordinary meaning is beyond the scope of this Article, n1 2 common
experience suggests both that one interprets a new document by
using one's prior understandings of word meanings, and that it is
entirely wholesome to augment one's untutored understanding of a
word's meaning by consulting a dictionary, professionally prepared at
great effort, to remind oneself of the full range of ordinary meanings
that a given word possesses. Indeed, the Supreme Court highlighted
this very use of dictionaries in the context of legal disputes over a
century ago.113
112. See supra note 24 (distinguishing the question whether the Federal Circuit
should use dictionaries from the question of how the Federal Circuit can best use
dictionaries, having chosen to do so).
113. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (categorizing tomatoes as
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It is not enough, however, simply to note that dictionaries can be
helpful. There is an important middle step between the act of writing
a definition for a word (back in the publishing house's lexicography
shop) and the act of quoting a definition (in a judicial opinion or a
lawyer's brief)-namely, choosing which dictionary (or dictionaries)
to use from among the available candidates. The court often uses
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, but not always. The
Federal Circuit's increasing reliance on dictionaries thus raises an
important question: how does the court select the dictionary it uses
in any given case?'
1 4
The selection question is a critical one because the court now
justifies its use of dictionaries primarily by reference to the neutrality
with which professional lexicographers write dictionary definitions.
1 1 5
This neutrality-based justification for favoring dictionaries rings quite
hollow, of course, if the way the court picks the dictionary it uses in a
given case is not itself neutral. Put another way, to achieve the full
measure of neutrality, and thus predictability, that the Federal Circuit
has set as its claim construction goal, one should be able to state in
advance some rule or principle that guides dictionary selection
without regard to the merits of the case in which the dictionary will
be used. Sadly, the cases suggest a large share of judicial caprice in
dictionary selection. One cannot, moreover, dismiss the arbitrariness
in dictionary selection as inconsequential. We consider, in turn, both
the lack of formal constraints on court choice of dictionaries in claim
construction, and the demonstrable difference in case outcome that
the choice among dictionaries can make.
A. Dictionary Choice Unchained-The Dark Side ofTelegenix
A court confronting a claim construction dispute today can, after
the dispute is well under way and the parties' general positions on the
merits are clear, effectively pick whatever dictionary it prefers to help
"vegetables," rather than as "fruit," for purposes of a tariff schedule). "Of that
[ordinary] meaning the [C]ourt is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard
to all words in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted,
not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the [C]ourt."
Id.
114. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he first step toward claim
interpretation using a dictionary should be selecting an appropriate dictionary, a
step that was not addressed by the Telegenix court and which is neither
straightforward nor inconsequential." Hattenbach, supra note 60, at 187.
115. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (praising dictionaries because they
are "not influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the
intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties,
and not inspired by litigation").
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construe the words in the claim. The only apparent constraint is a
temporal one: the reference source should have been publicly
available as of the filing date of the application that matured into the
patent in suit." Importantly, a court is not bound by the parties'
evidentiary submissions in the litigation. The Federal Circuit took
pains to emphasize the point in the Telegenix case:
As resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in
the understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely
proper for both trial and appellate judges to consult these materials [i.e.,
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises] at any stage of a litigation,
regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence'or
not.
117
To the extent one views a publicly available reference work's content
as an adjudicative fact, Telegenix is consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence governing judicial notice of such facts,"8 which empower
courts to take notice on their own initiative 19 both at trial and on
116. See Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1124, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("[W]hen a claim term understood to have a
narrow meaning when the application is filed later acquires a broader definition, the
literal scope of the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time of
filing."); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1650, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Rather, the [claim] term 'IFN-a' in the patent has a
specialized meaning limited to the particular leukocyte interferon that Dr. Weissman
supported in his original application. In sum, this court must determine what the
term meant at the time the patentee filed the '901 application."). The principle that
a claim term forever has the same meaning it had on the date the application was
filed is a longstanding one. See Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d
3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 504 (7th Cir. 1943) ("Moreover, the meaning which the
inventor gives to his words can not be made to depend upon subsequent events, but
should appear when the application is filed.").
The Federal Circuit has, in some recent cases, sown needless confusion on this
point. The cases just cited establish that, as a doctrinal matter, the key date for fixing
the meaning of a claim term is the application's filing date. Even if this were not
already a matter of settled doctrine, the filing date is the only date that makes any
sense in view of patent law requirements regarding a given written disclosure's ability
to properly support a given set of claims. See infra Part III.B. It is thus quite strange
that in the Telegenix case the court speaks of reference sources that are "publicly
available at the time the patent is issued." Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1818 (emphasis added). After Telegenix, the Federal Circuit has twice stated
that its "decisions have not always been consistent as to whether the pertinent date is
the filing date of the application or the issue date of the patent." Inverness Med.
Switz. GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 1365, 1370 n.1, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1930 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v.
Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.2, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 1936 n.2(Fed. Cir. 2002). There is no cause for the court to be coy: the filing date is the one
that matters, and the Telegenix court erred on this point.
117. Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (emphasis added).
118. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (a)-(b). See generally CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 2.7, at 80-81 & n.9 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing judicial notice
of such "verifiable facts" as "language or word usage").
119. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c) ("A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or
not.").
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appeal. 20 Historically, judicial notice has been the ground on which
the Supreme Court based its own use of dictionaries. 2 ' To the extent
one views dictionary content as a legislative rather than an
adjudicative fact, 22 the Federal Rules of Evidence do not regulate the
situation at all.
2
The lack of formal constraints does not, of course, mandate that a
judge simply indulge her personal preference when choosing a
dictionary to help define a word in a patent claim. The Federal
Circuit, however, has not stated any rules or principles for how a
judge should choose a dictionary in this context-not how to decide
between using a general purpose or a specialized reference source, or
how to decide precisely which (or how many) reference source(s) to
use from among several candidates, or how to distill some core
ordinary meaning from multiple definitions in multiple sources.14
Judges, both trial and appellate, are thus left with little more to guide
them than personal preference-preference for one dictionary over
120. Fed. R. Evid. 201(f) ("Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding."); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, § 2.10, at 90. The Federal
Circuit has taken judicial notice of facts in reliable documents in a number of cases.
See Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 497 n.1, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1608, 1609 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 954 n.27,
28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1941 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Standard Havens Prods., Inc.
v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 514 n.3, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2029, 2031 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
121. See Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, at 246-48.
122. On the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 610-11 (7th ed. 1999) and MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118,
§§ 2.2-2.3, at 65-72.
123. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, § 2.3, at 66 ("The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not regulate the process of noticing legislative facts.").
124. The Federal Circuit, tacitly acknowledging its failure thus far to provide any
guidance on these critical questions, requests, in its en banc order in Phillips, see supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text, additional briefing on, among others, the
following two questions: "What use should be made of general as opposed to
technical dictionaries? How does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are
multiple dictionary definitions of the same term?" Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d
1382, 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765, 1766 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Question #2).
In fairness to the Federal Circuit, the court is hardly alone in failing to give
meaningful guidance on dictionary selection. The Supreme Court, too, has failed to
state any rules or principles governing how courts should choose dictionaries when
construing statutes and the like, and scholars have criticized the Court accordingly.
See Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, at 264-76 (providing extended critique of the
"confusion" resulting from the fact that, "[ajlthough the Court has relied on
dictionaries for nearly 170 years, there are few articulated principles to provide
guidance to the Court's use of dictionaries"); Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries
and New Textualists, 71 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2177, 2197-2201 (2003) (reviewing critiques
of the Supreme Court's unpredictable dictionary selection practices); Looking It Up,
supra note 8, at 1447-48 ("Yet there has been no apparent pattern to (or discussion
of) the Justices' choices of [dictionary] volume or vintage.... If the Court is serious
about its quest for ordinary meaning, it should not continue to employ dictionaries
in such a chaotic fashion.").
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another, or preference for one internal, unstated guideline over
another.
For example, one judge might opt to rely on the dictionary cited by
the party he finds more persuasive on other grounds, converting
dictionaries from useful tools for reaching sound conclusions into
post hoc rationalizations. Another judge might opt consistently for
unabridged over collegiate dictionaries. Yet another judge might opt
to stick with the dictionary she has at hand in her chambers, or in the
courthouse library, when it is time to make a decision. Indeed, given
the lack of guidance from the Federal Circuit, one cannot be
surprised at the following exchange, involving an experienced federal
trial judge, at a three-day patent law conference in September 2003:
Returning to the notion that claim construction should begin with
the dictionary meaning of the disputed term, a conference
participant suggested that different dictionaries may provide
inconsistent definitions, leaving a judge with the need to decide
which dictionary to rely upon. [U.S. District] Judge [T.S.] Ellis
[E.D. Va.] shot back, "I use the dictionary in my library. 1 '25
Such an approach to dictionary choice is neither neutral nor
predictable. Indeed, to the degree that cases are assigned to judges
at random, the "it's in my library" method amounts to random
dictionary selection. This state of affairs is, from a systemic
perspective, highly undesirable.
Dictionary selection by judicial caprice is not merely the stuff of
anecdote. Our detailed review of dictionary-citing cases from April
1995 to June 2004 reveals two troubling phenomena that underscore
the chaotic way in which the Federal Circuit itself appears to choose
dictionaries for claim construction. First, we identified four cases in
which the Federal Circuit used a dictionary different from the
dictionary it reported the trial court had used in the same case.12 In
125. Judge Lourie Defends CAFC Reversals, PTO Chief Rogan Promises Patent Quality, 66
PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 580, 581 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/PTC.NSF. It is not clear from the report whether
Judge Ellis was referring to a library in his chambers or instead to a general library at
the courthouse where he works.
126. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1324, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (shifting from Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary to Webster's Third New International Dictionary to help
define a claim term); Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1370-74, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 1214-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (shifting from Webster's
Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary to Webster's Third New International Dictionary to help
define three separate claim terms); Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert
Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (DykJ.)
(shifting from Merriam-Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary to both Webster's Third New
International Dictionmy and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to help define two separate
claim terms); Johnstown Am. Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., Nos. 97-1070, 97-1071,
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none of these four cases does the Federal Circuit explain, in any way,
why it chose a dictionary different from the one the trial court used.
The dictionary switches in these cases are made all the more puzzling
by the fact that the Federal Circuit has, in other cases, used all the
dictionaries it rebuffs from the trial judges in these four cases. Why
the inter-court switch? A Federal Circuit preference for unabridged
over college dictionaries (which could explain three of the four
cases)? The chosen book's ready availability in a chambers or court
library? The personal preference of an opinion's authoring judge?
Some other reason? The court does not say.
Second, we identified four cases (separate from those just
discussed) in which the Federal Circuit uses different dictionaries to
define two different words from the very same disputed phrase in the
claim. 127 In the most recent of the cases, for example, the court
construes the claim phrase "opening for connecting" by, among
other things, looking up the definition of "opening" in the Oxford
English Dictionary and the definition of "connect" in Webster's Third
New International Dictionary 2 8 In none of these four cases does the
Federal Circuit explain, in any way, why the dictionary used to define
one word in the phrase is inadequate or inappropriate when defining
the other word in the very same phrase. Why the mid-phrase switch?
Did the parties themselves cite the dictionaries in this pattern? If so,
what about this citation pattern was persuasive? Was one dictionary
more comprehensive on the desired term than the other? Some
other reason? Again, the court does not say.
It thus appears to the outside observer that the Federal Circuit
effectively chooses dictionaries at random. To be sure, both the
sweeping mandate of Telegenix (licensing any dictionary at any time)
and the freewheeling approach to dictionary selection that its own
cases reveal maximize the Federal Circuit's freedom to obtain the
objective reference(s) that it finds most helpful-whatever that
1997 WL 291956, at *1-3 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Archer, J.) (shifting from American Heritage
Dictionary to Dictionary of Architecture & Construction to help define a claim term).
127. TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (using two
different general purpose dictionaries for two different words); Housey Pharms., Inc.
v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Clevenger, J.) (using two different specialized dictionaries for two
different words); Anchor Wall Sys. v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298,
1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Gajarsa, J.) (using two
different general purpose dictionaries for two different words); Karlin Tech., Inc. v.
Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1468 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (using a general purpose dictionary for one word and a specialized
dictionary for another).
128. TI Group, 375 F.3d at 1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
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means-at a given moment. When a court chooses a dictionary
according to this approach, it knows, of course, its own dictionary
predilections, the bottom-line positions of each party offering any
other dictionary, and the final conclusion it favors based on the other
materials in the case.12'9  This approach, which replaces judicial
caprice for party bias, is thus quite at odds with the neutrality that
Telegenix praises as the reason to prefer dictionaries over resources
such as expert testimony."O The price of the courts' freedom is the
costly uncertainty the court imposes on all other actors in the patent
system-patentees, potential licensees, accused infringers, the Patent
Office-who are simply left to guess, for good or ill, what dictionary a
trial court may choose when litigation arises and what dictionary
(perhaps a different one) the Federal Circuit may choose on appeal.
Nor is the guessing game mere sport. The dictionary that a court
chooses to help define a claim term can have a demonstrable effect
on the case's outcome.
B. The Difference a Different Dictionary Can Make
One might posit, in response to the apparent caprice in dictionary
selection just discussed, that there is no harm in such caprice because
dictionaries do not differ enough in content for the choice among
them to materially affect a case's outcome. There is doubtless some
common sense appeal to this notion. After all, professional
lexicographers, whether writing a general purpose English language
dictionary or a specialized dictionary, strive to define the words in a
common lexicon, e.g., standard American English, or standard
medical terminology. All dictionary writers are under enormous
129. In a thoughtful discussion of the Federal Circuit's "ordinary meaning" cases,
Barney posits that judicial selection of a dictionary is preferable to litigant selection
of a dictionary. See Barney, supra note 42, at 126. Specifically, Barney argues, "unlike
[with] other sources of extrinsic evidence, a judge can pull a dictionary from his or
her own shelf and find a definition of a disputed term free from any influence by the
litigants." Id. (emphasis in original). First, we disagree that a judge who has heard
the parties' arguments on claim construction is "free from any influence by the
litigants." Second, even if Barney is right about the absence of litigant influence, a
"let the judge choose" strategy provides no guidance to parties who are attempting in
good faith to avoid litigation in the first place, either by licensing the patent or
designing around the claimed invention. Surely our goal should be to develop a
claim construction methodology that helps opposing interests accurately assess their
respective likelihoods of success were litigation to occur and thus dispense with the
need actually to litigate at all.
130. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (dictionaries are helpful because they are "not
influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic
record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not
inspired by litigation").
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pressure to be concise,'3 ' and concision leaves less room for differing
creative expressions. All reputable dictionary writers use extensive
evidence of common usage 1 2 and, in the case of specialized terms,
copious input from accomplished experts in the relevant field.1
3
Finally, competing lexicographers have, since the birth of the English
language dictionary, aggressively monitored (and sometimes avidly
borrowed from) one another's published definitions.3 4  The hunch
131. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 173 ("Almost every defining characteristic
common to dictionaries can be traced to the need to conserve space.").
132. The "chief sources of definitions" for modern dictionaries are "the citation
file and the electronic corpus." Id. at 189. According to Landau, a "citation file is a
selection of potential lexical units in the context of actual usage, drawn from a
variety of written sources and often some spoken sources, chiefly because the context
illuminates an aspect of meaning." Id. at 190 (emphasis in original). And a
"corpus... is a collection of different texts or of recorded speech, nowadays stored
electronically on a computer and indexed so that any particular word can be found
quickly in the context in which it has been used." Id.; see also id. at 192-93
(contrasting electronic corpora from citation files). Landau provides both exemplar
citation slips and sample corpus printouts. See id. at 196-99 (citation slips in Figs. 8-13); id. at 194 (corpus printout in Fig. 7); see also BtfJOINT, supra note 79, at 97-99
(discussing usage-based evidence for definitions). All lawyers are, of course, familiar
with the corpora known as Westlaw and LexisNexis.
133. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 168 ("Although usage in scientific terminology is
given much weight when it is available, in general imposed definitions are
determined by a consensus of experts."); id. at 191 (noting that general purpose
dictionaries "rely on specialists to define the large percentage of scientific and
technical terms."); id. at 213 ("Most scientific and technical terms must be defined by
specialists on the basis of their judgments about preferred scientific usage.").
Consulting experts (or, at least, claiming to) is as old as Edward Phillips' The New
World of English Word (1658), in which the author vouched "for the accuracy of his
definitions by naming specialist sources of information, for example 'Dr Sparks' for
'physicks', 'Mr Molins' for 'botanicks', and 'Dr Wybard' for geometry." Michael
Rand Hoare & Vivian Salmon, The Vocabulary of Science in the OED, in LEXICOGRAPHY
AND THE OED: PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 156, 156, 171 (Lynda
Mugglestone ed., 2000).
134. As Landau succinctly states, "[m]odern lexicographers look very carefully at
each other's work." Id. at 43. The practice is dictated, in part, by the profit motive:
"Few modem commercial publishers have an instinct for scholarship so pure that
they will spend millions of dollars to redo what other, better scholars have done
before them." Id. at 44. As a result, when a new dictionary project begins, one
scrutinizes existing sources. According to Landau,
Dictionary makers acquire every significant new dictionary as soon as it is
published. One's direct competitors' works are examined with due care to
see what new terms they have included-or failed to include.... Another
dictionary's definition must be considered along with other citations for the
word being defined.... [C]ommercial dictionaries are now loath to admit
having relied on a competitor. For marketing reasons, every dictionary is
represented as being unaffected by every other. Nothing could be further
from the truth.
Id. at 214. Even so, not all dictionaries are equal: "the Merriam-Webster dictionaries
in America and the Oxford dictionaries in the UK are less influenced by other
dictionaries than other dictionaries are by them." Id. at 402. For an engaging
discussion of detailed examples of verbatim definition borrowing, in dictionaries
both modem and antique, see Robert Burchfield, The Genealogy of Dictionaries, in
UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 147 (1989).
Borrowing a competitor's handiwork verbatim is as old as English lexicography.
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that different dictionaries often converge in their definitions is thus
consistent with actual lexicography practice.
At the same time, important differences among competing
dictionaries exist alongside convergence in some definitions. First,
different dictionaries approach crafting the body of a definition
differently. Consider the flagship dictionaries of the two groups that
the Federal Circuit cites most often, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary and American Heritage Dictionary. A definition in Webster's
Third, for example, is consciously designed to be "a single coherent
and clearly expressed phrase that need[s] no punctuation except
where commas [are] essential to separate words or groups of words in
a series."'"5  In addition, the definitions in Webster's Third carry only
minimal status and usage labeling.1 6  A definition in American
Heritage, by contrast, is not confined to the single-statement defining
Robert Cawdrey's A Table Alphabeticall (1604), "most often accepted as the first
[English monolingual] dictionary," copied liberally from two Latin-English works.
LANDAU, supra note 2, at 46, 48. Cawdrey's work was in turn copied liberally by " [t] he
next English dictionary," John Bullokar's An English Expositor (1616). Id. at 48. In
short, "[t]he earliest English lexicographers by and large copied the definitions of
their predecessors." Id. at 190.
135. MORTON, supra note 3, at 87. This defining style, pioneered by Philip
Babcock Gove, the Editor-in-Chief of Webster's Third, was "Gove's most distinctive
innovation" in the work. Id. The style produced some clunkers and thus had its
critics. Id. For example, Webster's Third broadly defines the noun "door" as follows:
1 a: a movable piece of firm material or a structure supported usu. along
one side and swinging on pivots or hinges, sliding along a groove, rolling up
and down, revolving as one of four leaves, or folding like an accordion by
means of which an opening may be closed or kept open for passage into or
out of a building, room, or other covered enclosure or a car, airplane,
elevator, or other vehicle-see kalamein door, panel door
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 674 (2002).
136. MORTON, supra note 3, at 135 ("The most striking of Gove's policies on usage
was his decision to cut back on the use of the slang label, eliminate the label
colloquial entirely, and put greater reliance on illustrative quotations and usage
notes to indicate the status of words that were on the borderline of standard
English."). As Morton recounts in comprehensive detail, Gove's choice to minimize
status and usage labeling in Webster's Third was savaged by many reviewers and hailed
by others in the two years following the book's first publication. Id. at 153-214. See
also Robert Burchfield, Words and Meanings in the Twentieth Century, in UNLOCKING THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 61, 76 (1989) ("The publication of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary in 1961 was greeted with immense pleasure by most academic
reviewers and with implacable hostility by nearly every journalist who reviewed it.
University teachers loved its inclusiveness and its up-to-dateness. Journalists spoke of
'sabotage at Springfield': they judged it to be a work of deplorable linguistic
permissiveness.").
So spirited were the so-called "prescriptivist/descriptivist" debates attending the
publication of Webster's Third, the controversy yielded an anthology of detractors' and
supporters' reviews. See DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY: A CASEBOOK ON THE
AIMS OF LEXICOGRAPHERS AND THE TARGETS OF REVIEWERS 50-250 (James Sledd &
Wilma R. Ebbitt eds., 1962). Gove later defended his policy on status and usage
labels. See also Philip B. Gove, Usage in the Dictionary, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY
51 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1967).
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style of Webster's Third,'37 and American Heritage provides both copious
status labeling and usage advice from a 200-member "usage panel."
'
"'
8
These differences are, in fact, rooted in the great controversy that
erupted with the publication of Webster's Third in 1961: both the
American Heritage Dictionary, first published in 1969, and the "usage
panel" device it inaugurated, were direct responses to what its
publisher viewed as the radical descriptivism of Webster's Third.'
39
Second, when defining a word with multiple senses, different
dictionaries order the several senses differently. There are two
conventional approaches to ordering these senses: chronologically
(or historically), ranging from earliest to most recent sense; and
logically, ranging from more to less important or frequent sense. A
given dictionary usually states its approach to ordering senses in its
"front matter," which most users rarely, if ever, consult.' 40  Funk &
Wagnalls pioneered ordering senses by frequency of usage in its
Standard Dictionary (1893) and New Standard Dictionary (1913), "' and
logical ordering is now the more common way to organize senses.142
Both Merriam-Webster and Oxford University dictionaries order
senses chronologically. 143  Both American Heritage and Random
137. For example, American Heritage broadly defines the noun "door" as "[a]
movable structure used to close off an entrance, typically consisting of a panel that
swings on hinges or that slides or rotates." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 536 (4th
ed. 2000).
138. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY viii (4th ed. 2000) ("The Usage Notes are
based on periodic surveys of the Usage Panel, a group of some 200 distinguished
writers, scholars, scientists, and other respected users and students of the English
language."); id. at xiii-xv (listing members of the usage panel); see also LANDAU, supra
note 2, at 93 ("The one extraordinary feature of the American Heritage dictionaries
apart from their [graphic and color illustration] design has been the introduction of
a usage panel of putative 'good writers' whose judgments about disputed usages are
supposed to provide guidance for the rest of the benighted English-speaking
world.").
139. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 93-94 (discussing the early history of the American
Heritage Dictionary); MORTON, supra note 3, at 223-25,228-32 (same).
140. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 148 ("The trend in recent years has been to cut
back on front matter because it is widely believed among lexicographers that no one
reads it.").
141. See id. at 86.
142. See BtJOINT, supra note 79, at 50.
143. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17 a, 12.5 (2002)
("The order of senses is historical: the one known to have been first used in English
is entered first."); I SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xvii-xviii, 4.10 (5th ed.
2002) (explaining chronological ordering of senses); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
xxix (2d ed. 1989) ("[T]hat sense is placed first which was actually the earliest in the
language: the others follow in the order in which they appear to have arisen.");
WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (1985) ("The order of senses
within an entry is historical: the sense known to have been first used in English is
entered first .... When a numbered sense is further subdivided into lettered
subsenses ... their order is likewise historical: subsense la is earlier than lb, lb is
earlier than ic, and so forth."). For a lucid and detailed account of the way in which
James A.H. Murray and his assistants crafted definitions for the first edition of the
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House dictionaries, by contrast, order senses from more to less
central usage.""
These important differences among different dictionaries can, in
turn, generate different claim construction analyses. First, when a
court uses only one dictionary in aid of its claim construction, the
dictionary's content may differ fromothers in a way that hits hard at
the patentee's core disagreement with the accused infringer. Second,
these content-based effects may be compounded by the fact that,
when a court uses multiple dictionaries to derive a unified ordinary
meaning for a disputed word, it can select from among varied
approaches to forging one definition from many sources. A brief
review of three Federal Circuit cases from the last year amply
demonstrates the substantive difference that selecting different
dictionaries can make.
1. The usage note case
In International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,145 the Federal Circuit
confronted a claim construction dispute involving a patented
semiconductor chip structure. The claimed structure included both
a "wafer of semiconductor material having a relatively lightly doped
major body portion" and "a further region of opposite conductivity
type adjoining [the] lightly doped major body portion.' ' 46  The
accused infringer's liability for infringement of the claims using the
word "adjoining" turned entirely on whether or not "adjoining"
requires that the major body portion and the further region touch
each other. 147
The district court, quoting defining language from Webster's Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary, concluded that "two objects need not be in
physical contact to be 'adjoining." 48 IXYS, the accused infringer,
Oxford English Dictionary, see Penny Silva, Time and Meaning: Sense and Definition in the
OED, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED: PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 77 (Lynda
Muggleston ed., 2000).
144. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY xxxiv (4th ed. 2000) ("Entries containing
more than one sense are arranged for the convenience of contemporary dictionary
users with the central and often the most commonly sought meaning first. Senses
and subsenses are grouped to show their relationships with each other."); AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY xxv (3d ed. 1997) (same); RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE xxxii (2d ed. 1987) ("In each part of speech
group, the most frequently encountered meanings generally come before less
common ones."); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY xviii (2d ed.
1997) (same).
145. 361 F.3d 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
146. Id. at 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (quoting claim 19 of U.S. Patent
No. 4,959,699 (issued Sept. 25, 1990)).
147. Id. at 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
148. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
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conceded that it could not avoid infringement of the claims under
the district court's construction of "adjoining.',
49
What does this dictionary actually say? The Ninth New Collegiate
defines "adjoin" as "to lie next to or in contact with" and "to be close
to or in contact with one another," and defines "adjoining" as
"touching or bounding at a point or line.' 50  The definition of
"adjoining" also directs the reader to the definition of "adjacent,"
which it labels a synonym. 5' The Ninth New Collegiate defines
"adjacent" as "not distant," "having a common endpoint or border,"
and "immediately preceding or following.', 2 All these definitions
suggest that one can, consistent with ordinary usage, use both
adjoining and adjacent to describe two items that are close to each
other but not touching. Most importantly for our discussion here,
the definition of "adjacent" in the Ninth New Collegiate further
includes a usage note contrasting adjoining and adjacent, a note to
which the district court made no apparent reference:
ADJACENT, ADJOINING, CONTIGUOUS, JUXTAPOSED mean
being in close proximity. ADJACENT may or may not imply
contact but always implies absence of anything of the same kind in
between; ADJOINING definitely implies meeting and touching at
some point or line; CONTIGUOUS implies having contact on all
or most of one side; JUXTAPOSED means placed side by side esp.
so as to permit comparison and contrast.
53
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's
construction of "adjoining," holding that this word in the claims
requires physical contact between the major body portion and the
further region. 54 It also held that, as a matter of law, IXYS could not
have infringed the claims containing the "adjoining" requirement.
First, and without explaining why, the Federal Circuit switched from
the Ninth New Collegiate to the 1966 printing of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary. 5 6 Second, after quoting the definitions of
"adjoining" and "adjacent" from Webster's Third, the court focused on
the Webster's Third version of the usage note (appended to the
'57definition of "adjacent") that contrasts these two synonyms.
149. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
150. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (1985).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Int'l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1209, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
155. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
156. Id. at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
157. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
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The usage note in Webster's Third is quite a bit longer than the
corresponding note in the Ninth New Collegiate. It states, in relevant
part, as follows:
ADJACENT is sometimes merely a synonym for near or close to.
Applied to things of the same type, it indicates either side-by-side
proximity or lack of anything of the same nature intervening.
ADJOINING is quite similar to ADJACENT in meaning and
suggestion but may more strongly indicate existence of common
bounding lines or lines or points ofjunction.
The Federal Circuit, after quoting this usage note, concludes that
the district court erred by ignoring its teaching. According to the
Federal Circuit,
[T]he district court was not free to disregard this usage note....
[T]he district court's adoption of a definition [for "adjoining"]
attributed to "adjacent," a synonym of the claim term, disregards
entirely the distinction between the two terms set forth in the usage
note. Had the inventor meant "adjacent," he could have used that
word.159
The court betrays no hint of irony at faulting the district court for
"disregarding" a usage note in a dictionary that the district court
never consulted.
Putting the unexplained dictionary switch to one side, it seems
sensible at first blush to conclude that, having decided to consult a
dictionary, one must take all that one finds there-both the bitter
and the sweet, as it were. And the Ninth New Collegiate, like Webster's
Third, includes a usage note for "adjacent" that tilts decidedly in favor
of the Federal Circuit's construction of "adjoining." Then one
wonders, do other dictionaries draw precisely the same distinctions
between "adjoining" and "adjacent" that the Merriam-Webster
sources do? If not, perhaps more weight has been put on these usage
notes than they can bear.
As it turns out, the American Heritage dictionaries-which as a group
take second place among the Federal Circuit's most commonly cited
general purpose dictionaries-distinguish "adjoining" from
158. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 26 (1966) (illustrative
quotations omitted). The 2002 printing of Webster's Third contains the very same
definitions and usage note. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 26-
27 (2002). In addition, the Addenda Section of the 2002 printing, id. at 55a-144a,
which contains new words and new senses of words that have entered the lexicon
since 1961, does not provide any additional information for "adjacent" or
"adjoining." See id. at 55a. We suspect that many who use post-1961 printings of
Webster's Third do not know about the existence of, much less the importance of
consulting, the Addenda Section. The Federal Circuit appears never to have cited it.
159. Int'lRecti fier, 361 F.3d at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
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"adjacent" far less tidily than do the Merriam-Webster sources. The
entire definitions of "adjoining" and "adjacent" from the three
American Heritage sources are as follows:
"ADJOINING" "ADJACENT"
American Heritage Neighboring; 1. Close to; lying near;
Dictionary 21 (4th contiguous. adjacent cities. 2. Next to;
ed. 2000) adjoining: adjacent garden
plots.
American Heritage Neighboring; 1. Close to; lying near;
College Dictionary contiguous. adjacent cities. 2. Next to;
16 (3d ed. 1997) adjoining: adjacent garden
plots.
American Heritage Neighboring; 1. Close to; lying near.
Dictionary 79 (2d contiguous; 2. Next to; adjoining.
college ed. 1985) next to.
None of these three dictionaries has any usage note for either
word. Nor do any of them even point from the word "adjoining" to
the word "adjacent." The definition of "adjacent" merely uses the
word "adjoining."
It thus appears that, had the Federal Circuit switched to an
American Heritage dictionary rather than switching to Webster's Third, it
might well have affirmed the district court's construction of
"adjoining" and the concomitant infringement liability judgment.
Instead, it reversed the claim construction and the liability judgment.
Dictionary selection seems to have made the difference between
liability and no liability.
2. The high frequency and wood board cases: Making one from many
Two recent cases expose an important methodological choice that
arises when one tries to use definitions from multiple dictionaries to
create a single statement of a word's ordinary meaning. One option
is to take as the word's ordinary meaning only the select material that
is common to all the definitions; another option is take as the word's
ordinary meaning the totality of the material from all the
definitions. 160 The first approach, which extracts material common to
all the definitions, has the virtue of identifying the meaning of the
target word that is most widely and well-established in the relevant
language community. And it is the settled nature of ordinary
160. We owe this point toJohn Duffy.
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meaning that makes ordinary meaning-and the use of a dictionary
to identify it-attractive as a default rule for claim construction. 161
The second approach, which embraces all material found in any
definition, has the virtue of identifying the broadest possible range of
ordinary meaning for the target word. And it is the promise of a
comprehensive reminder which augments one's untutored
understanding that makes consulting a dictionary a helpful
exercise. 62 Both methods, then, are consonant with some of the
policy bases for relying on dictionaries. Choosing between the
methods, one must note, also interacts with one's choice of
dictionaries, given that dictionaries vary in content. Which method
should a court use when creating one definition of a disputed claim
term from many dictionaries? Interestingly, each of the two Federal
Circuit cases to which we now turn uses a different one of these two
methodologies.
In Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablebvision of
Westchester, Inc.,63 the Federal Circuit construed the phrase "high
frequency carrier" in a patent claim covering a wired broadcasting
system. 64  The district court, relying on both the McGraw-Hill
161. Thus, for example, the Federal Circuit recently rejected the efforts of both a
patentee and an accused infringer to rely on reference sources that reflected
changing, rather than settled, meanings of the claim term under dispute. In the
case, captioned ACTV, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 68 U.S.P.Q2d (BNA)
1516 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the parties disputed the scope of the claim term "uniform
resource locator." Each party urged the court to rely on one of two dueling
reference documents, called Requests for Comments or RFCs, from the internet
standard setting body known as the World Wide Web Consortium. Id. at 1088-89, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21. The Federal Circuit rejected both reference
documents on the ground that they did not reflect a settled meaning for the target
term:
The purpose of the RFCs is... to collect commentary and to select language
to facilitate a common understanding, or to select a standard, from a variety
of competing technologies and vocabularies and from a variety of potentially
competing interests.... This purpose is in sharp contrast to the role of
dictionaries and treatises, which aim not to select or give meaning to a word
or phrase, but to report the meaning already established and commonly
understood by those skilled in the art.... Because the RFCs were not
designed to reflect common usage, but rather to assign language to facilitate
further conversation, and because of the seeming contradictions between
RFC 1738 and RFC 1808, we conclude that both documents are extrinsic
evidence... (and] we decline to rely on them in our claim construction
analysis.
Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
The reader interested in learning more about the role of RFCs in developing
internet standards should consult Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in
OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 47, 50 (Chris DeBona et
al. eds., 1999).
162. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
163. 336 F.3d 1308, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
164. Id. at 1310-12, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
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Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms and Webster's Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary, construed "high frequency" to mean between
three and thirty MHz. 165 The Federal Circuit, for its part, affirmed
this construction of "high frequency," relying on the same
dictionaries as the district court.
166
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit rejected the
patentee's contention that it was improper to define "high frequency"
so narrowly given the existence of dictionaries that define the phrase
more broadly. Specifically, the patentee presented broader
definitions from both the Oxford English Dictionary and the Dictionary
of Electronics.167 The Federal Circuit resolved the apparent problem
with the broader definitions by pointing out, with the help of
extended quotations from them, that they also included the narrower
equation of "high frequency" with "3 to 30 megahertz.' 68 In other
words, without expressly stating it, the court used the first of the two
methodologies described above: take as the ordinary meaning only
that which is common to multiple dictionary definitions. The
narrower construction of "high frequency" precluded infringement
liability. 69 Less than a year later the court shifted ground to the other
methodology.
In Nystrom v. TREX Co., 70 the Federal Circuit construed the noun
"board" in a patent claim covering a flooring board with a top surface
designed to slope gradually off to either side of the center. 7' The
patentee contended that the word "board" covered both wood boards
and synthetic boards; the accused infringer, who made synthetic
boards that otherwise fell within the scope of the patent claims,
contended that "board" covered only wood boards.7 7 The district
court, agreeing with the accused infringer, construed "board" to
mean "a piece of elongated construction material made from wood
cut from a log.'' 173 The Federal Circuit reversed this construction,
defining "board" as "an elongated, flat piece of wood or other rigid
material."1
7 4
165. Id. at 1314-15, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
166. Id. at 1315-16, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389-90.
167. Id. at 1315, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
168. Id. at 1316 n.7, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390 (quoting from Oxford English
Dictionary and Dictionary of Electronics).
169. Id. at 1317, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
170. 374 F.3d 1105, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
171. Id. at 1107-08, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
172. Id. at 1110-11, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
173. Id. at 1110, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
174. Id. at 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
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Just as in UA-Columbia, the Federal Circuit confronted multiple,
differing dictionary definitions of the critical term. Specifically,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary and American Heritage
Dictionary define "board" differently, and the difference is precisely
the 'wood only v. wood and synthetic' distinction. Webster's Third
defines "board," in relevant part, as "a piece of sawed lumber of little
thickness but considerable surface area usu. being rectangular and of
a length greatly exceeding its width.,,17-5 American Heritage, by contrast,
defines "board," in relevant part, as both "[a] long flat slab of sawed
lumber; a plank" and "[a] flat piece of wood or similarly rigid
material adapted for a special use.' 7 6  The court quoted both
definitions, noting that "[w]hile some dictionaries define 'board'
solely in reference to its material composition, not all dictionaries are
so constrained.'
'177
Had the Nystrom panel followed the same methodology as the UA-
Columbia panel, the court would have distilled from these disparate
definitions that which is common to both and thus defined "board"
to mean "a slab of sawed lumber.' ' 78  Under that construction, it
would have affirmed the district court's judgment of no liability.
Instead, the court adopted the opposite methodology-combining
material mentioned in any definition, rather than extracting material
mentioned in all definitions. According to the Federal Circuit, the
differing Webster's Third and American Heritage definitions "show that
the ordinary meaning of the word 'board' encompasses both a piece
of cut wood or sawn timber and a similarly-shaped item made of rigid
material."1 '9  The court did not cite, much less discuss, the UA-
Columbia case.
In the foregoing cases, the court's dictionary selections and
methods for using dictionaries directly affected the liability outcome.
It is, of course, possible that in most other instances in which the
Federal Circuit used one or more dictionaries to help construe a
claim term, the court would have reached the very same outcome no
matter what dictionary it used. But it is not likely. Dictionary choice
matters. And thus the need remains for a principled, predictable
175. WERSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 243 (2002) (sense 3a).
The Addenda Section defines additional senses for the noun "board," id. at 65a, but
none of them is relevant here. It is interesting to note that, had the Federal Circuit
used one dictionary alone (which is the more common technique), and that
dictionary had been Webster's Third (which it cites most often, see Apps. B & C), the
case could well have come out the opposite way.
176. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 203 (4th ed. 2000).
177. Nystrom, 374 F.3d at 1111-12, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
178. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
179. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
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dictionary selection method that shares the neutrality of dictionary
writing, i.e., that helps one get dictionary content that is free from
the biasing influence of the parties' position-dictated views or the
judge's purely personal preferences. The method we propose
achieves this predictability and neutrality by mandating that
dictionary selections be made before the parties to a dispute can
know which reference sources best favor the outcomes they desire-
indeed, before the patent, at the heart of a later dispute, even exists.
III. MOVING DICTIONARY CHOICE TO THE PATENT OFFICE
The presumption of ordinary meaning has great merit. A person
of ordinary skill in the art to which a patent pertains is knowledgeable
about both the art itself and the ways that people in the art talk and
write about their work. As a result, when a person of ordinary skill in
the art reads a patent, she looks at the words that the patentee has
used in light of the ordinary meaning that those words have to people
skilled in the art. Patentees surely know this about their readers.• 180
Only nonce words-words that are coined for a single occasion --
often lack an ordinary meaning outside the context of the patent.
Patentees know this, too. It is thus quite sensible to assume that,
unless there is good evidence to the contrary, the patentee has
chosen the words in the written description and the claims of the
patent according to their ordinary meaning. The Federal Circuit's
heavy presumption of ordinary meaning builds this insight into the
claim construction process.""
180. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1535 (2002) (defining
adjective "nonce" as "occurring, used, or made only once or for a special occasion").
The highfalutin term is hapax legomenon. Id. at 1030. Nonce words can have an
ordinary meaning upon being coined if they are constructed using other well known
words. For example, no one who lived through or knew about the Nixon resignation
had any trouble understanding on first reading the popular press terms "travelgate"
(the dustup over firings at the White House Travel Office early in President Clinton's
first term), "nannygate" (the sinking of President Clinton's first nominee to be
Attorney General, ZoE Baird, over her having employed two illegal immigrants to
work as nannies) or "zippergate" (a colorful term for the Lewinsky scandal)-all of
which are derived analogically from the Watergate break-in scandal that destroyed
the Nixon presidency. See generally Dieter Kastovsky, Words and Word-Formation:
Morphology in OED, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED: PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN
FOREST 110, 113 (Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000) (discussing the ways in which "a
nonce-formation can usually be satisfactorily interpreted by the listener when he or
she hears it for the first time").
James A.H. Murray, the editor of the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary,
coined the phrase "nonce word" to describe items that appeared in only one source.
See 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxvii (2d ed. 1989) ("Words apparently employed
only for the nonce, are, when inserted in the Dictionary, marked nonce-wd."); see also 10
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 487 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 1, sense 4, of "nonce").
181. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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Consulting dictionaries and similar usage-based sources to
determine ordinary meaning also has great merit. Of course, even
our most comprehensive dictionaries cannot map all the linguistic
terrain. As Robert Burchfield, editor of the four-volume Supplement to
the Oxford English Dictionary from 1957 to 1986, s2 put it, there is a
"never-ending raggedness, stretching away into the darkness, of our
language at the perimeter of what we can manage to put in our
largest dictionaries."'8 3 All the same, it is better to aid subjective
memory with objective resources than to rely on subjective memory
alone. The Federal Circuit's turn to dictionaries as helpful reminders
about the full range of a word's ordinary meaning to a person of
ordinary skill follows, in this respect, a well-worn judicial path.184 The
empirical evidence discussed above, which shows that all current
members of the Federal Circuit have relied on dictionaries in claim
construction to at least a degree,85 strongly suggests that the court
will not stop using dictionaries altogether as a claim construction
tool. 18 6 The court's dictionary selections in individual cases, however,
remain troublingly chaotic.
The Federal Circuit, having chosen to presume that patentees
select words for a claim according to their ordinary meaning, is right
to seek out this meaning in "unbiased reflections of common
understanding" that are "not colored by the motives of the parties,
and not inspired by litigation."8" The court cannot reach this goal,
however, without identifying some predictable basis upon which to
deploy objective reference sources that were publicly available to the
patentee and others in the art at the time the patent application was
filed.
182. See Robert Burchfield, Linguistic Milestones, in UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 3, 3 (1989).
183. Id. at 19 (quoting a letter he wrote to Anthony Burgess, novelist and literary
critic, in 1986). One of the Federal Circuit's predecessor courts made a similar point
in discussing the freedom the law gives every patentee to coin new words in a patent:
Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The
dictionary does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things
are not made for the sake of words, but words for things. To overcome this
lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.
Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 502 (Ct.
Cl. 1967).
184. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
185. See infraTbl. 7, App. B.
186. We concede that, as a formal matter, the en banc order in the Phillips case
puts a "no more dictionaries" option in play. See supra notes 17-18 and
accompanying text. As a practical matter, however, we do not think it is likely that
the court will choose the "no more dictionaries" option.
187. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 US.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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One might be tempted to conclude that the Federal Circuit can
bring about this predictability entirely on its own. We conclude
otherwise. To appreciate why, consider the following thought
experiment: Imagine that the court declares that, so far as it is
concerned, (a) the definitive general purpose English language
dictionary is Webster's Third New International Dictionary, (b) it will
consult one and only one general purpose English language
dictionary, Webster's Third, when determining a contested claim's
ordinary meaning, and (c) it will consult the printing of Webster's
Third that most closely precedes the disputed patent's filing date.
This framework, which has the virtue of maximizing predictability (at
least in the short run), is far too brittle to survive. Its largest defect,
apart from grossly violating existing patentees' settled expectations
about the acceptability of numerous dictionaries, 8 is the failure to
take any account of the court's preference, about thirty percent of
the time, for specialized reference sources. s9
Imagine, then, that the court modifies the simple framework above
to include specialized reference sources. The court cannot limit itself
to a single specialized source because it reviews cases from numerous
technological domains. As the court tries to answer questions that
necessarily arise when it uses multiple sources, predictability quickly
begins to collapse. When should one use a specialized source rather
than a general purpose source? Should one use a single specialized
source, or multiple sources? Which source(s)? 90 If one uses multiple
sources, how does one forge a single meaning from what they say as a
group? Most of these questions likely cannot be answered in a way
that applies robustly across a large number of patents, even within a
single field of art. Moreover, if the court somehow managed to
188. This is not a small problem. The Supreme Court has cautioned the Federal
Circuit against violating patentees' settled expectations with jarring retroactive
changes to the rules of the patent game. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) ("[C]ourts must be cautious before adopting
changes [to patent law] that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing
community.").
189. See supra Tbl. 8.
190. This question is probably the toughest for the court to answer. First, a single
case is simply not a good vehicle for issuing what amount to prospective regulations
about acceptable reference books. Second, even if it wanted to try to identify
mandated reference books case by case, the court does not have the institutional
resources to determine, for any given field at a given time, which specific reference
books were the highest quality for claim construction purposes. For example, which
specialized reference is best for pharmaceutical inventions made in the late 1980s?
For computer software inventions made in the early 1990s? For semiconductor chip
inventions made in 2000? Nor does the problem stand still. As time rolls forward,
the court would have to keep identifying the best reference sources over and over
again.
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provide answers that had some staying power, the prior decision to
permit use of only one general purpose source (Webster's Third in our
hypothetical) would doubtless come under relentless pressure from
parties who stood to gain, in their respective cases, from the use of a
different general purpose dictionary (e.g., American Heritage
Dictionary). The task of drafting what amount to complex dictionary
citation regulations, in the guise of deciding cases, would thus begin
anew with the general purpose sources.191
This brief thought experiment should be enough to show that the
Federal Circuit, if forced to undertake the task alone, is ill suited to
make dictionary selection substantially more predictable. All the
court alone can do, at least at this time, is mandate a closed list of the
reference sources it will consult. Happily, the Federal Circuit is not
alone.
The Patent Office, another key player in our patent system, 192 is well
suited to deploy its power over patent examination procedure to
render dictionary selection far more predictable. And it can do so
without relying on closed source lists.193 Specifically, as we describe in
detail below, the Patent Office can and should require all patent
applicants to state their dictionary preferences, both general purpose
and specialized, on the face of their patent applications at the time of
191. At least one commentator has concluded that choosing dictionaries for use in
statutory interpretation cases is better resolved by legislative than by judicial action.
See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2143-48 (2002). According to Rosenkranz, "Congress could provide:
'When Courts have recourse to a dictionary in interpreting any federal statute
enacted after this one, it shall be the Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, and no
other."' Others, it must be said, have criticized his proposals. See Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory
Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97 (2003).
192. See generally Rai, supra note 26.
193. Professor Wagner, in a recent article that wisely urges greater attention to the
ex ante effects of patent law doctrines, suggests that "a rule assigning the default
meaning of claim terms according to a standard dictionary would be beneficial," at
least "in the sense that [the rule] would induce patentees to be clear about the
meanings of the words they choose for the claims." R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering
Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 244 &
n.312 (2002) (footnote omitted). He notes, in connection with recommending "a
standard dictionary," that "the PTO could promulgate an 'official' list of standard
reference sources, related to technological field where appropriate." Id. at 244
n.311. Under this approach, "[c]laim terms would... be presumed to take the
meaning assigned in the standard source, unless the patentee clearly designated a
different meaning." Id. The interim half of the proposal we describe below
resembles Professor Wagner's approach, although we do not think it is advisable for
the Patent Office to devote resources to developing a consensus about which
reference sources merit inclusion on an official agency list. See infra Part III.C.3. We
propose, instead, that each patent examiner have the flexibility to specify, in the
context of each separate patent application, which reference sources will be
consulted absent objection from the applicant. See infra Part III.C.2.
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filing.94 In any subsequent claim construction process, whether for
licensing, design-around, or litigation purposes, parties would look to
the reference sources that the patentee himself selected. The courts,
including the Federal Circuit, would limit themselves to the same
patentee-selected resources when adjudicating a claim construction
dispute; they would do so in accordance with the general principle
that a patentee is bound in subsequent litigation by the statements
she made in the intrinsic patent record. 195 The Patent Office would
thus, in effect, add another facet to the longstanding practice of
allowing patentees to provide controlling express definitions for any
claim terms in the body of the patent.196 Put another way, patentees,
who are already empowered to be their own lexicographers, i.e.,
dictionary writers, would also be their own dictionary choosers. Such
an approach provides courts with a way to use dictionaries that is
both highly predictable and tailored to each patent. This rule's
properly cognizable cost to the applicant is small, and the benefit to
those who must construe the patent in the future is large.
Before elaborating on our proposed change to the Patent Office's
procedural rules, we address two questions that might arise about the
194. See infra Part III.C.
195. See, e.g., Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 995,
65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("The public notice function of a
patent and its prosecution history requires that a patentee be held to what he
declares during the prosecution of his patent."); Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp.,
162 F.3d 1379, 1384, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The public
is entitled to rely upon the public record of a patent in determining the scope of the
patent's claims."); Key Pharns. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716-17, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Competitors are entitled to rely on
the public record of the patent, and if the meaning of the patent is plain, the public
record is conclusive."); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (" [C] ompetitors are entitled to review
the public record, apply the established rules of claim construction, ascertain the
scope of the patentee's claimed invention and, thus, design around the claimed
invention."); see also Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. R.A.Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354,
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("This court and its predecessor
have held that a statement by an applicant during prosecution identifying certain
matter not the work of the inventor as 'prior art' is an admission that the matter is
prior art.").
196. See 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371,
1374, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1054-55, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate,
Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1137, 1140-41 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re
Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441, 164 U.S.P.Q. 619, 622 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Autogiro Co. v.
United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. 697, 702 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The leading
claim drafting guide recommends the following technique: "When one wishes to
impart a special meaning to a word or phrase appearing in the claims, one should
define that word or phrase in the specification; for example, 'As used in this
description and in the appended claims, the word "-" means ".". ROBERT C.
FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 19, at 111-15 (4th ed.
2001).
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Patent Office playing any role in dictionary selection: whether
compelling dictionary selection falls within the agency's power over
examination procedure; and whether appropriate dictionary
selections can be made at the time the patent application is filed.
The short answer to both questions is, "Yes."
A. Patent Office Power Over Dictionary Choice
The Patent Act grants the Patent Commissioner "broad powers"
over PTO practice. 97 It is equally clear, however, that "Congress has
not vested the Commissioner with any general substantive
rulemaking power."'1 9  Specifically, the Patent Act gives the
Commissioner the power to "establish regulations, not inconsistent
with law, which.., shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the
Office,"'199 i.e., to make procedural rules that bind patent applicants.
When the Patent Office promulgates a rule under this grant of
power, it must use notice-and-comment rulemaking in accordance
with the Administrative Procedure Act.""0 The Federal Circuit, in
turn, gives such a procedural rule controlling weight unless it is
197. Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1528, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912, 1915
(Fed. Cir. 1992); see also id. at 1527 n.3, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 n.3 ("Congress
thus delegated plenary authority over PTO practice, including interference
proceedings, to the Commissioner."); Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325, 1333, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d 1765, 1771 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same).
198. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting Patent Office's contention that its gap-filling
interpretation of two complex patent term provisions was a substantive agency
regulation entitled, if reasonable, to controlling deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)); see also Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 930, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1677, 1686 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (concluding that Patent Office policy regarding the substantive reach of
the Patent Act's "patentable subject matter" provision, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), was
merely an interpretive rule and thus not required to be established through "notice
and comment" rulemaking).
199. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2) (A) (2001). From 1952 to 1999, this grant of power was
set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 6. See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus
Reform Act of 1999, 113 Stat. 1501A-521 to 603, § 4712 (pp. 572-73, amending 35
U.S.C. § 2). The Patent Office has had this power over examination procedure since
1870. See Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198, 200 ("[T]he Commissioner,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, may from time to time
establish rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of
proceedings in the patent office.").
200. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2001) (establishing "notice and comment" rulemaking);
35 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2) (B) (requiring that Patent Office procedural rules "shall be made
in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code"). The current rules
governing the conduct of Patent Office proceedings are codified in Title 37 of the
Code of Federal Regulations. For a concise description of notice-and-comment
rulemaking in federal agencies, see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE § 7.3 (4th ed. 2002). There is no question that the Patent Office is an
"agency" for purposes of the Administrate Procedure Act. See Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999).
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"'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' 20' One
might wonder, against this backdrop, whether the Patent Office has
the power to require every patent applicant to state, on the face of
her application, what publicly available general purpose and
specialized dictionaries she wants the Office to use in the event it
needs help from such sources to construe the scope of her proposed
claims. In short, is such a dictionary rule procedural? If it is, the
Patent Office has the power to promulgate it.
It is important, when analyzing the divide between procedural and
substantive rules in the patent law context, to keep in mind the
Patent Office's primary task-to assess the patentability of the
inventions put before it by applicants. The Patent Act broadly
provides that, when it receives a patent application, the Patent Office
"shall cause an examination to be made of the application and the
alleged new invention" to assess its patentability under the Act.20 2 A
patent issues to the applicant, upon payment of the proper fees2 02 "if
on such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a
patent under law. 20 14 To assess a claim's compliance with each of the
Patent Act's substantive patentability requirements-utility,
2 00
novelty, 206 nonobviousness, and an adequately supporting written
disclosure°S20-a patent examiner must establish the scope of the claim
under review.9 The Patent Act alone, however, provides only
201. In re Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324, 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145, 1149 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984)) (rejecting challenge to validity of Patent Office procedural rule); Tamai,
366 F.3d at 1333-34, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72 (upholding reasonableness of
Patent Office procedural rule).
202. 35 U.S.C. § 131. As the Federal Circuit has succinctly stated, "It is the PTO's
duty to assure that the statutory requirements for patentability are met." In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023,1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
203. 35 U.S.C. § 151.
204. Id. § 131.
205. Id. § 101; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 155-59 (discussing utility
requirement).
206. 35 U.S.C. § 102; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 91, 93 (discussing novelty
requirements).
207. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 131-34 (discussing
nonobviousness requirement).
208. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 65-67 (discussing best
mode, enablement, and written description requirements).
209. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (referring throughout to "the invention"); see
also Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1027, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The first step in any invalidity or infringement analysis
is claim construction."); In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 494,
496 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("All words in a claim must be considered in judging the
patentability of that claim against the prior art."). It is thus no surprise that the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, the Patent Office's official "set of
instructions to the examining corps," In re Kaghan, 387 F.2d 398, 401, 156
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 130, 132 (C.C.P.A. 1967), includes a lengthy discussion of
2005] 889
HeinOnline  -- 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 889 2004-2005
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sparsely phrased general requirements for what an applicant must do
to present a proper patent application. 210 To flesh out the details of
this minimalist statutory framework, the Patent Office has
promulgated detailed regulations governing the manner in which an
- • 211
applicant must present her materials.
Many of the Patent Office's regulations governing patent
applications appear designed to facilitate an examiner's prompt and
efficient comprehension of the scope of the applicant's proposed
claims. For example, to implement the Patent Act's broadly framed
requirement of a specification that describes the invention and ends
with numbered claims, the Patent Office details both the materials
the specification must contain213 and the order in which those
materials must be arranged.214  Similarly, to implement the Patent
Act's broadly framed provision about illustrative drawings, 21 5 the
Patent Office maintains highly detailed regulations governing the
form and content of patent drawings. 6 All these regulations, which
no doubt have some incidental effect on the substance of applicants'
resulting patent rights, are framed with the primary goal of
structuring the patent examination process to facilitate accurate and
efficient assessment of claim patentability. These rules are thus
procedural, in that they are designed not to shape the primary
behavior of inventors (e.g., inventors' decisions to invent new
solutions to problems or, instead, use known solutions), but rather to
important claim construction principles. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2111, 2173.05(a)
(8th ed. 2001, rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter MPEP], available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html; see also Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 81
F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1665, 1671 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The
MPEP does not have the force and effect of law; however, it is entitled to judicial
notice as the agency's official interpretation of statutes or regulations, provided that
it is not in conflict with the statutes or regulations.").
210. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (a) (2) (requiring that an application contain "a specification
as prescribed by" 35 U.S.C. § 112, "a drawing as prescribed by" 35 U.S.C. § 113, and
"an oath by the applicant as prescribed by" 35 U.S.C. § 115). A special preliminary
application, called a "provisional application," can be filed without including any
separately numbered claim paragraphs. Id. § 111 (b) (2); see also MUELLER, supra note
22, at 378. The existence of this sort of preliminary patent does not alter the points
discussed here.
211. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.51-1.59 (2004) (application); §§ 1.63-1.69 (inventor's oath);
§§ 1.71-1.79 (specification); §§ 1.81-1.85 (drawings); §§ 1.97-1.98 (information
disclosure statement); §§ 1.801-1.825 (biotechnology invention disclosures).
212. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1, 2.
213. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.75.
214. § 1.77(b).
215. 35 U.S.C. § 113.
216. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.83-1.84.
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improve the accuracy and efficiency of inventors' engagement with
government officials who assess their legal rights.1
Most interestingly, for our purposes, the Patent Office has already
promulgated a regulation directly targeted at helping an examiner
readily understand the words in the claims. Specifically, the Patent
Office expressly requires that a patent application "[b]e in the
English language or be accompanied by a translation of the
application.., into the English language together with a statement
that the translation is accurate. ,2 "' This procedural rule, by making
the meaning of an applicant's claim words more readily accessible to
the patent examiner, helps the Office more accurately and efficiently
determine the scope of the claim to which the applicant asserts an
entitlement.
Our proposed rule, by mandating that all applicants identify on the
face of their applications their preferred general and specialized
reference sources for defining claim terms, is akin to the "use English
or translate" rule. If promulgated, it would help the examiner better
understand the scope of the claim that an applicant seeks to patent.
Specifically, if an examiner were in doubt about the meaning of a
claim word, and thus about the scope of the proposed claim, she
could consult the applicant-identified reference sources for
assistance. Indeed, such dictionary consultation is fully consistent
with the established Patent Office practice of giving a claim term its
broadest reasonable construction during examination.9 The Federal
217. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(finding that one can distinguish substantive and procedural rules "by inquiring if
the choice of rule would substantially affect ... primary decisions respecting human
conduct"); S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewarage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th
Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (asserting that a state rule has a substantive goal if it is
"designed to shape conduct outside the courtroom and not just improve the
accuracy or lower the cost of the judicial process"). We owe this formulation to
LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, PROCEDURALJUSTICE 19-21 & n.49 (U. San Diego, Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 04-02, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstractid=508282. See also Thomas W.
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 46 n.200 (1985)
("Substantive rules ... guide the conduct of persons outside the courtroom, before
they are drawn into litigation. By negative implication, 'procedural' rules are those
that would not affect behavior in... 'everyday, prelitigation life."').
218. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(b)(ii); see also § 1.52(d) (requiring English translations of
non-English applications). There is also a similar provision requiring translation of
any non-English documents that parties submit in an interference proceeding at the
Patent Office. See § 1.647.
219. See MPEP, supra note 209, § 2111, at 2100-46; see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("(A]s an initial
matter, the PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest
reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art"). The policy justification for this
approach is that, if the broadest reasonable construction of a claim term creates a
20051
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Circuit has, in at least three post-Markman cases on direct review from
Patent Office rejections, used dictionaries to help establish the
broadest reasonable construction of a claim term.220 The examiner
could also use the reference sources to help explain to the applicant
her evaluation of the claim's patentability. Of course, if none of the
claim words raised doubts for the examiner that consulting an
applicant-identified source would resolve, she might not consult the
applicant-identified dictionaries at all. In any event, the dictionaries
would have been identified for later use in design-around, licensing,
and litigation settings.
We know anecdotally that examiners sometimes cite and quote
dictionary definitions in their interactions with patent applicants.
Our proposed rule would thus simply transform a sporadic practice
into a regularized one. The rule is procedural because it is aimed at
regulating patent applicants' engagement with the machinery of the
patent system, not their innovation behavior outside the patent
system. Nor would our rule, if adopted, be the first time that the
Patent Office has adjusted the application process to take account of
the Federal Circuit's post-Markman claim construction jurisprudence.
Specifically, in June 2003, the Patent Office modified its regulation
222
requiring an "Abstract" in every application, first promulgated in
1966,223 to conform the rule to the Federal Circuit's claim
construction case law.24 From 1966 to 2003, the rule requiring an
abstract had ended with the statement that "[t] he abstract will not be
used for interpreting the scope of the' claims." 221 In Hill-Rom Co. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit concluded that,
notwithstanding the text of the Office's abstract rule, there was "no
patentability problem for the applicant, the applicant has the opportunity to respond
to the problem with an appropriate change in claim language. See In re Hyatt, 211
F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Indeed, this
approach "promotes the development of the written record before the PTO that
provides the requisite written notice to the public as to what the applicant claims as
the invention." In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027.
220. In reThrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002, 2006 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666; In reMorris, 127 F.3d at
1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029.
221. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronics AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1359, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (during reexamination prosecution,
the examiner used the definition of the claim word "slots" from Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary to help explain to the applicant how a prior art reference showed
the claimed structure).
222. 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b).
223. 31 Fed. Reg. 12922, 12922 (Oct. 4, 1966) (adopting § 1.72(b)).
224. 68 Fed. Reg. 38611, 38614 (June 30, 2003) (describing new rule); id. at 38621
(Comment 18); id. at 38628 (text of new version of 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b)).
225. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (1967); 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (1983); 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.72(b) (2003).
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legal principle that would require [it] to disregard [a] potentially
helpful source of intrinsic evidence as to the meaning of claims."2 6
The Patent Office expressly relied on Hill-Rom to explain its deletion
of the final sentence in its 2003 revision to the rule.2 7 Given the far
greater number of times the Federal Circuit has cited a dictionary,
compared to a patent abstract, a Patent Office rule regularizing
dictionary selection by patent applicants would be even better
grounded than this recent change to the abstract requirement.
In sum, a rule mandating that all applicants specify their preferred
general purpose and specialized reference sources on the face of
their applications falls well within the ambit of the Patent Office's
plenary power over examination procedure.
B. There's No Time Like the Filing Date
It might seem odd, at first blush, to suggest that one should
improve a litigation technique by making a change to the start of an
administrative process that begins several years earlier. Upon
reflection, however, it is clear that the best time to regularize the
selection of objective reference sources for claim construction is the
time a patent application is first filed.
First, a dictionary selection policy implemented at the time of filing
229is comprehensive. All patents result from the examination process.
It is therefore certain that any patent that is in litigation today was the
subject of an examination process at some point in the past. In light
of this basic fact about patent administration, the best way to ensure
that an information-forcing rule such as the one proposed here
226. 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.*, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437, 1440 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
227. 68 Fed. Reg. at 38614, 38621. Interestingly, this brings the abstract rule full
circle: when it was first proposed in 1966, the rule did not include the statement that
the Patent Office would not use the abstract for claim construction. 31 Fed. Reg.
4412, 4412 (Mar. 15, 1966) (providing language of proposed Rule 1.75).
228. It takes an average of just over two years for a patent application to mature
into an issued patent. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FiscAL YEAR 2003 19 [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE REPORT] (reporting average total pendency time of 26.7 months for
fiscal year 2003), available at http://www.ustpo.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2003/
index.html. In addition, patentees who sue on their patents typically do so within
two to four years of a patent's issue date. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92
GEO. L.J. 435, 454 (2004) (Figure 1). Adding these two typical time periods together,
the filing date of a patent application is likely to precede the filing date of a patent
suit by about four to six years.
229. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2001) (requiring an application); id. § 131 (requiring
examination of the application).
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provides the greatest public benefit is to make it part of the patent
230
examination process.
Second, an application's filing date is one of the key touchstones of
every patentability analysis. As has already been noted, the Office
cannot evaluate the patentability of a claim without construing the
scope of that claim.23' The claim itself must therefore be sufficiently
definite to make it amenable to construction, and the Patent Act
expressly requires that claims be definite.32 Claim definiteness is
assessed as of the application's filing date. Similarly, all three
doctrines that test a written disclosure's adequacy to support the
applicant's claims-best mode, enablement, and written
description-are assessed as of the application's filing date.234 Finally,
the content of the prior art that is used to assess both novelty and
nonobviousness is expressly tied, in part, to the application's filing
date. It is plainly appropriate, in light of the filing date's central
role in all patentability analysis, to require that a patent applicant
230. See Wagner, supra note 193, at 198-209 (explaining the great importance of
information-forcing rules that are put in place at the patent examination stage).
231. See id. at 204 ("Patent scope determinations occur during patent prosecution
and during litigation (possibly years apart).") (footnote omitted).
232. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 ("The specification shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention."); see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 40-45
(discussing claim definiteness requirement). As the Federal Circuit explained in its
recent decision in Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 35 U.S.C. § 112 "requires
'that the claims be amenable to construction, however difficult that task may be."'
341 F.3d 1332, 1338, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Exxon Research & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
233. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-57, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (overturning trial court's conclusion that
claims were invalid for indefiniteness, on the ground that "subsequently developed
and therefore irrelevant formulae cannot be used to render non-enabling or
indefinite that which was enabling and definite at the time the application was
filed").
234. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 557, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (best mode); Vas-Cath Inc. v.
Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111, 1116-17 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(written description); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367,
1384, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (enablement); see also MUELLER,
supra note 22, at 68 ("The patent application must comply with the disclosure
requirements when it is filed.").
235. The content of the prior art is determined according to 35 U.S.C. § 102, both
for novelty and nonobviousness purposes. See MUELLER, supra note 22, at 94, 139.
Subections (b) and (d) are expressly tied to the filing date of the application under
review. And subsections (a), (e), and (g), although tied to the invention date of the
application under review, often rely on the filing date as a proxy for the invention
date: the Patent Office "presumptively treats the applicant's filing date as her
invention date (based on a constructive reduction to practice theory) for purposes of
applying [subsections] (a), (e), and (g), unless and until the applicant proves an
earlier actual invention date." MUELLER, supra note 22, at 95 (footnote omitted).
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identify at that time her preferred objective reference sources for use
in claim construction.
Third, mandating that an applicant express his dictionary
preferences on the filing date comports with two separate temporal
restrictions on a patent's written content. The Patent Act expressly
provides that, in the course of amending claims and correcting the
supporting disclosure in response to points raised by the patent
examiner, an applicant cannot make any substantive addition to the
patent disclosure. In the words of the Patent Act, "[n]o amendment
shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention."
2
1
6
The Patent Act similarly restricts changes to drawings included in a
patent. Specifically, section 113 of the Act provides that an applicant
"shall furnish a drawing where necessary for the understanding of the
subject matter sought to be patented."23 ' The courts have long
looked to drawings for whatever help they provide in construing
disputed claim terms.3' Importantly, section 113 expressly precludes
consulting a post-filing drawing to help construe claim terms:
"Drawings submitted after the filing date of the application may not
be used... to supplement the original disclosure thereof for the
purpose of interpretation of the scope of any claim.23 9 Augmenting
these filing-date based restrictions on patent content with a dictionary
selection requirement will help keep the focus of the claim
construction process on the content of the originally filed patent
document.
Fourth, requiring an applicant to name her preferred dictionaries
is not, in fact, all that dramatic a departure from current patent
drafting or examination practice. For example, experienced patent
drafters already advise those who are learning the trade to consult
dictionaries and similar sources to ensure a high-quality patent.
240
236. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). According to Professor Mueller, "The fundamental
principle underlying the new matter prohibition is that 'the invention described in
the original patent [or application] must not be changed.' MUELLER, supra note 22,
at 68 n.14 (quoting In re Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1203, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 268, 270-71
(C.C.P.A. 1971)).
237. 35 U.S.C. § 113.
238. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 398, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697,
703 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("In those instances where a visual representation can flesh out
words, drawings may be used in the same manner and with the same limitations as
the specification."); Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570
(D.N.J. 1998) (same), affd, 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir.
2000). Indeed, drawings may be sufficient, by themselves, to provide a written
disclosure that supports claims. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1565, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1118 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[U]nder proper circumstances, drawings alone may provide
a "written description" of an invention as required by § 112.").
239. 35 U.S.C. § 113(ii).
240. See, e.g., FABER, supra note 196, § 19, at 111-16 ("In most cases, the inventor or
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Patentees sometimes expressly rely on particular dictionaries in their
patents to help explain the meaning of claim terms. 4' In addition,
we know that examiners sometimes cite dictionaries to applicants to
help explain why a claim term should be construed in a particular242 i
manner. It is safe to conclude, on the basis of these informal,
occasional practices, that patent practitioners will readily adapt to the
dictionary selection requirement we propose.
Fifth, and finally, one might still object that dictionary selection at
the filing stage is unworkable because, at that time, the applicant
lacks the context necessary to make a meaningful choice among
competing reference sources-context that a live dispute with
another party about claim scope would provide. However, this
objection simply denies the wisdom in the Federal Circuit's view that
it is better to enrich claim construction with reference sources that
are "not colored by the motives of the parties" to a dispute, "and not
inspired by litigation., 243 If reference sources are to be more than
mere props in a post hoc justification game, patentee pleas for "more
context" should be set aside.
C. Changing Patent Office Rules to Regularize Dictionary Choice
To make dictionary consultation more predictable, for design-
around, licensing, and litigation purposes, the Patent Office should
require all patent applicants to state their dictionary preferences
(general purpose and specialized) on the face of their patent
applications at the time they file them. Such a rule is well within the
244Patent Office's regulatory power over examination procedure, and
a mechanical dictionary can supply the precise name for a part in any specific
embodiment."); JEFFRE G. SHELDON, How To WRrrE A PATENT APPLICATION
§ 6.3.5.1.3, at 6-32 (PLI Press, 2001) ("A thesaurus and a dictionary are indispensable
tools for the practitioner and should be frequently referred to when preparing the
claims.").
241. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,972,909 (issued Nov. 27, 1990) at col. 1, 11. 50-60
(citing WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (G&G Merriam 1967) to
help define claim term "caulk," spelled "caulk" in the dictionary), at http://www.
uspto.gov (on file with the American University Law Review); U.S. Patent No.
6,708,400 (issued Mar. 23, 2004) at col. 7, 11. 32-40, at http://www.uspto.gov (on file
with the American University Law Review) (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
to help define claim term "particulate"),
242. See In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (discussing the examiner's use of Webster's New International Dictionary to
give the term "sharing" its broadest common meaning).
243. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
244. See supra Part III.A.
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the time of filing is an appropriate one at which to require applicants
to state their preferences.45
The new regime we propose would be more predictable than the
effectively random approach to choosing dictionaries that the courts,
including the Federal Circuit, use now. There will, of course, be a
cost to achieving this increased predictability. Is this cost offset by at
least as large a savings in patent licensing and litigation costs, such
that our proposed change yields a net social benefit? We think it is.
Admittedly, as is usually the case in such patent reform discussions,
we can offer only the roughest estimates of our proposal's costs and
benefits. 246 These estimates, however, make quite a persuasive case.
The primary cost of implementing our proposal, apart from the
initial cost of promulgating the regulation itself, would be the
increased cost of preparing a patent application for initial filing.
Specifically, the patent drafter would take some time to determine
which reference sources are preferable for the application at hand
and pass along the cost of this time to her client. 41 In estimating this
cost, one must keep in mind two important background facts.
First, the drafter's additional cost of choosing reference sources for
a single application is likely to be very low. Above an obvious
minimum quality threshold, the precise identity of the reference
sources named matters far less than the simple fact that some specific
sources are named (thereby eliminating uncertainty about which
sources the courts will consult if litigation occurs). That this is so
becomes plain when one considers the fact pattern that prompts one
to turn to dictionaries in the first place: namely, the inevitable
occasion where one wants more guidance on the meaning of a claim
term than the patent itself provides, because the drafter did not
foresee the need to choose a more precise word or phrase to cover
the point in question. Of course, where the drafter did foresee the
need for a precise word or phrase, she consulted the appropriate
reference sources to ensure proper word choice or, alternatively,
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that revising the patent review procedures to require a
more thorough examination of all patent applications is unnecessary given that
litigation occurs for only a minority of patents and that most patents are never
licensed). Only rough estimates are possible concerning our proposal because there
are no reliable data on (a) how many patents are licensed, (b) how much it costs, on
average, to negotiate a patent license, (c) how many patents, whether licensed or
not, are the subject of formal infringement or validity analysis, or (d) how much it
costs, on average, to conduct such a formal analysis. Id. at 1507-08.
247. In the context of in-house counsel, who do not bill the client in this manner,
the cost is born in the form of a reduced number of applications the drafter can
prepare in a given unit of time.
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drafted express definitions for inclusion in the body of the patent.
The cost of thoroughly addressing foreseeable scenarios is already a
cost of patent preparation today, and it would continue to be a cost of
patent preparation were our proposal adopted. Given that we turn to
dictionaries to cope with the unforeseeable, it makes little sense for a
patent applicant to invest more in choosing dictionaries than it takes
to identify one or two sources with a good, solid reputation. So, for
example, a rational patent drafter will not choose a dictionary by
looking up every word in a draft claim in several dictionaries in an
effort to see which one is "best."
Second, however high or low the drafter's additional cost of
reference source selection may be for a single application, the drafter
spreads that cost over a large number of patent applications involving
similar technology. As a result, the average cost of dictionary
selection will be far lower than the cost of dictionary selection for the
first application a drafter prepares in a given technology.
It is possible, against this backdrop, to give a rough estimate of the
annual increased patent preparation cost that our proposal entails.
According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association's
("AIPLA") most recent biennial survey of, among other things, patent
prosecution and litigation costs, the national median costs of
preparing and filing "relatively complex" applications in the three
main technological areas are as follows: (a) biotechnology/chemical,
$10,001; (b) electrical/computer, $9,995; and (c) mechanical,
$8,001.24' The average median cost across these technologies is
$9,332.33. Assume, for purposes of this analysis, that selecting
reference sources increases the average preparation cost by 1%, or
$93.32, per application. The Patent Office receives just over
330,000 utility patent applications a year 2 5 ) about 28% of which are
continuation applications,2 51 i.e., applications that simply re-initiate
248. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 88 tbl. 21 (2003) [hereinafter
SURVEY].
249. We think this estimate is actually far higher than would likely be the case, and
thus overstates the cost of our proposal. If, however, the benefits of the proposal
outweigh even this overstated cost, we can be confident that the proposed change
produces a net social benefit.
250. See PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1 (providing a summary
of patent examining activities for the fiscal years 1999-2003). In particular, from
2001-2003, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office received over 330,000 patent
applications per year. Id. However, in 1999 and 2000, the Patent Office received
under 330,000 patent applications. Id.
251. The principal empirical study of these applications reports that, during fiscal
years 1993-1998, "28.4% of the utility, plant, and reissue (UPR) applications in those
years were not new or original applications, but were continuing applications
claiming the benefit of the filing dates of previously filed applications." Cecil D.
Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the
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the examination process on an application that was filed at least once
before . Of course, an application will entail the dictionary selection
cost only the first time it is filed. Using the one percent increase
assumption, then, we estimate the annual increase in preparation
cost to be $22,172,832 .
Would making dictionary selection part of the patent examination
process save at least $22.2 million a year? We think it would. One
source of savings would be court cases that are not filed at all because
greater agreement on the likely construction of an arguable claim
term makes litigation unnecessary. According to the AIPLA's most
recent biennial survey, the national median cost of a full patent trial
in which $1 to $25 million is at risk is $2 million per side, i.e., $4
million.' If six such trials are avoided every year, the new rule has
both paid for itself and yielded a small social benefit; additional
avoided trials are pure benefit. Given that about 1,900 utility patent
infringement cases are filed every year, 5 and that about ninety-five ofthes cass r fuly -- -156
these cases are fully tried , avoiding six trials does not seem like that
tall an order. Alternatively, the national median cost of taking
through discovery a patent infringement case in which $1 to $25
million is at risk is $1,001,000 per side, i.e., $2 m....o 257m lionis t is , ,  , ,$2milli n. If twelve
such cases are avoided every year, the new rule has both paid for itself
and yielded a small social benefit. Again, this is not too high a
hurdle, given the 1,600 cases filed annually. Given that the Federal
Circuit used dictionaries to help construe claim terms in twenty-six
separate appeals in 2003, and another twenty separate appeals in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. BJ. 1, 3 (2001); see also id. at 16 tbl.I.
The Quillen & Webster data group utility patent applications with plant and reissue
applications. Id. at 3. Only the utility applications, however, are of interest in this
study. Their 28% figure remains a good estimate for continuing applications for
utility patents alone because reissue and plant patent applications make up such a
small portion of the total number of applications filed in a given year. For example,
in fiscal year 2003, the Patent Office received 331,729 utility applications, 785 plant
applications, and 938 reissue applications. PERFORMANcE REPORT, supra note 228, at
106 tbl. 1. Similarly, in fiscal year 2002, the Patent Office received 331,580 utility
applications, 1,134 plant applications, and 974 reissue applications. Id.
252. For a concise explanation of continuation applications in U.S. patent
practice, see Quillen,Jr. & Webster, supra note 251, at 4-6.
253. (330,000 applications per year) x (72% originally filed) x ($93.32 per
application) = $22,172,832.00 per year.
254. SURVEY, supra note 248, at 93 tbl. 22.
255. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903 tbl. 1 (2001) (indicating that, from 1995 to
1999, district courts resolved about 1,900 utility patent infringement cases per year).
256. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Piece Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 384 & tbl. 1 (2000) (reporting that from 1983 to
1999, the annual number of full patent trials ranged from a low of seventy-three to a
high of 112, with an average of ninety-five).
257. SURVEY, supra note 248, at 93 tbl. 22.
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first half of 2004, it seems safe to conclude that the annual litigation
savings that our proposal would generate would more than cover the
cost of requiring all applicants to state their dictionary preferences.
Another source of savings would be less costly license negotiations.
The savings mechanism in licensing, as in avoided litigation, is
greater agreement among the parties on the likely construction of an
arguable claim term. There are virtually no reliable data about how
many of the roughly 180,000 patents that issue each year25' are
licensed for revenue.2'8 Professor Lemley, in his study of the costs
and benefits of various patent law reform proposals, estimates that
about 3.5% of issued patents are licensed for revenue, and that the
cost to an industry of negotiating a license with the patentee is
$100,000.26 Using these assumptions, along with an estimate that the
identification of dictionaries on the face of the patent lowers the
licensing cost by one percent, the annual savings is $6,300,000.61
This licensing savings alone covers twenty-eight percent of the
increased patent preparation cost of our proposal. Using a licensing
cost discount of 5%, which we think is more likely, our proposed rule
generates an annual licensing cost savings of $31,500,000,262 i.e., 142%
of the estimated increase in annual patent preparation costs.
Finally, a key source of savings would be avoided dead weight loss,
achieved through more effective competition against patentees from
those who have designed around their patents. Dictionaries named
on the face of all patents will reduce the uncertainty of a competitor's
analysis of the scope of the claim; the reduced uncertainty will, in
turn, facilitate more rapidly achieved and more numerous design-
arounds. Competition from these design-arounds will help drive
down the patentee's price to marginal cost, thereby helping trim
dead weight loss. It is impossible to estimate the size of this effect,
but it seems hard to imagine that it would fall below $22.2 million per
year in an economy as vast as our own. This savings from enhanced
certainty, moreover, takes nothing from a patentee that she is
258. See PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1 (reporting the annual
number of allowed patents for the fiscal years 1999-2003, however failing to note how
many of those patents were licensed for revenue). From 1999-2003, the number of
allowed patent applications rose from year to year, averaging out to 186,607
applications per year. Id.
259. See Lemley, supra note 246, at 1507 (noting the lack of accurate data
regarding patents licensed for revenue).
260. Id. at 1507-08.
261. (180,000 patents per year) x (3.5% licensed) x ($100,000 per license) x (1%
savings per license) = $6,300,000 savings per year.
262. (180,000 patents per year) x (3.5% licensed) x ($100,000 per license) x (5%
savings per license) = $31,500,000 savings per year.
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entitled to keep. One of the core policies underlying the public
notice function that clear claim language serves is the desirability of
facilitating design-arounds by the patentee's competitors.263 As the
Federal Circuit observed more than a decade ago, "[d]esigning
around patents is, in fact, one of the ways in which the patent system
works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the
useful arts, its constitutional purpose.
' '
2
64
It appears, from these three savings sources alone, that moving
dictionary selection from the litigation stage (where it is effectively
random) to the examination stage (where it greatly reduces
uncertainty for every patent throughout its term) will generate
important social benefits. The Patent Office should make this
change to the patent examination rules without delay. It can do so in
two stages. We discuss both in turn, beginning with the long-term
265
solution at which the Patent Office should aim.
1. Changing the application content rule to require dictionary selection
We think the ultimate goal at which the Patent Office should aim is
a change to the existing rules governing what an applicant must
include in her application on the day it is filed. The existing rules,
codified in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 66 are the
result of notice-and-comment rulemaking. The change we propose-
a requirement that an applicant name her preferred reference
263. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 95 n.126 (2004) (explaining that design-arounds
benefit the public by encouraging progress in the marketplace through the creation
of new and innovative advances and variations of the patented product); Craig Allen
Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARv.J.L. & TECH. 1, 40-43 (2000) (noting
that when a competitor plans to design around a patented product, he or she seeks
to create a product that will not result in an infringement suit).
264. Slimfold Mfg. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1842, 1845-46 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
265. The specific suggestions we make here are predicated on the current state of
the law. Depending on how the Federal Circuit resolves the Phillips case, see supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text, some of the details of our proposal might
require adjustment.
266. The most natural locus for our proposed change is 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.79
(2005), a cluster of rules called "Specification." A patent specification requires,
among other things, a written description of the invention or discovery (§ 1.71)
setting forth what the applicant seeks to patent in a manner that distinguishes it from
other inventions (§ 1.71); a title of the invention or discovery (§ 1.72); a summary of
the nature and substance of the invention (§ 1.73); and one or more claims that
define the scope of the invention (§ 1.75). One could also make our proposed
change by modifying the rules governing the "information disclosure statement," a
form that applicants use to tell the Patent Office about prior art references of which
she is aware. See §§ 1.97-1.98 (providing the guidelines that qualify an applicant to
issue an "information disclosure statement" and also explaining what the
"information disclosure statement" must include).
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sources, both general and specialized, on the face of the
application-also requires notice-and-comment rulemaking, such
that it will have the force of law and bind all applicants.
267
This new dictionary selection requirement need not limit
applicants in their choice of sources, either in name or number. If
the applicant names a source that the Patent Office does not yet
possess, it can acquire the title in keeping with its congressional
2681
mandate to maintain an effective library. In short order, any
existing gaps in the Office's reference library will be filled. If the
applicant wants to commit in advance to using many dictionaries of a
given type (e.g., by naming two or three general purpose English
language sources), we can think of no reason to disallow the practice
at the outset. Of course, the same tension that today sharpens the
choice between broad language (which covers more potential
infringements, and is also more vulnerable to prior art-based
invalidity attacks) and narrow language (which covers fewer potential
infringements, and is also less vulnerable to prior art-based invalidity
attacks) will also sharpen the choice between naming more and fewer
dictionaries. We think it likely that most applicants will name one or
two general purpose and one or two specialized reference sources. If,
after monitoring the practice for a year or two, the Patent Office
finds that applicants are overwhelming the system with too many
reference source designations, it can revisit the question whether to
cap the number of reference sources an applicant may name.
2. Changing examiner practice to require dictionary identification
In the interim, as the notice-and-comment process plays out, the
Patent Office should immediately change the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure to direct all examiners to state, in the first
response from the Office that is sent to the applicant, the general
purpose and specialized reference sources the examiner will use to
construe claim words should any doubts about claim scope arise.
This rule, which would bind examiners but not applicants, can be
implemented without notice-and-comment rulemaking. 69 Should an
267. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (explaining the Patent
Office's power to promulgate binding procedural rules).
268. See 35 U.S.C. § 7 (2002) ("The Director shall maintain a library of scientific
and other works and periodicals, both foreign and domestic, in the Patent and
Trademark Office to aid the officers in the discharge of their duties.").
269. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2002) (providing that notice-and-comment
rulemaking is not required for "interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice"). The Patent Office regularly
relies on this exception to the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement when
promulgating examination guidelines that are directed at the examiner corps. See,
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applicant object to the use of the reference sources that the examiner
chooses, the applicant can designate alternative reference sources. In
addition, the Patent Office should adapt the existing rules ensuring
that any prior art that the examiner identifies during the
examination process also appears on the face of the patent, 270 so that
the examiner-identified reference sources (or their applicant-
identified substitutes) also appear on the face of any resulting patent.
3. The undesirability of an official dictionary list
It is worth pausing for a moment, in this discussion of integrating
dictionary selection into the patent examination process, to consider
why the Patent Office should not prescribe a closed list of reference
sources after conducting a formal proceeding to determine which
reference sources are most reliable for each main technological
area.2 1' First, this top-down approach cuts against the general grain of
the patent process, which is quite applicant-driven.' 2 Second, a top-
down approach is on the wrong side of a basic information
asymmetry: applicants, who know far more about the current state of
the art in their fields than do patent examiners,2 73 are in the best
position to choose the most up-to-date, high-quality dictionaries and
similar sources. Third, a centralized selection process would
needlessly divert resources from other Patent Office needs. Indeed,
the more the selection process sought to overcome the information
asymmetry just described, the more costly it would be. And the
expense would be incurred time and again as the Patent Office
e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg.
1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("Because these Guidelines only govern internal practices,
they are exempt from notice and comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) (A).").
270. See MPEP, supra note 209, § 707.05, at 700-12 (providing that the patent
examiner should consider and cite prior art which is related to the claims asserted in
the patent application); id. § 1302.12, at 1300-13 (encouraging the patent examiner
to cite related art for allowed patent applications).
271. See Wagner, supra note 193. As we noted earlier, Professor Wagner may have
suggested something along these lines. Id. However, because his proposal occupies
only two or three sentences, it is difficult to be certain. Id. at 244 & n.311.
272. For example, it is the applicant, not the Patent Office, who prompts
examination by drafting and filing an application. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (indicating
that it is the inventor or someone authorized by the inventor who actually files the
patent application). And it is the applicant who, after receiving notice from the
Patent Office of the problems with her application, submits new claims and other
amendments to correct the problems. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a).
273. See Wagner, supra note 193, at 206-09 (discussing the litigation process of
patent cases). During the "prosecution history phase," the patentee provides
information to the Patent Office. Id. at 206-07. Because the patentee is required to
provide the most accurate information it has regarding the innovation, the
prosecution history also tends to be an accurate source of information. Id. at 207.
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regularly updated its list of prescribed reference sources. In short,
this "official list" game would not be worth the candle.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit has put dictionary consultation at the heart of
its claim construction jurisprudence. This practice is not likely to
change. A dictionary-friendly approach to claim construction has
neutrality and predictability goals that are both worthy and
attainable. These goals cannot be fully realized, however, until the
choice of dictionary is made something more than a capricious, post
hoc exercise at the courthouse. The Patent Office thus has a vital
regulatory role to play in making dictionary selection a routine
applicant-driven, pre-dispute process. The Patent Office should, in
short, act quickly and decisively to make dictionary choice as central
to patent examination as it has already become to patent litigation.
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POSTSCRIPT: THE DECISION IN PHILLIPS V. AWH CORP.
Just before this Article went to press, the Federal Circuit issued its
en banc decision on claim construction methodology in Phillips v.
AWU Corp.,274 concluding a rehearing that was ordered while this
Article was in draft.275 Phillips rejects the Telegenix decision's use of
dictionaries as a universal, necessary first step in claim construction. 76
After a brief review of the court's decision in Phillips, we consider the
evidence that courts are likely to continue to rely on dictionaries to
construe claims. We also conclude, given Phillips' continued
commitment to de novo review in claim construction and utter silence
about how courts should select from among multiple pertinent
dictionaries, that there is as great a need as ever for the Patent Office
to help make dictionary selection in claim construction more
predictable with regulations of the type we propose.
The Federal Circuit, capturing the essence of the several questions
it had posed in its order directing en banc review,277 framed the
"principal question in" Phillips as "the extent to which [courts] should
resort to and rely on a patent's specification in seeking to ascertain
the proper scope of its claims. 2 78 Holding up its decade-old decisions
in Markman279 and Vitronics, 2 0 as well as a more recent decision in
Innova/Pure Water,81 for special "reaffirm[ation] , ' 282 the court
emphasized that "the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to
read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in
which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire
patent, including the specification. 2 8 3  The two overarching
principles that frame the claim construction process, discussed
274. Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en banc).
275. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
276. 2005 WL 1620331, at *11-*16. For our analysis of the Telegenix discussion
about using objective reference sources in claim construction, see supra notes 73-84
and accompanying text.
277. See 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (setting forth seven groups of
questions for additional briefing).
278. 2005 WL 1620331, at *4.
279. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). For our analysis of Markman's discussion about
using objective reference sources in claim construction, see supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
280. SeeVitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For
our analysis of Vitronics' discussion about using objective reference sources in claim
construction, see supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
281. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
282. 2005 WL. 1620331, at *4; see also id. at *16.
283. Id. at *5.
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above, remain the same: "the words of a claim 'are generally given
their ordinary and customary meaning, ' ' 285 and "the ordinary and
customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term
would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the
time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent
application. 286  According to the court, a term's ordinary and
customary meaning "provides an objective baseline from which to
begin claim construction. 2 87 The particularized context for the claim
term that the patent specification and prosecution history provide
remains central to the process throughout.288  Indeed, the
"specification's virtue" is that it was "created at the time of patent
prosecution for the purpose of explaining the patent's scope and
meaning.289
What of dictionaries and other objective reference sources, which
are extrinsic to the particularized context of the specification and
prosecution history? Can courts continue to use such reference
sources to help construe claims? On this point, the court struck a
more complex balance. On the one hand, the court reaffirmed its
basic approval of court use of objective reference sources extrinsic to
the patent, such as dictionaries and technical treatises, for the
background information they provide to generalist judges facing
unfamiliar technology. "Because dictionaries, and especially
technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of
terms used in various fields of science and technology," the court
opined, "those resources have been properly recognized as among
the many tools that can assist the court in determining the meaning
of particular terminology to those of skill in the art of the
invention. '' 9° Moreover, even "general purpose dictionaries may be
helpful" when, for example, "the ordinary meaning of claim language
as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent
even to lay judges.28 ' In short, so long as it "keep[s] in mind the
flaws inherent in each type of evidence," a district court is permitted
284. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
285. 2005 WL 1620331, at *5 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90
F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at *6-*9.
289. Id. at*11.
290. Id. at *10; see also id. at *11 ("extrinsic evidence," such as dictionaries, "can
help educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court
determine what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to
mean").
291. Id. at *6. In such a case, claim construction "involves little more than the
application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words." Id.
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"in its sound discretion to admit and use such [extrinsic] evidence. '92
The result in Phillips is, in this respect, as we predicted.2 193
On the other hand, the Phillips court repudiated the more
extrinsic-directed, always-consult-a-dictionary-first methodology that
the Telegenix case had prescribed. 94 After recounting the Telegenix
methodology's focus on dictionaries, according to which "the
specification should be consulted only after a determination is made,
whether based on a dictionary, treatise, or other source, as to the
ordinary meaning or meanings of the claim term in dispute,"295 the
court rejected the methodology as "improperly restrict[ing] the role
of the specification in claim construction. 2 96 According to the court,
"[t]he main problem with elevating the dictionary to such
prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of
words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within the context
of the patent. , 297 As a result, "too often [the Telegenix] line of cases
has been improperly relied upon to condone the adoption of a
dictionary definition entirely divorced from the context of the
[patent's] written description., 29  The compulsory methodology of
Telegenix has thus been rejected. The intrinsic patent materials, not
extrinsic evidence that may help one understand them, are restored
as claim construction's touchstone. Interestingly, neither the
authoring judge in Telegenix, Judge Linn, nor any of six heavy
dictionary citers we identify in our study,9 ' wrote separately in Phillips
to take issue with this repudiation of Telegenix.
The court in Phillips effectively dials its claim construction
jurisprudence back to October 15, 2002, just before Telegenix was
decided. And Telegenix itself is rejected as a dead end detour. In
light of this result, will district courts and the Federal Circuit
continue to rely on dictionaries to construe claims? Existing evidence
292. Id. at *11; see also id. at *15 ("As we have noted above, however, we do not
intend to preclude the appropriate use of dictionaries.").
293. See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
295. 2005 WL 1620331, at *13.
296. Id.
297. Id. at*14.
298. Id.
299. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
300. See infra Tbl. 7, App. B. Judge Lourie, who frequently cited dictionaries in his
claim construction opinions for the court, did write separately in Phillips. He did so,
however, to dissent from the court's construction of the particular claim term in
question, not to take issue with the court's general claim construction methodology.
See 2005 WL 1620331, at *20-*22 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part). With regard to
methodology, Judge Lourie "fullyjoin[ed]"Judge Bryson's opinion for the court. Id.
at *20.
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suggests that they will, and at a significant rate. First, as our own data
show, by 2002 the Federal Circuit was issuing, on average, more than
two claim construction decisions a month that relied on dictionaries
and similar sources to construe claim terms.3nl The case law that
preceded Telegenix was thus adequate to support a significant rate of
reliance on dictionaries. If litigation parties and the judges who hear
their cases continue to find dictionaries useful, courts will continue to
rely on them.
Second, two other claim construction decisions bracket the Phillips
decision-one just before, and one just after-and both make. use of
dictionaries to construe claim terms. Thirteen days before Phillips,
the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Seachange International, Inc. v.
C-Cor, Inc.30 2  In Seachange, written by Judge Linn (the author of
Telegenix) for a panel that includes Judge Bryson (the author of
Phillips), the court overturned a district court's constructions of three
disputed claim terms. In explaining its rationale for each of the
three terms, the Federal Circuit cited and quoted from The New IE
Standard Dictionary of Electrical and Electronics Terms (5th ed. 1993) .
Two days after Phillips, the Federal Circuit issued its decision in North
American Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.3°5 In Plastipak,
written by Judge Lourie for a panel that includes Judge Bryson (the
author of Phillips) and Judge Linn (the author of Telegenix), the court
affirmed a district court's construction of the claim term "generally
convex. ' 306 The district court had relied on, among other things, a
definition for "generally" provided by the Oxford English Dictionary
Online.30 7  The Federal Circuit agreed, concluding that "the court
articulated a common-sense understanding of the term ['generally']
confirmed by a dictionary. 3 0 8 These cases show the truth in Phillips'
insistence that it "do[es] not intend to preclude the appropriate use
of dictionaries.
30 9
Third, Phillips, like Vitronics before it, praises dictionaries for their
objectivity. According to Phillips,
301. SeesupraTbl.4.
302. Nos. 04-1375, 04-1498, 2005 WL 1523382 (Fed. Cir. June 29, 2005).
303. Id. at*I.
304. Id. at *4 (quoting defintion of "network"), *12 (quoting definition of
"distributed system"), *13 (quoting definition of "CPU"). According to our data, this
is the third most frequently cited technical source on which the Federal Circuit
relied. See supra Thl.6, App. B.
305. Nos. 04-1306, 04-1307, 2005 WL 1645620 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2005).
306. Id. at*1.
307. Id. at *5.
308. Id. at*10.
309. Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *15 (Fed. Cir.July 12, 2005) (en
banc).
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Dictionaries or comparable sources are often useful to assist in
understanding the commonly understood meaning of words and
have been used both by our court and the Supreme Court in claim
interpretation. A dictionary definition has the value of being an
unbiased source "accessible to the public in advance of
litigation."31 '
Phillips, like Vitronics, also highlights the risk of partisan slant that
diminishes the value of expert testimony, observing that, because
expert testimony "is generated at the time of and for the purpose of
litigation," it "can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic
evidence.".3  Given that ordinary and customary meaning must be
determined, and that expert testimony continues to bear the taint of
comparatively greater bias, one must expect some courts to prefer
dictionaries as sources for ordinary meaning. 2 Both parties and
courts can thus draw strong support from Phillips itself to justify
continued reliance on dictionaries in claim construction, so long as
they avoid the dictionary-first method of Telegenix, now condemned
for its perceived excess.
One cannot help but wonder whether, assuming courts do continue
to use dictionaries to help construe disputed claim terms at
something like 2002 levels, the courts' selections from among
available reference sources will become more predictable than the
chaotic pattern that our study documents. We think not. As we have
explained, the pre-Phillips case law offers no guidance on how to
select from among multiple pertinent reference sources, and offers
conflicting signals on how to synthesize a single definition using the
content from multiple sources. 3  Phillips, for its part, offers no
310. Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed.
Cir. 1996)) (citation omitted). As we discussed above, supra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text, Vitronics emphasized the relative objectivity and reliability of
dictionaries to help explain the court's greater solicitude for dictionaries compared
to expert testimony. By reaffirming that premise in Phillips, the court once again
invites greater reliance on objective reference sources than expert witnesses.
311. 2005 WL 1620331, at *11; see also supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
312. See MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 n.* (Fed. Cir.
2001) ("Standard dictionary definitions indicate ordinary meaning."); Dow Chem.
Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co. Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Thus, in
determining the ordinary meaning of a technical term, courts are free to consult
scientific dictionaries and technical treatises at any time."); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del
Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Without evidence in the
patent specification of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term,
the term takes on its ordinary meaning. For such ordinary meaning, we turn to the
dictionary definition of the term.") (citation omitted); Quantum Corp. v. Rodime,
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("[W]e see no error in the district court's
use of dictionary definitions to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the relevant claim
limitation.").
313. See supra notes 116-130 and accompanying text, and notes 160-179 and
accompanying text.
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guidance on how courts or parties should select dictionaries or other
reference sources, other than expressing a mild preference for
314technical over general purpose dictionaries and using the patent
application's effective filing date as the relevant anchoring date.'5
Phillips also sidesteps the opportunity to reconsider whether the
Federal Circuit should engage in de novo review of lower court claim
construction rulings,316 a question on which it had ordered additional
briefing.317 The unpredictability of trial court use of dictionaries is
thus compounded by further unpredictability in Federal Circuit use
of dictionaries on de novo review. Judge Mayer's dissent in Phillips
decries this very unpredictability.3 1 8 Indeed, as Professor Wagner has
observed,3 9 the rule of Phillips is that, in claim construction, there are
no rules. Phillips states that "there is no magic formula or catechism
for conducting claim construction. Nor is the court barred from
considering any particular sources or required to analyze sources in
any specific sequence, as long as those sources are not used to
contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous in light of the intrinsic
evidence. 20  This approach maximizes the Federal Circuit's flexibility
314. 2005 WL 1620331, at*10.
315. Id. at *5.
316. Id. at *20.
317. See 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc order) (questioning "is it
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim
construction rulings?").
318. See 2005 WL 1620331, at *26 (MayerJ, dissenting)
If we persist in deciding the subsidiary factual components of claim
construction without deference, there is no reason why litigants should be
required to parade their evidence before the district courts or for district
courts to waste time and resources evaluating such evidence.... If the
proceedings before the district court are merely a tryout on the road, as they
are under our current regimen, it is wasteful to require such proceedings at
all. Instead, all patent cases could be filed in this court; we would determine
whether claim construction is necessary, and, if so, the meaning of the
claims.
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
319. See R. Polk Wagner, Phillips Analysis, Part 1: The New Rule Is There Are No Rules,
(July 15, 2005), at http://www.polkwagner.com (on file with the American University
Law Review). Judge Mayer, in his dissent in Phillips, makes a similar point:
[A]fter proposing no fewer than seven questions, receiving more than thirty
amici curiae briefs, and.whipping the bar into a frenzy of expectation, we say
nothing new, but merely restate what has become the practice over the last
ten years-that we will decide cases according to whatever mode or method
results in the outcome we desire, or at least allows us a seemingly plausible
way out of the case.
2005 WL 1620331, at *22.
320. 2005 WL 1620331, at *16; see also id. ("In Vitronics, we did not attempt to
provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to explain
why, in general, certain types of evidence are more valuable than others. Today, we
adhere to that approach and reaffirm the approach to claim construction outlined in
that case, in Markman, and in Innova.").
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in choosing and using objective reference sources in light of all the
other circumstances in a case. This flexibility, however, comes at the
price of the costly uncertainties now imposed all the more clearly on
other patent system actors-patentees, potential licensees, accused
infringers, and the Patent Office.
After Phillips, as before, dictionaries are bound to be used routinely
for claim construction. After Phillips, as before, the Federal Circuit
provides no rules or principles, other than "sound discretion," for
how a judge should choose or use a dictionary in this context. After
Phillips, as before, the Patent Office has the power to make dictionary
selection more predictable, as we have explained at length.1
21
Nothing in Phillips stands in the way of the regulatory solution we
propose. Given the benefits that would accrue from the truly
objective and predictable use of objective reference sources in claim
construction, the Patent Office should act to make reference source
selection a necessary step in obtaining a patent.
321. See supra at notes 180-273 and accompanying text.
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 911 2004-2005
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX A
From HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER'S THIRD:
PHILIP GOVE'S CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 215
(1994) (facing page).
Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Merriam-Webster,
Incorporated (www.Merriam-Webster.com).
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APPENDIX B
This Appendix contains all the tables and figures for this
manuscript that do not fit neatly in the manuscript's main body.
TABLE 5
This table shows all the general purpose English language sources the Federal
Circuit used as resources in claim construction cases from April 5, 1995, to
June 30, 2004.
SOURCE CIT'N FREQUENCY (%)322
American College Dictionary (Random House) 1 (0.4%)
American Heritage Dictionaries (Houghton Mifflin) 24 (9.0%)
American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed.) 5 (1.9%)
American Heritage Dictionary 12 (4.5%)
American Heritage Dictionary Second College Edition 7 (2.6%)
Chambers Concise Dictionary (Chambers) 1 (0.4%)
Merriam-Webster Dictionaries (Merriam-Webster) 103 (38.4%)
Merriam-Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.) 3 (1.1%)
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (6th ed.) 7 (2.6%)
Webster's New International Dictionary 1 (0.4%)
Webster's New International Dictionary Second Edition 2 (0.7%)
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 18 (6.7%)
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 4 (1.5%)
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 68 (25.4%)
Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press) 18(6.7%)
Oxford English Dictionary 14 (5.2%)
Oxford Reference Dictionary 1 (0.4%)
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 3 (1.1%)
Random House Dictionaries (Random HouISe) 1 (4. 1%
Random House College Dictionary 1 (0.4%)
Random House Unabridged Dictionary 4 (1.5%)
Random House Webster's College Dictionary 1 (0.4%)
Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 5 (1.9%)
Strunk & White, The Elements of Style (4th ed. 2000) 1 (0.4%)
322. Percentages based on the total number of all
treatises, and similar sources cited, i.e., 268.
dictionaries, encyclopedias,
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"the dictionary"323  1 (0.4%)
Webster's II New College Dictiona2 4 (Houghton Mifflin) 1 (0.4%)
Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (Riverside 25) 10 (3.7%)
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary (Gramercy 1 (0.4%)
Books)
Webster's New 20th Centuiy Dictionary (Simon & Schuster) 2 (0.7%)
Webster's New World Dictionary (various publishers) 15 (5.6%)
TOTAL 189 (70.5%)
Note: This table groups together all citations to differently dated
printings of the same title (e.g., the 1966, 1968, 1971, 1986, 1993, and
2002 printings of Webster's Third New International Dictionary).
323. Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1564,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Although the dictionary broadly
defines 'conductor' as any substance that conducts an electrical charge, the patent
itself belies such a broad construction."). Judge Lourie, who authored Tex.
Instruments, most often cites to WEBSTER'S 1I NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY
(Riverside Publ'g Co. 1988) and WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (3d ed., Simon
& Schuster 1988).
324. This is the current edition of, and the successor title to, WEBSTER'S II NEW
RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (Riverside Publ'g Co. 1994).
325. Riverside Publishing Co. has been a subsidiary of Houghton Mifflin since
1979, prior to the first publication of Webster's H New Riverside University Dictionary in
1984. RIVERSIDE PUBLISHING: A DISTINGUISHED HISTORY, at http://www.riverpub.com
/about/history.html (last visitedJuly 19, 2004) (on file with American University Law
Review). Sidney Landau surmises that Houghton Mifflin may have established this
dictionary, which does not include taboo sexual or scatological words, to distinguish
it from the American Heritage Dictionary series, which does. LANDAU, supra note 2, 228-
30, 443 n.15 (2d ed. 2001).
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TABLE 6
This table shows all the technical or specialized sources the Federal Circuit used
as resources in claim construction cases from April 5, 1995, to June 30, 2004.
SOURCE CIT'N FREQ'Y (%)326
Annual Book of ASTM Standards (1996) 1
Maribeth Cuccinelli, The Art & Science of Footwear 1
Manufacturing (1974)
Barron's Dictionary of insurance Terms (4th ed. 2000) 1
Chambers Dictionary of Science & Technology (1999) 1
Serway & Faughn, College Physics (4th ed. 1995) 1
Michael Busby, DemystifyingATM/ADSL (Wordware 1998) 1
Cyril M. Harris, Dictionary of Architecture & Construction (2d ed. 1
1993)
Dictionary of Computing (4th ed. 1996) 3 (1.1%)
Dictionary of Electronics 1
Dictionary of Mechanical Engineering 2
Dictionary of Microbiology & Molecular Biology (2d ed. 1987) 1
Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 4 (1.5%)
Encyclopedia of Computer Science (1976) 1
Encyclopedia of Polymer Science (1965) 1
Skoog et al., Fundamentals of Analytical Chemistry (7th ed. 1996) 1
Benjamin Lewin, Genes V (1990) 1
Handbook of Chemistry & Physics (63d ed. 1982-83) 1
Michael & Irene Ash, Handbook of Pharmaceutical Additives 1
(1995)
Hawley ' Condensed Chemical Dictionary 3 (1.1%)
Henderson's Dictionary of Biological Terms (11 th ed. 1995) 1
IBM Dictionary of Computing (10th ed. 1994) 2
Illustrated Dictionary of Electronics (3rd ed. 1985) 2
G.B. Stringfellow & H.T. Hall, 43 Journal of Crystal Growth 47 1
(1978)
Knight's American Mechanical Dictionary (1876) 1
Robert C. Faber, Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting I
(4th ed. 2000)
326. Percentages based on the total number of all dictionaries, encyclopedias,
treatises, and similar sources cited, i.e., 268. Percentage values less than one percent
are omitted.
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Kenneth L. Williamson, Macroscale & Microscale Organic
Experiments (2d ed., Heath 1994)
Marks' Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers (9th ed. 1
1987)
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms 9 (3.4%)
McGraw-Hill Electronics Dictionary (5th ed. 1994) 1
McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology (7th ed. 1992) 1
A. Parish, Mechanical Engineer's Reference Book (11 th ed. 1973) 1
Melloni's Illustrated Medical Dictionary (1979) 1
Microsoft Computer Dictionary 7 (2.6%)
Modern Dictionay of Electronics 5 (1.9%)
New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical &Electronics Terms 6 (2.2%)
(5th ed. 1993)
Louis F. Feisner, Organic Experiments (Heath 1964) 1
Photonics Dictionary (2000) 1
Copper Development Association, Standards Handbook:
Wrought & Cast Copper and Copper Alloy Products (6th ed. 1994)
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 3 (1.1%)
E. Bryan Came, Telecommunications Primer (2d ed., Prentice 1
Hall 1999)
Karl Drlica, Understanding DNA & Gene Cloning: A Guide for the
Curious (2d ed. 1992)
Van Nostrand Reinhold Dictionary of Information Technology (3d
ed. 1989)
Hala et al., Vapour Liquid Equilibrium (2d English ed. 1967) 1
Wordsworth Dictionary of Science & Technology I
TOTAL 79(29.5%)
Note: This table groups together all citations to differently dated
versions with the same title (e.g., the 12th and 13th editions of
Hawley's Condensed Chemical Dictionary).
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TABLE 7
Number of claim terms construed by reliance on a dictionary or similar source,
by Judge, by Year
Judge 32  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total
328Archer 2  11(r00%) 0 0 3 1 0 2 3 0 1 1 (3(100%) (5.3%)
Bryson 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 7
(100%) (3.3%)
Clevenger 0 4 4 1 1 1 5 3 3 2 24
(100%) (11.5%)
329
Dyk 0 4 9 6 3 22(45%) (10.5%)
Gajarsa 0 0 1 1 2 0 13 4 21
(75%) (10.0%)
3 3 1
Linn 0 5 7 4 11 27
(49%) - (12.9%)
Lourie 23(100%) 0 2 0 0 1 9 3 4 0 4 (.(100%) (11.0%)
Mayer 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
(100%) (0.5%)
Michel 6Mihl 0 1 0 1 0 2 6
(100%) 0 1 1 0 (2.9%)
Newman 2(100%) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ((100%) (1.0%)
327. The percentage measure beneath each judge's name states the percentage of
the 110 months between April 1995 (the date of the in banc Markman decision, supra
note 190) and June 2004 (the end of the study) that a judge was a member of the
Federal Circuit.
328. Judge Archer took senior status on December 25, 1997. U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRcurr, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at
http://www.fedcir.gov/judg bios.html (last modified Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with
American University Law Review).
329. Judge Dyk entered service on June 9, 2000.
330. Judge Gajarsa entered service on Sept. 12, 1997.
331. Judge Linn entered service on Jan. 1, 2000.
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Nies 33 2  0 1 1
(15%) 1 (0.5%)
Plager' 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
(100%) (1.4%)
Prost(30% )334 1 0 1 0 3 (4%)
Rader 0 2 2 0 0 3 6 5 7 1 26
(100%) (12.4%)
Rich 335  6
0 1 1 1 3 -
(45%) (2.9%)
Schall 18(100%) 0 2 1 3 3 2 0 1 2 4 (8(100%) (8.6%)
Per 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 4 0 7
Curiam (3.3%)
Note: Biographical information on the judges can be found at
www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html. In any year in which a given judge did
not serve at all on the Federal Circuit, the year is marked "-" for that
judge. This table does not include data for Senior Judges Friedman
or Cowen, who were on senior status when the Federal Circuit issued
its en bank Markman decision and who were not the authoring judge
for any of the decisions we studied.
332. Judge Nies served on the Federal Circuit from its inception in 1982 until
1996. On November 1, 1995, Judge Nies took senior status, and died while serving
on August 7, 1996. Briefly, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at A5.
333. Judge Plager took senior status on November 30, 2000. U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at
http://www.fedcir.gov/judg bios.html (last modified Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with
American University Law Review).
334. Judge Prost entered service on Oct. 2001.
335. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Giles S. Rich Dies at 95, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 1999, at A6;
judge Giles S. Rich Succumbs to Illness (Boston Patent Law Ass'n), June 30, 1999, at 1.
Judge Rich served on the Federal Circuit from its inception in 1982 until the last days
of his life in 1999; he died on June 9, 1999.
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APPENDIX C
This Appendix contains the basic data from the detailed review of
the Federal Circuit's claim construction cases from April 1995 to June
2004. It contains data for all the opinions in which the court used
one or more dictionary definitions of a word in a patent claim to
construe an element of that patent claim. Cases are listed first in year
order, then alphabetically by first party name. The italicized portion
of an entry in the "Claim Term" column is the text for which the
court used one or more dictionary definitions. When the court relied
on a dictionary definition for a cognate of the word that appeared in
the patent claim, rather than or in addition to the claim word itself,
the cognate is indicated in brackets.
CASE YEAR CLAIM SOURCE (S) USED JUDGE
TERM
National Presto Indus. v. 1995 means on Webster's Ninth New Newman
Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., said Collegiate Dictionary (1981)
Nos. 92-1388, 92-1476, housing
1995 WL 367072, at *4
n.2 (Fed. Cir.June 20,
1995).
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, 1995 at least 600 Webster's Third New Plager
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581, tpi International Dictionary
36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (1986)
1162, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, 1995 at least Webster's Third New Plager
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 approximate InternationalDictionaqy
n.3, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d ly 600 tpi (1986)
(BNA) 1162,1166 n.3
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
Athletic Alternatives, Inc. 1996 varies Webster's Third New Michel
v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 between International Dictionary
F.3d 1573, 1579, 37 (1976)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Cole v. Kimberly-Clark 1996 perforation Webster's Encyclopedic Rich
Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531, means Unabridged Dictionary
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (1989)
1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
Dana Innovations v. 1996 elongate Webster's Third New Schall
Speakercraft, Inc., No. 95- bar International Dictionary
1472, 1996 WL 748250, (1986)
at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec 2,
1996).
Dana Innovations v. 1996 elongate Webster's Third New Schall
Speakercraft, Inc., No. 95- bar International Dictionary
1472, 1996 WL 748250, (1986)
at *2 (Fed. Cir. Dec 2,
1996).
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CASE YEAR CLAIM SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE
TERM
Great N. Corp. v. Henry 1996 greater Webster's New International Clevenger
Molded Prods., Inc., 94 flexural Dictionary (1932)
F.3d 1569, 1574, 39 cushionin
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997, g/ [
2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996). flexure ]
Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo- 1996 detent Random House Unabridged Bryson
Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d mechanis Dictionary (2d ed. 1993);
1580, 1583, 39 m Webster's Third New
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783, International Dictionary
1786 (Fed. Cir. 1996). (1968);
Dictionary of Mechanical
Engineering (4th ed. 1996)
Maxwell v.j. Baker, Inc., 1996 shoe upper Maribeth Cuccinelli, The Lourie
86 F.3d 1098, 1105, 39 Art & Science of Footwear
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, Manufacturing (Norman V.
1005 (Fed. Cit. 1996). Germany ed., 1974)
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. 1996 a conductor "the dictionary" Lourie
Cypress Semiconductor
Corp., 90 F.3d 1558,
1564, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1492, 1497 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
Yamaha Corp. -. ESS 1996 a stored New IEEE Standard Clevenger
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362, waveshape Dictionary of Electrical and
1996 WL 146499, at *6 table Electronics Terms (5th ed.
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1993)
1996).
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS 1996 a stored New IEEE Standard Clevenger
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362, waveshape Dictionary of Electrical and
1996 WL 146499, at *6 table Electronics Terms (5th ed.
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1993)
1996). 1
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS 1996 a stored New IEEE Standard Clevenger
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362, waveshape Dictionary of Electrical and
1996 WL 146499, at *6 table Electronics Terms (5th ed.
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1993)
1996).
York Prods., Inc. v. Central 1996 a American Heritage Dictionary Rader
Tractor Farm &Family substantial Second College Edition
Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572- part of / (1982);
73, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) [ substantia Webster's Ninth New
1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. ly ] Collegiate Dictionary (1983)
1996).
York Prods., Inc. v. Central 1996 a plurality American Heritage Dictionary Rader
Tractor Farm & Family of... Second College Edition
Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1575, (1982)
40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1619, 1625 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 1996 coherence Handbook of Chemistry & Nies
79 F.3d 1563, 1565 n.1, ength of Physics (63d ed. 1982-83)
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) the beam
1281, 1282 n.1 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
920
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American Permahedge, Inc. 1997 extending American Heritage Dictionary Clevenger
v. Barcana, Inc., 105 F.3d laterally of (2d ed. 1976)
1441, 1444, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614,
1616 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 1997 are secured Webster's II New Riverside Rader
Inc., No. 96-1399, 1997 to University Dictionary (2d ed.
WL 419391, at *8 (Fed. 1988)
Cir. July 14, 1997).
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron 1997 joined in Karl Drlica, Understanding Rich
Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, proper DNA and Gene Cloning. A
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) reading Guide for the Curious (2d
1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. frame ed. 1992)
1997).
Hazani v. United States 1997 integrally Webster's New International Bryson
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 126 formed in Dictionary (2d ed. 1939)
F.3d 1473, 1480, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1358,
1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Hazani v. U.S. Int'l Trade 1997 integrally Webster's New International Bryson
Comm'n, 126 F.3d 1473, formed in Dictionary (2d ed. 1939)
1480, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1358, 1363-64
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1997 integrally Webster's Third New Plager
1048, 1056, 44 formed as International Dictionary
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, aportionof (1986)
1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Johansson v. Rose Displays 1997 absent Webster's Third New Clevenger
Ltd., No. 96-1410, 1997 deformation International Dictionary
WL 437016, at *3 (Fed. or (1966)
Cir. Aug. 5, 1997). destructio
n of
Johansson v. Rose Displays 1997 absent Webster's Third New Clevenger
Ltd., No. 96-1410, 1997 deformati International Dictionary
WL 437016, at *3 (Fed. on or (1966)
Cir. Aug. 5, 1997). destruction
of
Johnstown Am. Corp. v. 1997 longitudina Cyril M. Harris, Dictionary Archer
Trinity Indus., Inc., Nos. I axis of Architecture &
97-1070, 97-1071, 1997 Construction (2d ed. 1993)
WL 291956, at *2 (Fed.
Cir. May 28, 1997).
Kegel Co., Inc. v. AMF 1997 maintenan Webster's Third New Schall
Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d ce assembly International Dictionary
1420, 1427, 44 (1986)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123,
1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
MHB Indus. Corp. v. 1997 across said Webster's Third New Archer
Garberg & Assocs., Inc., common International Dictionary
No. 96-1539, 1997 WL header (1971)
423021, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
July 29, 1997). 1
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TERM
MHB Indus. Corp. v. 1997 bag Webster's Third New Archer
Garberg & Assocs., Inc., International Dictionary
No. 96-1539, 1997 WL (1971)
423021, at *4 (Fed. Cir.
july 29, 1997).
Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon 1997 first Webster's Third New Rader
Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d opening International Dictionary
1420, 1430-31, 44 through (1981)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103,
1112 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Young Dental Mfg. Co., 1997 axial bore Webster's Third New Clevenger
Inc. v. Q3 Special Prods., International Dictionary
Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, (1968)
1142,42 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1589, 1593 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
Action Techs., Inc. v. 1998 type of Webster's New World Schall
Novell Sys., Inc., Nos. 97- conversati Dictionary (3d college ed.
1460, 97-1481, 1998 WL on 1994)
279359, at *5 (Fed. Cir.
May 27, 1998).
Action Techns., Inc. v. 1998 state of the Webster's New World Schall
Novell Sys., Inc., Nos. 97- conversati Dictionary (3d college ed.
1460, 97-1481, 1998 WL on 1994)
279359, at *6 (Fed. Cir.
May 27, 1998).
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 1998 through Webster's I New Riverside Archer
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, [X] to [Y] University Dictionary (1984)
1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1169, 1177 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
Lee's Aquarium &Pet 1998 gravel Annual Book of ASTM Per
Prods., Inc. v. Python Standards, American Society Curian
Prods., Inc., Nos. 97-1278, of Testing Materials (1996);
97-1328, 1998 WL Random House Webster's
129903, at *3 (Fed. Cir. College Dictionary (1991);
Mar. 24, 1998). Webster's New World
Dictionary (3d college ed.
1994);
American Heritage College
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997);
Webster's New World
Dictionary
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 1998 block Encyclopedia of Polymer Per
Huntsman Polymers Corp., copolymer Science (1965) Curiam
157 F.3d 866, 874-75, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1168 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
Societa'perAzioni, 158
F.3d 1243, 1251, 1251
n.4, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1117, 1123, 1123
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
generating
a trigger
signal when
Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1985);
Webster's Third New
International Dictionary
(1993);
Chambers Concise Dictionary
(1992)
Clevenger
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CASE YEAR CLAIM SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE
TERM
Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. 1998 open cold- G.B. Stringfellow & H.T. Michel
United States, 147 F.3d wall Hall, 43J. CRYSTAL
1358, 1363, 1363 n.7, 47 reactor GROWTH 47 (1978)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027, [cold-wall
1030, 1030 n.7 (Fed. Cir. added
1998). during
prosecutio
n history] I
Technology Chems. & 1998 porosity Webster's Third New Schall
Prods., Inc. v. Home gradient International Dictionary
Diagnostics, Inc., Nos. 97- (1986)
1068, 97-1075, 1998 WL
163650, at *6 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 9, 1998).
Trimedyne, Inc. v. Surgical 1998 a hollow, Random House Unabridged Rich
Laser Techs., Inc., No. 96- bulbous Dictionary (2d ed. 1993);
1538, 1998 WL 393864, element Webster's II New Riverside
at *12 (Fed. Cir.July 10, University Dictionary (1984)
1998).
Antonious v. Spalding & 1999 attached Webster's Third New Schall
Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 98- solely to International Dictionary
1478, 1999 WIL 777450, said rear (1971)
at *3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, wall
1999).
Antonious v. Spalding & 1999 attached Webster's Third New Schall
Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 98- solely to International Dictionary
1478, 1999 WL 777450, said rear (1971)
at *3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, wall
1999).
Bickerstaff v. Dr. Shrink, 1999 cowl Webster's Third New Schall
Inc., No. 99-1091, 1999 International Dictionary
WL 693884, at *6 (Fed. (1986)
Cir. Sept. 3, 1999).
Karlin Tech., Inc. v. 1999 series of Webster's Ninth New Rich
Surgical Dynamics, Inc., threads Collegiate Dictionary (1986)
177 F.3d 968,971, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Karlin Tech., Inc. v. 1999 series of McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Rich
Surgical Dynamics, Inc., threads Scientific and Technical
177 F.3d 968, 971, 50 Terms (5th ed. 1994);
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, A. Parish, Mechanical
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Engineer's Reference Book
(11th ed. 1973)
Middleton, Inc. v. 1999 material Webster's Ninth New Clevenger
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. for Collegiate Dictionary (1984)
Co., No. 99-1201, 1999 finishing
WL 1072246, at *4 (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 16, 1999).
National Recovery Techs., 1999 selecting for Webster's New World Gajarsa
Inc. v. Magnetic Separation processing Dictionary (3d college ed.)
Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190,
1195, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1671, 1675 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). _ _ _ _ __ _
2005]
HeinOnline  -- 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 923 2004-2005
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:829
CASE YEAR CLAIM SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE
TERM
Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 1999 flashlight American Heritage Dictionary Mayer
F.3d 1342, 1346, 51 (2d college ed. 1982)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Rival Co. v. Sunbeam 1999 defined by Webster's II New Riverside Lourie
Corp., Nos. 98-1198, 98- the base University Dictionary (1988)
1199, 1999 WL 96416, at
*5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23,
1999).
Ultrak, Inc. v. Radio Eng'g 1999 lens American Heritage Dictionary Rich
Indus., Inc., Nos. 97- window (1969)
1523, 97-1543, 1999 WL means
197173, at *4, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526,
1529 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8,
1999).
Brita Wasser-Filter-Systeme 2000 sleeve Oxford English Dictionary Gajarsa
v. Recovery Eng'g, Inc., (2d ed. 1989)
No. 99-1322, 2000 WL
1375170, at *4 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 21, 2000).
Cortland Line Co., Inc. v. 2000 end plate Webster's Ninth New Rader
Orvis Co., Inc., 203 F.3d Collegiate Dictionary (1990)
1351, 1356, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734,
1737 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Doyle v. Crain Indus., Inc., 2000 at ambient Hawley's Condensed Lourie
No. 00-1103, 2000 WL temperature Chemical Dictionary (12th
1608826, at *4 (Fed. Cir. s ed. 1993)
Oct. 25, 2000).
Doyle v. Crain Indus., Inc., 2000 ejecting Webster's New World Lourie
No. 00-1103, 2000 WL said Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
1608826, at *5 (Fed. Cir. mixture
Oct 25, 2000).
Eisenberg v. A limed, Inc., 2000 trough Webster's New Collegiate Archer
No. 98-1317, 2000 WrL Dictionary (1979)
1119743, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 8, 2000).
Eisenberg v. Alimed, Inc., 2000 hollow Webster's New Collegiate Archer
No. 98-1317, 2000 WL section Dictionary (1979)
1119743, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 8, 2000).
Elekta Instrument S.A. v. 2000 only within Webster's New World Lourie
0. UR. Scientic Int'l, Inc., a zone Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
214 F.3d 1302, 1307, 54 extending
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, between
1913 (Fed. Cir. 2000). latitudes
Elekta Instrument S.A. v. 2000 only Webster's New World Lourie
O.U.R Scientific Int'l, Inc., within a Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
214 F.3d 1302, 1307, 54 zone
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, extending
1913 (Fed. Cir. 2000). between
latitudes
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Elekta Instrument S.A. v. 2000 only Webster's New World Lourie
. UR Scientific Int'l, Inc., within a Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
214 F.3d 1302, 1307, 54 zone
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910, extending
1913 (Fed. Cir. 2000). between
latitudes
Envirco Corp. v. Clestra 2000 Second Webster's Ninth New Rader
Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d baffle Collegiate Dictionary (1990)
1360, 1365, 54 means
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449,
1452 (Fed. Cir 2000).
Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v. 2000 cushion Webster's Third New Bryson
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209 International Dictionary
F.3d 1337, 1340-41, 54 (1976)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437,
1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 2000 shar[ e]ing Webster's Third New Bryson
1367, 1371, 54 International Dictionary
U.S.PQ.2d (BNA) 1664, (1968)
1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Mitek Surgical Prods., Inc. 2000 for boring Webster's Third New Per
v. Arthrex, Inc., Nos. 99- International Dictionary Curiam
1004, 99-1034, 2000 WL (1971)
217637, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 22, 2000).
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. 2000 extending Webster's II New Riverside Michel
Standard Register Co., 229 along said University Dictionary (1984)
F.3d 1091, 1114, 56 end edges
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
NFA Corp. v. Asheboro 2000 intermeshi American Heritage Dictionary Clevenger
Elastics Corp., No. 98- ng with / (1st ed. 1981)
1579, 2000 WL 6217, at [inter- ]
*2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 5,
2000).
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del 2000 ramped Webster's Third New Schall
Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d trailing International Dictionary
1324, 1335,54 edges/ (1986);
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, [ramp ] Modern Dictionary of
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Electronics (6th ed. 1997)
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del 2000 decreasing Webster's Third New Schall
Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d the time International Dictionary
1324, 1338,54 (1986)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v. 2000 automatical Webster's 11 New Riverside Lourie
Lockheed Martin Corp., ly University Dictionary (1988)
Nos. 99-1255, 99-1289,
2000 WL 1205154, at *5
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 23,
2000). 1 1 1 1
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Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. 2000 an inner Webster's New World Lourie
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 body Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
F.3d 958, 965, 55 portion
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513,
1517 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. 2000 to expose Webster's New World Lourie
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
F.3d 958, 967, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513,
1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. 2000 integral Webster's New World Lourie
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 contrastin Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
F.3d 958, 967, 55 g border
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513,
1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. 2000 a liquid McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Michel
Clinical Innovations column/[ Scientific and Technical
Assocs., No. 00-1140, U-tube Terms (5th ed. 1994)
2000 WL 1838586, at *2 manometer
n.2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13,
2000).
UV Coatings, Ltd. v. Sico, 2000 sprayable Webster's Third New Rader
Inc., No. 99-1336, 2000 InternationalDictionary
WL 986965, at *3 (Fed. (1986)
Cir. luly 18, 2000).
Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor 2001 engag[e]in Webster's H New Riverside Rader
Danek Group, Inc., 253 g University Dictionary (1988)
F.3d 1371, 1381, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130,
1137 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Bell Atil. Network Servs., 2001 channel E. Bryan Came, Gajarsa
Inc. v. Covad Telecommunications Primer
Communications Group, (2d ed., Prentice Hall
Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1999);
1276, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d Michael Busby,
(BNA) 1865, 1877 (Fed. DemystifyingATM/ADSL
Cir. 2001). (Wordware 1998)
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King 2001 substantiall American Heritage Dictionary Dyk
Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. y flat Second College Edition
Appx. 894, 898 (Fed. (1982);
Cir. 2001). Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1983)
Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total 2001 a plurality American Heritage Dictionary Dyk
Containment, Inc., 258 of Second College Edition
F.3d 1317, 1328, 1328 (1982);
n.5, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d Random House Webster's
(BNA) 1489, 1497, 1497 Unabridged Dictionary (2d
n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ed. 1988)
Doorking, Inc. v. Sentex 2001 disabl[e]in Webster's Third New Dyk
Sys., Inc., 19 Fed. Appx. g said [X] InternationalDictionary
872, 876 (Fed. Cir. (1968)
2001).
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Dow Chem. Co. v. 2001 codistills.. Hawley's Condensed Gajarsa
Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 .at a Chemical Dictionary (13th
F.3d 1364, 1373, 1373 boiling ed. 1997);
n.8, 1374, 1374 n.9, point / Louis F. Feisner, Organic
1375-76, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d [ distillatio Experiments (Heath 1964);
(BNA) 1609, 1615, 1615 n] Kenneth L. Williamson,
n.8-9, 1616 (Fed. Cir. Macroscale and Microscale
2001). Organic Experiments (2d
ed., Heath 1994);
Hala et al., Vapour Liquid
Equilibrium (2d English ed.
1967)
Durel Corp. v. Osram 2001 metal oxide McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Lourie
Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d coating Scientific and Technical
1298, 1304, 59 Terms (5th ed. 1994);
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, Hawley's Condensed
1242 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ChemicalDictionary (12th
ed. 1993)
Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, 2001 substantial American Heritage College Linn
Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, ly uniform Dictionary (3d ed. 1997)
1366, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d alkaline
(BNA) 1173, 1179 (Fed. detergent
Cir. 2001).
Ecolab, Inc. v. Envirochem, 2001 substantiall American Heritage Dictionary Linn
Inc., 264 F.3d 1358, y uniform Second College Edition
1366,60 U.S.P.Q.2d alkaline (1982);
(BNA) 1173, 1179 (Fed. detergent Webster's Ninth New
Cir. 2001). CollegiateDictionary (9th
ed. 1983)
Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. 2001 lateral Webster's Third New Clevenger
v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d International Dictionary
1311, 1318, 60 (1968)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203,
1208 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 2001 an angular Webster's New Collegiate Linn
F.3d 1334, 1343, 59 medial Dictionary (1975)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, surface
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 2001 an angular Webster's New Collegiate Linn
F.3d 1334, 1343, 59 medial Dictionary (1975)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290, surface
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Generation II Orthotics Inc. 2001 controlled Stedman's Medical Dictionary Linn
v. Medical Tech. Inc., 263 medial (27th ed. 2000)
F.3d 1356, 1367, 59 and lateral
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919, inclination
1928 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Glaxo Group Ltd. v. 2001 essentially Webster's Third New Rader
Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 262 free from International Dictionary
F.3d 1333, 1336, 59 (1986)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950,
1952 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
HeinOnline  -- 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 927 2004-2005
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:829
CASE YEAR CLAIM SOURCE(S) USED JUDGE
TERM
Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC, 2001 vaginal American Heritage Dictionary Dyk
Inc., 25 Fed. Appx. 915, swab (3d ed. 1992);
918 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Dorland's Illustrated Medical
Dictionary (28th ed. 1994)
Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc., 25 2001 extending Webster's Ninth New Clevenger
Fed. Appx. 837, 844 into each Collegiate Dictionary (1985)
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
LNP Eng'g Plastics, Inc. v. 2001 substantiall Webster's Ninth New Rader
Miller Waste Mills, Inc., y Collegiate Dictionary (1983)
275 F.3d 1347, 1354, 61 completely
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1193, wetted
1198 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
MSM Invs. Co. v. 2001 method of Webster's II New Riverside Lourie
Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d feeing University Dictionary (1988)
1335, 1339, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856,
1859 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Oak Tech., Inc. v. 2001 cyclic Encyclopedia of Computer Clevenger
International Trade redundancy Science (1976)
Comm'n, 248 F.3d 1316, checker
1329-30, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1748, 1758 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
Pandrol USA v. Airboss Ry. 2001 adher[e]ing Webster's Ninth New Clevenger
Prods., Inc., 10 Fed. material Colegiate Dictionary (1985)
Appx. 837, 842,842 n. I
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram 2001 portion Random House Unabridged Clevenger
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, Dictionary (2d ed. 1993)
1344, 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1851, 1855 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)
Schaefer Fan Co., Inc. v. J 2001 rings Webster's Ninth New Rader
&D Mfg., 265 F.3d 1282 Collegiate Dictionary (1998);
(Fed. Cir. 2001) American Heritage College
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997)
Tapco Int'l Corp. v. Van 2001 portions Webster's New Collegiate Archer
Mark Prods., 18 Fed. projecting Dictionary (1979)
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. outwardly
Cir. 2001) from
Tapco Int'l Corp. v. Van 2001 portions Webster's New Collegiate Archer
Mark Prods., 18 Fed. projecting Dictionary (1979)
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. outwardly
Cir. 2001) from
Tapco Int'l Corp. v. Van 2001 portions Webster's New Collegiate Archer
Mark Prods., 18 Fed. projecting Dictionary (1979)
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. outwardly
Cir. 2001) from
Union Pac. Res. Co. v. 2001 comparing American Heritage College Rader
Chesapeake Energy Corp., [XI to [Y] Dictionary (3d ed. 1997)
236 F.3d 684, 692, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
928
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Wenger Mfg., Inc. v. 2001 air Webster's New World Lourie
Coating Mach. Sys., Inc., circulat[e]i Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)
239 F.3d 1225, 1232-33, ng
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) means/[
1679, 1684-85 (Fed. Cir. re-]
2001)
Winbond Eles. Corp. v. 2001 adjacent Webster's II New Riverside Rader
International Trade said [X] University Dictionary (1988)
Comm'n, 4 Fed. Appx.
832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
Banyan Licensing, L. C. v. 2002 defines a Oxford English Dictionary Linn
Orthosupport Int'l, Inc., 34 length (2d ed. 1989)
Fed. Appx. 696, 698
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Beckson Marine, Inc. v. 2002 sloping American Heritage Dictionary Rader
ATM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, drain (4th ed. 2000);
723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d groove Oxford English Dictionary
(BNA) 1031, 1034 (Fed. (2d ed. 1989)
Cir. 2002)
Belden Wire & Cable Co. v. 2002 bronze Copper Development Lourie
Cable Design Techs. Corp., Association, Standards
35 Fed. Appx. 905, 907 Handbook: Wrought & Cast
(Fed. Cir. 2002) Copper and Copper Alloy
Products (6th ed. 1994)
Benetton Sportsystem USA, 2002 toe region Webster's Third New Clevenger
Inc. v. First Team Sports, International Dictionary
Inc., 38 Fed. Appx. 599, (1993)
605 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
CCS Fitness, Inc. v. 2002 reciprocati McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Michel
Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d ng member Scientjic and Technical
1359, 1367, 62 Terms (5th ed. 1994);
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, American Heritage Dictionary
1663 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (3d ed. 1996)
Display Techs., Inc. v. Paul 2002 aperture Webster's New World Schall
Fum Ideas, Inc., 60 Fed. Dictionary (3rd college ed.
Appx. 787, 792 (Fed. (1994)
Cir. 2002)
Electro Scientific Indus., 2002 workpiece Oxford English Dictionary Rader
Inc. v. Dynamic Details, (2d ed. 1989);
Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, Robert C. Faber, Landis on
1349, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d Mechanics of Patent Claim
(BNA) 1781, 1784 (Fed. Drafting (4th ed. 2000)
Cir. 2002)
Frank's Casing Crew & 2002 monitoring Random House Webster's Dyk
Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR the torque Unabridged Dictionary (2d
Techs., Ltd., 292 F.3d ed. 1998);
1363, 1374 & n.8, 63 Webster's Ninth New
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, Collegiate Dictionary (9th
1073 & n. 8 (Fed. Cir. ed. 1983)
2002)
Honeywell Inc. v. Victor Co. 2002 placed Webster's Third New Bryson
ofJapan, Ltd., 298 F.3d contiguous International Dictionary
1317, 1324-25, 63 the [X] (1966)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904,
1907-09 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 1 1 1 1
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In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 2002 speech IBM Dictionay of Dyk
1357, 1364, 63 user agent Computing (10th ed. 1994);
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002, / [ speech Van Nostrand Reinhold
2006 (Fed. Cir. 2002) recognition Dictionary ofInformation
] , [ speech Technology (3d ed. 1989)
recognizer I
Inverness Med. Switz. 2002 mobility of Webster's Third New Dyk
GmbH v. Princeton said [X] is International Dictionary
Biomeditech Corp., 309 facilitated (1968);
F.3d 1365, 1370 & n. 2-3, by / Shorter Oxford English
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) [mobile] Dictionary (3d ed. 1947)
1926, 1930 & n. 2-3
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Inverness Med. Switz. 2002 mobility of Webster's Third New Dyk
GmbH v. Princeton said [XI is International Dictionary
Biomeditech Corp., 309 facilitated (1968)
F.3d 1365, 1370 & n. 4, by
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1926, 1930 & n. 4 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Inverness Med. Switz. 2002 onto a Webster's Third New Dyk
GmbH v. Warner Lambert portion International Dictionary
Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378, (1968);
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) Shorter Oxford English
1933, 1936 (Fed. Cir. Dictionary (3d ed. 1947)
2002)
Inverness Med. Switz. 2002 on said [X] Webster's Third New Dyk
GmbH v. Warner Lambert International Dictionary
Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378- (1968);
79,64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) Shorter Oxford English
1933, 1936-37 (Fed. Cir. Dictionary (3d ed. 1947)
2002)
M-3 & Assocs., Inc. v. 2002 restrain the Webster's Third New Dyk
Cargo Sys., Inc., 33 Fed. door International Dictionary
Appx. 513, 515 (Fed. (1968)
Cir. 2002)
Manning v. Paradis, 296 2002 a method Webster's Third New Dyk
F.3d 1098, 1103 & n.1, of treating InternationalDictionary
63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) (1966)
1681, 1685 n. 1 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Masco Corp. v. United 2002 to drive the American Heritage Dictionary Linn
States, 303 F.3d 1316, lever (3d ed. 1996);
1323-24, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d McGraw-HillDictionary of
(BNA) 1182, 1186 (Fed. Scientific and Technical
Cir. 2002) Terms (5th ed. 1994)
Masco Corp. v. United 2002 transmittin Dictionary of Mechanical Linn
States, 303 F.3d 1316, g a force/ Engineering (3d ed. 1985);
1327-28, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d [ transmissi Oxford English Dictionary
(BNA) 1182, 1189 (Fed. on] (2d ed. 1989)
Cir. 2002) 1 1 1 1 1
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Masco Corp. v. United 2002 the dial American College Dictionary Linn
States, 303 F.3d 1316, (1970)
1328, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1182, 1189 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Middleton, Inc. v. 2002 uniform Webster's Ninth New Rader
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. flexible Collegiate Dictionary (1985)
Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1387, film
65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1138, 1140 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident 2002 having a New IEEE Standard Clevenger
Microsystems, Inc., 287 coupling Dictionary of Electrical and
F.3d 1062, 1070-71, 62 Electronic Terms (5th ed.
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482, 1993);
1487-88 (Fed Cir. 2002) McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994);
Modern Dictionary of
Electronics (7th ed. 1999)
Nikken USA, Inc. v. 2002 magnetic Serway & Faughn, College Lourie
Robinsons-May, Inc., 51 polarity Physics (4th ed. 1995)
Fed. Appx. 874, 881-81
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. 2002 a Webster's Ninth New Rader
Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 31 continuous Collegiate Dictionary (1990)
Fed. Appx. 727, 731 slice
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. 2002 foling Webster's Ninth New Rader
Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 31 Collegiate Dictionary (1990)
Fed. Appx. 727, 730
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Schumer v. Laboratory 2002 or Webster's Third New Dyk
Computer Sys., Inc., 308 International Dictionary
F.3d 1304, 1311, 64 (1967)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832,
1838 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus 2002 wafer Knight's American Lourie
Sys., Inc., 44 Fed. Appx. support Mechanical Dictionary
949, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (1876)
Smith Eng'g Co., Inc. v. 2002 inlet duct American Heritage Dictionary Clevenger
Eisenmann Corp., 28 Fed. (1981)
Appx. 958, 963 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. 2002 repeatedly Modern Dictionary of Linn
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d substantial Electronics (6th ed. 1984)
1193, 1206, 64 ly
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813, simultaneo
1821 (Fed. Cir. 2002) usly
activating!
[ activate]
2005]
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Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. 2002 display Illustrated Dictionary of Linn
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d areas Electronics (3d ed. 1985)
1193,1209,64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813,
1823 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. 2002 background Illustrated Dictionary of Linn
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d area Electronics (3d ed. 1985)
1193, 1209, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813,
1823-24 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Transclean Corp. v. 2002 exhibiting McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Lourie
Bridgewood Servs., Inc., resilient Scientific and Technical
290 F.3d 1364, 1374-75, characteris Terms (5th ed. 1994);
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) tics / American Heritage Dictionary
1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. [resilience] (3d ed. 1992)
2002)
Union Carbide Chems. & 2002 characteriza Webster's Third New Prost
Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell ble by an International Dictionary
Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, efficiency (1993)
1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d equation/
(BNA) 1545, 1552 (Fed. [ characteri
Cir. 2002) ze I
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 2003 non- Webster's Third New Dyk
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d diffusively International Dictionary
1343, 1350, 67 bound (1968)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 2003 non- Webster's Third New Dyk
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d diffusively International Dictionary
1343, 1350, 67 immobilized (1968)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 2003 non- Webster's Third New Dyk
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d diffusively/ International Dictionary
1343, 1350, 67 [ diffusion (1968)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 2003 analyte Skoog et al., Fundamentals Dyk
Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d ofAnalytical Chemistry (7th
1343, 1354, 67 ed. 1996)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec 2003 boot Microsoft Press Computer Michel
Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, selection Dictionary (3d ed.)
1373, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d flag
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 2003 back Webster's Third New Cajarsa
Rockwood Retaining Walls, surface International Dictionary
Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, (1993)
1307-08, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1871 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) 1 1 1 1
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Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 2003 back Webster's Third New Gajarsa
Rockwood Retaining Walls, surface International Dictionary
Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, (1993)
1307-08, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1871 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 2003 a protrusion Webster's Third New Gajarsa
Rockwood Retaining Walls, International Dictionary
Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, (1993)
1308, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 2003 to mate Merriam-Webster's New Gajarsa
Rockwood Retaining Walls, Collegiate Dictionary (10th
Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, ed. 1998)
1309, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 2003 generally Webster's Third New Gajarsa
Rockwood Retaining Walls, parallel International Dictionary
Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, (1993)
1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v. 2003 generally Merriam-Webster's New Gajarsa
Rockwood Retaining Walls, parallel Collegiate Dictionary (10th
Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, ed. 1998)
1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1874 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 2003 circuit Dictionary of Computing Gajarsa
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d (4th ed. 1996)
1364, 1373, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444,
1451 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 2003 interface Dictionary of Computing Gajarsa
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d circuit/[ in (4th ed. 1996);
1364, 1374, 66 terface I Modern Dictionary of
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, Electronics (7th ed. 1999)
1452 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 2003 serial data Microsoft Computer Gajarsa
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d packet Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)
1364, 1375, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444,
1453 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 2003 overlay Microsoft Computer Gajarsa
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)
1364, 1376, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444,
1453 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan 2003 overlaid Microsoft Computer Gajarsa
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d signals/[ o Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)
1364, 1376, 66 verlay I
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444,
1453 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
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Apex Inc. v. Raritan 2003 switch Microsoft Computer Gajarsa
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)
1364, 1376-77, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444,
1454 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Arlington Indus., Inc. v. 2003 capable of Random House Unabridged Linn
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., flexing Dictionary (2d ed. 1993)
345 F.3d 1318, 1326, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439,
1444 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Bell Communications 2003 derived Webster's Third New Clevenger
Research, Inc. v. Fore Sys., from International Dictionary
Inc., 62 Fed. Appx. 951, (1993)
959 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Boehringer Ingelheim 2003 isolat[e]ing Dictionary of Microbiology Clevenger
Vetmedica, Inc. v. Schering- and Molecular Biology (2d
Plough Corp., 320 F.3d ed. 1987);
1339, 1346-47, 65 Random House College
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, Dictionary (1980)
1965-66 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Bowers v. Baystate Techs., 2003 plurality Oxford English Dictionary Rader
Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1332 (2d ed. 1989)
(Fed. Cir. 2003)
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. 2003 remote Webster's Third New Linn
Intuitive Surgical, Inc., location International Dictionary
326 F.3d 1215, 1221, 66 (1993)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1517,
1521 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Deere & Co. v. Toro Co., 2003 pivotably Webster's Third New Schall
57 Fed. Appx. 442, 447 attached International Dictionary
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (1986)
Deering Precision 2003 substantiall Webster's New 20th Century Gajarsa
Instruments, LLC. v. Vector y in [X] Dictionary (1983)
Distribution Sys., Inc. 347
F.3d 1314, 1323, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1716,
1722 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com 2003 electronic Merriam-Webster's New Dyk
Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, multi- Collegiate Dictionary (10th
1367, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d function ed. 1999);
(BNA) 1947, 1949 (Fed. card Random House Webster's
Cir. 2003) Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1998);
Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)
Ferguson Beauregard/Logic 2003 normal Webster's Third New Linn
Controls, Inc. v. Mega Sys. plunger International Dictionary
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, performan (1966)
1339, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d ce
(BNA) 1001, 1009 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
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Ferguson Beauregard/Logic 2003 predetermin Webster's Third New Linn
Controls, Inc. v. Mega Sys. ed plunger International Dictionary
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, performan (1966)
1340, 69 U.SP.Q.2d ce
(BNA) 1001, 1010 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Genzyme Corp. v. 2003 chromoso Benjamin Lewin, Genes IV Rader
Transkaryotic Therapies, mally (1990)
Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, integrated
1098, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d / [ integrati
(BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. on]
Cir. 2003)
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. 2003 hydroxyprop Michael Ash & Irene Ash, Newman
Andrx Pharms., Inc., 344 yl Handbook of Pharmaceutical
F.3d 1226, 1229, 68 methylcellul Additives (1995)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302, ose
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. 2003 high McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Schall
v. UA-Columbia frequency Scientific and Technical
Cablevision, Inc., 336 F.3d carrier Terms (1974);
1308, 1315-16, 1316 n. 7, Webster's Seventh New
67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) Collegiate Dictionary (1967);
1385, 1390 & n. 7 (Fed. Oxford English Dictionary;
Cir. 2003) 1 Dictionary oElectronics
Libman Co. v. Quickie 2003 surround Webster's II New College Rader
Mfg. Co., 74 Fed. Appx. the [X] Dictionary (1995)
900, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Moba, B. V. v. Diamond 2003 holding Oxford English Dictionary Per
Automation Inc., 325 F.3d stations / (2d ed. 1989) Curiam
1306, 1315, 66 tohold
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429,
1435 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Moba, B. V. v. Diamond 2003 to urge the Oxford English Dictionary Per
Automation Inc., 325 F.3d [X] (2d ed. 1989) Curiam
1306, 1316-17, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429,
1436 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Nautilus Group, Inc. v. 2003 in American Heritage Dictionary Rader
Icon Health & Fitness, cantilevered Second College Edition
Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 691, fashion (1986);
692-93 (Fed. Cir. 2003) McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (3d ed. 1984);
Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1986);
Wordsworth Dictionary of
Science and Technology
(1995);
Marks' Standard Handbook
for Mechanical Engineers
(9th ed. 1987);
McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of
Science and Technology (7th
ed. 1992)
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Omega Eng'g, Inc. v. 2003 the Webster's Third New Clevenger
Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d periphery International Dictionary
1314, 1322,67 (1993)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 76 2003 oligonucleot Melloni's Illustrated Medical Rader
Fed. Appx. 293, 296-97, ide Dictionary (1979);
297 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Dorland's Illustrated Medical
Dictionary (26th ed. 1981);
Stedman's Medical Dictionary
(24th ed. 1982);
Stedman's Medical Dictionary
I (26th ed. 1995)
Pinnacle Pigging Sys., Inc. 2003 after Webster's Third New Per
v. Eliminator Pigging Sys. inflat[e] ion International Dictionary Curiam
USA, Inc., 55 Fed. Appx. of (1968)
943, 944-45 (Fed. Cir.
2003)
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon 2003 integrated New rEEE Standard Rader
Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, circuit Dictionary ofElectrical and
1091, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d device Electronic Terms (5th ed.
(BNA) 1705, 1711 (Fed. 1993);
Cir. 2003) IBM Dictionary of
I Computing (10th ed. 1994)
Rambus Inc. v. lnfineon 2003 bus New IEEE Standard Rader
Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081, Dictionary of Electrical and
1094, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d Electronic Terms (5th ed.
(BNA) 1705, 1713-14 1993)
(Fed. Cir. 2003)
Simmons, Inc. v. 2003 a bottom for American Heritage College Per
Bombardier, Inc., 73 Fed. [X] Dictionary (3d ed. 1993) Curiam
Appx. 421, 423 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
System Div., Inc. v. Teknek 2003 permitting Webster's Third New Dyk
LLC, 59 Fed. Appx. 333, ready International Dictionary
339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003) removal (1968);
Random House Webster's
Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1998)
Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 2003 inboard Webster's New 20th Century Archer
331 F.3d 851, 854, 66 side flange Dictionary (2d ed. 1962)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943,
1946 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Animatics Corp. v. 2004 modular Webster's Seventh New Schall
Quicksilver Controls, Inc., motor Collegiate Dictionary (1976)
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 665 body
(Fed. Cir. 2004)
Animatics Corp. v. 2004 modular Webster's Seventh New Schall
Quicksilver Controls, Inc., control Collegiate Dictionary (1976)
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 662, unit
664-65 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Animatics Corp. v. 2004 connected Webster's Seventh New Schall
Quicksilver Controls, Inc., to Collegiate Dictionary (1976)
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 665-
67 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
936
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Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. 2004 surrender Barron's Dictionary of Bryson
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 value Insurance Terms (4th ed.
F.3d 1367, 1372, 69 protected 2000)
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996, investment
1999 (Fed. Cir. 2004) credits
Edwards Sys. Tech., Inc. v. 2004 specularly- Photonics Dictionary (2000) Archer
Digital Control Sys., Inc., reflective
99 Fed. Appx. 911,912- surface/[
13 (Fed. Cir. May 18, specular
2004) reflection]
[ specular
I reflector ]
Globetrotter Software, Inc. 2004 a message Random House Webster's Dyk
v. Elan Computer Group, preventing Unabridged Dictionary (2d
Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, said copy ed. 1998);
1380,70 U.S.P.Q.2d Webster's Third New
(BNA) 1161, 1171 (Fed. International Dictionary
Cir. 2004) (2002)
Goldenberg v. Cytogen, 2004 beta-subunit Dorland's Illustrated Medical Gajarsa
Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, Dictionary (29th ed. 2000)
1165, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1255, 1260 (Fed.
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